Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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In this appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the defendant, Paul Curtis Pemberton, contested his federal conviction for a murder committed in McIntosh County, Oklahoma in 2004. The case was influenced by the Supreme Court decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma (2020), which confirmed that the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Reservation covered a larger area of eastern Oklahoma than previously acknowledged by state and federal governments. This ruling impacted many crimes that had been prosecuted in state courts but were actually committed within tribal jurisdictions. Pemberton, an enrolled member of the Creek Nation, argued that his crime fell within this category and should have been prosecuted in federal court under the Major Crimes Act.The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, ruling that the state officers involved in Pemberton’s arrest and the subsequent collection of evidence had acted in good faith, based on the prevailing legal understanding at the time. The court noted that the officers could not have known that the Major Crimes Act barred state jurisdiction over the crime as the reservation boundaries were not clarified until the McGirt decision in 2020.The court also rejected Pemberton’s argument that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation during his sentencing. The court found that Pemberton's request to represent himself was made with the intention to delay the proceedings and was not related to the sentencing hearing. Therefore, the lower court's decision to deny his request was affirmed. View "United States v. Pemberton" on Justia Law

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In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the defendant, Donavan Jay White Owl, appealed an order of the district court denying his motion to dismiss an indictment based on the Double Jeopardy Clause. White Owl had been indicted for felony murder and arson within Indian Country. A mistrial was declared during the initial trial after a dispute over White Owl’s access to information about a prosecution witness. White Owl argued that a new trial would violate his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution.The Appeals Court, however, ruled that White Owl had impliedly consented to the mistrial. The court noted that while the defendant did not expressly request a mistrial, his actions and responses during the proceedings indicated his implicit agreement. Specifically, when the district court declared its intention to declare a mistrial and asked the parties for their views, White Owl did not object but instead emphasized the need for more time to prepare for cross-examination of a prosecution witness.In light of this, the court concluded that White Owl's lack of objection amounted to implied consent to a mistrial. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order denying White Owl's motion to dismiss the indictment based on the Double Jeopardy Clause. View "United States v. Donavan White Owl" on Justia Law

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In this case, Mike Austin Anderson, the defendant, was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, and using a gun during a crime of violence. These charges stemmed from an incident that took place on the Choctaw Indian Reservation in Mississippi, where Anderson shot Julian McMillan after an argument. On appeal, Anderson contested that the district court erred in ruling that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence for the jury to return guilty verdicts, despite the court's self-defense instruction. He also argued that the district court wrongly denied his pretrial motion to recuse the lead prosecutor and the entire United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Mississippi due to a conflict of interest. Anderson claimed that the lead prosecutor had previously represented him and his father while working as a public defender in Choctaw Tribal Court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the evidence against Anderson was sufficient and that the district court did not err in denying his recusal motion. The appellate court found no substantial relationship between the prosecutor's prior representation of Anderson and the current federal prosecution against him. View "USA v. Anderson" on Justia Law

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Defendant-appellant Kenneth Walker appealed his conviction and sentence for assault resulting in serious bodily injury within Indian country. Walker lived "off and on" with his adult niece, Victoria Dirickson. Walker asked Dirickson for a set of house keys. She declined because “[i]t was [her] only day off, and [she] really didn’t feel like getting out and making a copy” of the keys. Walker became “[r]eally aggravated,” and an argument ensued in the living room, which lead to the assault charges at issue in this case. A grand jury indicted Walker on one count of assault resulting in serious bodily injury within Indian country. The indictment alleged Walker was a non-Indian and Dirickson was Indian. A jury found Walker guilty as charged. On appeal, Walker: (1) challenged the district court's jurisdiction because it erred in admitting Dirickson's Certificate of Degree of Indian Blood (“CDIB”) and tribal registration cards; (2) the district court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony of a medical expert; (3) the district court abused its discretion in failing to give a unanimity-of-means jury instruction; (4) abused its discretion in failing to consider sentencing disparities arising from a possible sentence in a state case; and (5) Plainly erred in imposing an anger management condition of supervised release due to insufficient notice, and improper delegation of authority to the Probation Office. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Walker's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law

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Defendant’s mother called local dispatch and said an officer needed to come by because her son was “acting up.” A Bureau of Indian Affairs Officer was dispatched to the home, learning on the way that Defendant had an active tribal arrest warrant. Defendant’s mother invited Defendant into the living room and told Defendant to join them. The officer told Defendant he was “going to have to take you because you got that warrant.” Defendant fled to the garage, pursued by the officer, where Defendant knocked the officer down and escaped. Defendant was charged with forcibly assaulting, resisting, opposing, impeding, intimidating, or interfering with a federal officer and inflicting bodily injury. The jury convicted him of the lesser included offense of forcible assault of a federal officer involving physical contact. The district court sentenced Defendant to 44 months’ imprisonment. He appealed, raising numerous evidentiary issues and challenging the assessment of a two-level sentencing increase.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, the amicable conversation -- dominated by Defendant-- occurred in his mother’s home, a non-custodial atmosphere. The officer testified he did not know what the warrant was based on. Defendant fled only after the officer later told him he would be arrested, confirming that Defendant initially believed or at least hoped that he could avoid immediate arrest. Further, the court explained that even if Defendant was in custody, follow-up questions to clarify ambiguity do not amount to “interrogation” unless “their point is to enhance the defendant’s guilt.” The court concluded the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. View "United States v. Jade LaRoche" on Justia Law

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Defendant-appellant Michael David Jackson was convicted and sentenced for several offenses stemming from the sexual abuse of his young niece, including two counts of possession of child pornography. On appeal Jackson argued, and the government conceded, that the possession convictions were multiplicitous and violated the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause. To this the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and therefore remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate one of these convictions. Jackson also challenged his sentence, contending: it was procedurally unreasonable because the application of several sentencing enhancements constituted impermissible double counting; and it was substantively unreasonable. The Tenth Circuit noted the district court will have discretion to consider the entire sentencing package on remand. The Court rejected these challenges and concluded that the sentence imposed was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

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A district court conducted two hours of voir dire in a courtroom closed to the public and broadcasted live over an audio feed. After Defendant Quentin Veneno, Jr. objected, the district court concluded that the dangers of the COVID-19 pandemic justified its closure of the courtroom, but also provided a video feed for the rest of trial. Although Defendant objected to the initial audio-only feed after the initial two hours of voir dire, he never requested that the district court restart jury selection or moved for a mistrial. Defendant appealed both his conviction and challenged Congress’s constitutional authority to criminalize the conduct of Indians on tribal land, whether a previous conviction can be a predicate offense for 18 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) convictions, and whether admission of other-act evidence met the rigors of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "United States v. Veneno" on Justia Law

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Defendant Diamond Britt was convicted of first-degree murder in Indian Country, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment. Britt appealed, arguing, in pertinent part, that the district court erred by refusing his counsel’s request to instruct the jury on the theory of imperfect self-defense. After review of the trial court record, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Britt that the district court erred in this regard. Consequently, the Court remanded the case to the district court with directions to vacate the judgment and conduct a new trial. View "United States v. Britt" on Justia Law

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Petitioner applied to the trial court in March 2022 to change his name. On the ground that Petitioner has “outstanding warrant(s),” the trial court denied Harris’s petition.   The Second Appellate District affirmed because there was no abuse of discretion. The court explained that by statute, it was proper for the trial court to check law enforcement records when considering Petitioner’s petition to change his name. The California Legislature has directed courts to use the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) and Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) to determine whether a name change applicant must register as a sex offender. View "In re Harris" on Justia Law

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Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District of South Dakota challenging the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court’s exercise of jurisdiction in a custody matter involving his minor daughter, C.S.N. Petitioner claimed that the Tribal Court’s refusal to recognize and enforce North Dakota state court orders awarding him custody of C.S.N. violated the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. Section 1738A. The district court granted summary judgment to the Tribal Court after concluding that the PKPA does not apply to Indian tribes. Petitioner appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the PKPA does not apply to Indian tribes. As a result, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court is not obligated under that statute to enforce the North Dakota court orders awarding custody of C.S.N. to Petitioner. The district court properly granted summary judgment to the Tribal Court. The court further explained that its conclusion that the PKPA does not apply to Indian tribes is further supported by the fact that when Congress intends for tribes to be subject to statutory full-faith-and-credit requirements, it expressly says so. View "Aarin Nygaard v. Tricia Taylor" on Justia Law