Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was whether Washington State courts have jurisdiction over a civil case arising out of a contract in which the tribal corporation waived its sovereign immunity and consented to jurisdiction in Washington State courts. The Washington Supreme Court held that it did not infringe on the sovereignty of the tribe to honor its own corporation's decision to enter into a contract providing for jurisdiction in Washington State courts. View "Outsource Servs. Mgmt. v. Nooksack Bus. Corp." on Justia Law

The Ho-Chunk Nation, a federally recognized Indian Tribe, operates casinos in Wisconsin and nets more than $200 million annually from its gambling operations. Cash Systems, one of three businesses involved in this case, engaged in issuing cash to casino customers via automated teller machines and kiosks, check-cashing, and credit- and debit-card advances. Whiteagle, a member of the Nation, held himself out as an insider and offered vendors an entrée into the tribe’s governance and gaming operations. Cash Systems engaged Whiteagle in 2002 as a confidential consultant. Cash Systems served as the Nation’s cash-access services vendor for the next six years, earning more than seven million dollars, while it paid Whiteagle just under two million dollars. Whiteagles’s “in” was his relationship with Pettibone, who had been serving in the Ho-Chunk legislature since 1995. Ultimately, Whiteagle, Pettibone, and another were charged with conspiracy (18 U.S.C. 371) to commit bribery in connection with the contracts with the Ho-Chunk Nation and substantive bribery (18 U.S.C. 666). Whiteagle was also charged with tax evasion and witness tampering. Pettibone pleaded guilty to corruptly accepting a car with the intent to be influenced in connection with a contract. Whiteagle admitted that he had solicited money and other things of value for Pettibone from three companies, but denied actually paying bribes to Pettibone and insisted that he and Pettibone had advocated for Whiteagle’s clients based on what they believed to be the genuine merits of those clients. Convicted on all counts, Whiteagle was sentenced, below-guidelines, to 120 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence on the bribery charges, the loss calculation, and admission of certain evidence.View "United States v. Whiteagle" on Justia Law

In 1986, the City of Duluth and the Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa (the Band) entered into several agreements establishing a joint venture to operate gaming activities in Duluth. The agreements required that the Band seek approval before creating any additional Indian Country. In 1994, the Band and the City created a series of new agreements and amendments to the 1986 agreements. In 2010, the Band acquired a plot of land. The Band sought to have the plot placed in trust but did not seek the City’s approval to do so, as required by the 1986 agreements. The City commenced this action in state district court seeking a court order requiring the Band to withdraw its trust application. The district court dismissed the lawsuit, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Band had only consented to suit in federal court in the 1994 agreements. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision and reinstated the district court’s judgment for the Band, holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction to decide the issue of whether the Band breached the 1986 agreements because it required interpretation of the 1994 agreements, which was a matter vested in the federal courts. View "City of Duluth v. Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Robert Bonnet is a petroleum landman who conducted business through Bobby Bonnet Land Services. In 2008, Plaintiffs entered into a written contract with the Energy and Minerals Department of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation to serve collectively as an independent contractor and consultant. When the Tribe terminated this contract in 2009, Plaintiffs sued various companies and individuals (but not the Tribe) in federal court, alleging these defendants caused the Tribe to terminate this contract prematurely. Plaintiffs served the Tribe with a non-party subpoena duces tecum requesting documents relevant to their suit. The Tribe moved to quash the subpoena based on the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. The district court denied the Tribe's motion, but modified the subpoena to limit or strike requests it deemed overbroad. The Tribe appealed. The issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether a subpoena duces tecum served on a non-party Tribe seeking documents relevant to a civil suit in federal court is itself a "suit" against the Tribe triggering tribal sovereign immunity. Pursuant to the collateral order doctrine, the Court concluded, yes, it is a "suit" against the Tribe. Therefore the Court reversed the district court's denial of the Tribe's motion to quash based on tribal immunity. View "Bonnet v. Ute Indian Tribe" on Justia Law

Leisnoi, Inc. retained the law firm of Merdes & Merdes to represent it in litigation against Omar Stratman over its certification of and title to certain lands Leisnoi claimed under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. Leisnoi and Merdes entered a contingency fee agreement under which, if Leisnoi was successful, Merdes would receive an interest in the lands Leisnoi obtained or retained. The case was resolved in 1992 in favor of Leisnoi, although Stratman appealed and the related litigation continued for another decade. In October 2008, the Stratman litigation finally concluded in Leisnoi's favor. The following year, Merdes moved the superior court to issue a writ of execution. Leisnoi opposed the motion, arguing among other things that the judgment was void under 43 U.S.C. 1621(a)'s restrictions on contingency fee contracts involving Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act lands. In January 2010, the Superior Court issued an order denying Leisnoi's motion and granting Merdes's motion to execute. Six months later, Leisnoi paid Merdes the remaining balance. Leisnoi then appealed the superior court's ruling. The issue before the Supreme Court concerned questions of waiver and whether the superior court's judgment was void or voidable. Upon review of the matter, the Court concluded: (1) Leisnoi did not waive its right to appeal by paying Merdes the balance due on the judgment; (2) an Arbitration Panel's fee award and the superior court's 1995 entry of judgment violated 43 U.S.C. 1621(a)'s prohibition against attorney contingency fee contracts based on the value of Native lands that were subject to the Act; (3) the superior court's 2010 order granting Merdes's motion to execute on the 1995 judgment separately violated the Act's prohibition against executing on judgments arising from prohibited attorney contingency fee contracts; (4) notwithstanding the illegality of the Arbitration Panel fee award and the 1995 judgment, Leisnoi was not entitled to relief pursuant to Civil Rule 60(b) (the 1995 order was voidable rather than void for purposes of Civil Rule 60(b), and therefore not subject to attack under Civil Rule 60(b)(4)); and (5) Leisnoi was not entitled to relief under Civil Rule 60(b)(5) or 60(b)(6). Accordingly, Merdes was ordered to return Leisnoi's payment of the balance on the judgment, but Leisnoi was not entitled to recover payments made prior to the issuance of the writ of execution. View "Leisnoi, Inc. v. Merdes & Merdes, P.C." on Justia Law

Agreeing with the Board, the district court ruled that Quantum's 1996 Management Agreement with the Pueblo was null and void for lack of approval by the Secretary as required by 25 U.S.C. 81, and that it was incapable of being validated by the 2000 amendment to section 81, the application of which would be impermissibly retroactive. Applying Landgraf v. USI Film Products, the court concluded that Congress made no clear statement that it intended the 2000 amendment to apply retroactively. The court also concluded that, because the 1996 Agreement required Secretarial approval that was never obtained and the parties agreed that the Agreement would be valid without Secretarial approval under section 81 as amended, the application of the new law would give life to a null and void agreement, thereby attaching new legal consequences to it. Although the Pueblo may have voluntarily undertaken the stated duties and liabilities under the Agreement, such an agreement was null and void without Secretarial approval before 2000. Since the Secretary never approved the Agreement, any legislative validation of the duties or liabilities attached to it was impermissibly retroactive. Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment. View "Quantum Entertainment Ltd. v. Dept. of the Interior" on Justia Law

On December 14, 2012, the district court issued an alternative writ of mandate directing several irrigation districts to comply with Mont. Code Ann. 85-7-1956 and -1957 before executing a water use agreement with the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Nation and the United States. On February 15, 2013, the district court issued another writ of mandate that rescinded and superseded the alternative writ of mandate. The writ of mandate enjoined the irrigation districts from entering into the proposed agreement. The Supreme Court vacated both the district court's writ of mandate and injunction and the court's alternative writ of mandate, holding that the district court (1) issued an appealable order, making the appeal from the district court's writ of mandate and injunction as well as the issue of whether the statutes apply to the water use agreement properly before the Court; (2) improperly granted the writ of mandate and injunction; and (3) incorrectly compelled the irrigation districts to comply with sections 85-7-1956 and -1957 before they executed the water use agreement. View "W. Mont. Water Users Ass'n, LLC v. Mission Irrigation Dist." on Justia Law

This case concerned a circuit court's order to transfer to a tribal court a civil suit that was brought against a tribally owned entity by a nonmember of the tribe. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it transferred the action to tribal court. At issue was the interpretation and application of Wis. Stat. 801.54, which authorizes the circuit court, in its discretion, to transfer an action to the tribal court and sets forth the conditions for doing so. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the facts and the applicable law were not fully stated and considered together in making the determinations that the statute requires, the order to transfer was an erroneous exercise of the circuit court's discretion. Remanded. View "Kroner v. Oneida Seven Generations Corp." on Justia Law

Michael McCrary sued Ivanof Bay Village (Ivanof Bay) and its president, Edgar Shangin, under two contracts, alleging breaches of the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing. The superior court dismissed the suit based on sovereign immunity. McCrary appealed the sovereign immunity ruling, arguing that even though the United States Department of Interior lists Ivanof Bay as a federally recognized Indian tribe, Ivanof Bay has not been formally designated as a federally recognized tribe. The Supreme Court previously concluded Alaska Native tribes recognized by Congress or the Executive Branch are sovereign under federal law, and McCrary did not demonstrate that conclusion should be overturned. The Court therefore affirmed the superior court's dismissal of McCrary's suit.View "McCrary v. Ivanof Bay Village" on Justia Law

Defendant Linus Poitra appealed a default judgment entered by the district court regarding a lease between Plaintiff Darrel Gustafson as lessee and Leon and Linus Poitra as lessors. Linus Poitra argued the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to enter the default judgment because the Poitras were members of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, and the land subject to the lease is Indian-owned fee land located within the boundaries of the Turtle Mountain Indian Reservation. Linus Poitra argued the default judgment infringed upon tribal sovereignty because of cases pending in the Turtle Mountain Tribal Court. Upon review of the applicable legal authority and the evidence presented at trial, the Supreme Court vacated the default judgment finding that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the lease.View "Gustafson v. Poitra" on Justia Law