Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Derrick Jim of aggravated sexual abuse occurring in the Navajo Nation. Jim initially pled guilty to this offense, but later withdrew his plea and went to trial. On appeal, Jim claimed that the trial court erred when it let the Government present evidence of the admissions he made in his plea agreement and during his plea colloquy to the jury, despite Jim waiving his Rule 410 protections as part of the plea agreement underlying his (withdrawn) guilty plea. In its cross-appeal, the Government challenged Jim’s 360-month prison sentence, arguing that the district court erred in calculating Jim’s offense level under the sentencing guidelines. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court did not err in enforcing Jim’s Rule 410 waiver by allowing the Government to present to the jury Jim’s prior admissions of guilt. The Court agreed with the Government that the district court erred when it held that, in determining whether a two-offense-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2A3.1(b)(4)(B) for causing the victim serious bodily injury applied in Jim’s case, the court could not consider any injuries directly resulting from the sexual abuse for which Jim was convicted. Thus, the case was remanded for resentencing so the district court could determine, in the first instance, whether that enhancement was warranted in this case and, if so, the impact of that enhancement on Jim’s sentence. View "United States v. Jim" on Justia Law

Officer Glen Gutierrez, on duty as a full-time salaried police officer of the Pueblo of Pojoaque and also commissioned as a Santa Fe County deputy sheriff, was patrolling a portion of U.S. Highway 84/285 located within the exterior boundary of the Pojoaque Pueblo. Officer Gutierrez observed Jose Loya making a dangerous lane change and pulled Loya over. Once stopped, Officer Gutierrez asked Loya to step out of his vehicle and informed Loya that he was under arrest for reckless driving in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-113 (1987), a state law. Officer Gutierrez placed Loya in the back of his patrol vehicle and transported Loya to the Pojoaque Tribal Police Department for processing. Loya, a non-Indian, was not subject to prosecution for violation of tribal law, so he was transported from the Pueblo to the Santa Fe County Adult Detention Center where he was incarcerated. Ultimately, Officer Gutierrez prosecuted Loya for reckless driving in Santa Fe County Magistrate Court. The issue this case presented for the New Mexico Supreme Court's review centered on a a county’s legal obligation when a non-Indian, arrested by a tribal officer and prosecuted in state court for state traffic offenses, sues the arresting tribal officer for federal civil rights violations. Specifically, the issue the Court identified in this case was when the county has an obligation under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, to provide that tribal police officer with a legal defense in the federal civil rights action. The district court as well as the Court of Appeals found no such legal duty, in part because it concluded that the tribal officer was not a state public employee as defined in the NMTCA. The Supreme Court held the opposite, finding clear evidence in the text and purpose of the NMTCA requiring the county to defend the tribal officer, duly commissioned to act as a deputy county sheriff, under these circumstances. View "Loya v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

Schlemm, a member of the Navajo Tribe, and a prisoner, sought an order requiring the prison to accommodate his religious practices under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. Members of the Tribe honor the dead through dancing, praying, and eating traditional foods. Wisconsin concedes that this celebration is religious and that Schlemm sincerely believes that “traditional foods” should include game meat. The prison rejected his request for game meat or ground beef and his offer to secure a sealed platter from an outside vendor. The prison permits Jewish inmates to have outside vendors supply sealed Seder platters. Defendants maintain that serving venison would be too expensive, would exceed the capacity of institutional kitchens, and would violate a rule limiting prison foods to those certified by the USDA. The district court granted summary judgment, ruling that the denial does not impose a “substantial burden” on Schlemm’s religious exercise; the state has a “compelling governmental interest” in costs and using USDA-inspected meats; and that the denial is the “least restrictive means” of furthering those interests. The Seventh Circuit remanded, holding that the state was not entitled to summary judgment and ordering a preliminary injunction allowing Schlemm to order venison and to wear a multicolored headband while praying in his cell and during group ceremonies. View "Schlemm v. Frank" on Justia Law

Appellant Linda Vista Village San Diego Homeowners Association, Inc. appealed the dismissal of their request for a declaratory judgment and other relief. Appellant's complaint was filed in 2012 against defendants-respondents the City of San Diego and the predecessors of Tecolote Investors, LLC. Members of the HOA are sublessees of mobile home park lots subject to a 1979 master lease between the City and Tecolote Investors. Appellant argued that the park site was located on and should have been properly characterized as "Pueblo Lands" within the meaning of the San Diego City Charter (section 219). Section 219 and its predecessors since 1909 have been applied to certain Pueblo lands north of the San Diego River to require approval by City Council ordinance and City voters for any sale or lease of them for more than 15 years. Since no voter approval was sought or obtained for this transaction, Appellant alleged the City was without power to enter into the existing 55-year master lease of the park site with the Landlord Defendants (or their predecessors). As a consequence, Appellant sought decrees to invalidate the master lease and consequently its subleases, specifically attacking the 1983 City-approved provisions allowing periodic rent increases. Appellant also claims entitlement to various other types of relief, such as damages. In light of the applicable authorities, the recorded title documents for the parcels demonstrate as a matter of law that on this record, the restrictions of section 219 did not apply, the face of the pleading failed to state its causes of action, and the Landlord Defendants' demurrer was correctly sustained without leave to amend. Based on de novo analysis (akin to judgment on the pleadings),the Court of Appeal concluded the record fully supported the dismissal of all causes of action as to the City too. View "Linda Vista Village San Diego HOA v. Tecolote Investors" on Justia Law

Brooks, a member of the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community, is incarcerated for Minnesota convictions of first-degree DWI and assaulting an officer. The Minnesota Department of Corrections (MDOC) requires a chemical-dependency assessment. Brooks was ordered to complete treatment in order to be transferred to a lower-security prison, qualify for work release, and avoid disciplinary sanctions. Brooks began treatment in 2011, but, in 2012, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983; the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc; the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. 1996; and the Minnesota Constitution. He claimed that his required chemical-dependency program deprived him of his right to the free exercise of his religion. The district court dismissed some claims and granted summary judgment for the defendants on all others. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, because, based on the complaint, the court and the defendants could not discern what beliefs he has or what faith he professes. View "Brooks v. Roy" on Justia Law

An election dispute arose about which individuals were properly elected or appointed to govern the Thlopthlocco people. The Tribal Town filed suit in the tribal court of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and, accordingly, voluntarily submitted to that court's jurisdiction. The Tribal Town subsequently concluded it did not want to maintain its suit in tribal court and dismissed its claims. But the defendant in that suit had, by that time, filed cross-claims. Arguing that the Tribal Town's sovereign immunity waiver did not cover proceedings on the cross-claims, the Tribal Town attempted to escape Muscogee court jurisdiction, but, in various decisions, several judges and justices of the Muscogee courts held that they may exercise jurisdiction over the Tribal Town without its consent. The Tribal Town then filed a federal action in the Northern District of Oklahoma against those Muscogee judicial officers, seeking to enjoin the Muscogee courts' exercise of jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the case, finding that the federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction, defendants were entitled to sovereign immunity, the Tribal Town had failed to join indispensable parties, and the Tribal Town had failed to exhaust its remedies in tribal court. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded, however, that the Tribal Town presented a federal question and that the other claims do not require dismissal. But the Court agreed the Tribal Town should have exhausted its remedies in tribal court while its federal court action was abated. View "Thlopthlocco Tribal Town v. Stidham, et al" on Justia Law

In 1976, Gail Kennedy, a professor at the University of California-Los Angeles ("UCLA"), led an archaeological field excavation project on the property of the Chancellor's official residence at the University of California-San Diego. During the excavation, the archaeological team discovered a double burial site and uncovered two human skeletons (the "La Jolla remains"). Scientists estimated the remains were between 8977 to 9603 years old, making them among the earliest known human remains from North or South America. The property on which the La Jolla remains were discovered was aboriginally occupied by members of the Kumeyaay Nation. Since their discovery, the University has maintained custody of the La Jolla remains, but they have been stored at multiple locations, including UCLA, the San Diego Museum of Man, the National Museum of Natural History, and the Smithsonian Institution. Central to the heart of this case was custody of the La Jolla remains. The Tribes and their representatives claimed the right to compel repatriation of the La Jolla remains to one of the Kumeyaay Nation's member tribes. Plaintiffs Timothy White, Robert Bettinger, and Margaret Schoeninger ("the Scientists"), professors in the University of California system, opposed repatriation because they wished to continue to study the La Jolla remains. The issue this case presented to the Ninth Circuit was whether the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act ("NAGPRA") abrogated tribal sovereign immunity and, if not, whether the district court properly dismissed this declaratory judgment action because the tribes and their representatives were indispensable parties under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 and could not be joined in the action. The Court concluded that NAGPRA did not abrogate tribal sovereign immunity and that the affected tribes and their representatives were indispensable parties. Therefore, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "White, et al v. University of California" on Justia Law

The County appealed the district court's order preliminarily enjoining it from foreclosing upon certain real property owned by the Cayuga Nation in order to recover uncollected ad valorem property taxes. The court affirmed the district court's injunction where the court declined, as has the Supreme Court, to read a "commercial activity" exception into the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity from suit. In the absence of a waiver of immunity by the tribe, unless Congress has authorized the suit, precedents demand that the court affirm the district court's injunction of the County's foreclosure proceedings against the Cayuga Nation's property. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Seneca County, New York" on Justia Law

The Minto Tribal Court terminated the parental rights of Edward Parks and Bessie Stearman to their daughter S.P. At the termination hearing, the attorney for Parks and Stearman was not permitted to present oral argument to the tribal court. Parks did not file an appeal with the Minto Court of Appeals and instead brought suit against S.P.'s foster parents, the Simmondses, in the state superior court in an attempt to regain custody of S.P. The Simmondses moved to dismiss Parks's state lawsuit on the basis that the tribal court judgment terminating parental rights was entitled to full faith and credit under the Indian Child Welfare Act. The superior court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that full faith and credit should not be afforded because the tribal court had denied Parks minimum due process by prohibiting his attorney from presenting oral argument on his objections to tribal court jurisdiction based on his status as a non-tribal member. Although the superior court recognized that oral argument is not a per se requirement of minimum due process, the superior court concluded that the denial of oral argument in this case deprived Parks of a meaningful opportunity to be heard because Parks did not receive sufficient notice that his attorney would not be allowed to present oral argument to the tribal court. The Simmondses appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the superior court for further findings. On remand, the superior court reiterated its prior conclusion of a violation of minimum due process and further concluded that the due process error was not harmless because Parks's objections to the Minto Tribal Court's jurisdiction might have had merit. The Simmondses appealed again to the Supreme Court. Because Parks failed to exhaust his remedies in the Minto Court of Appeals, the Court concluded that his state court suit should have been dismissed. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court's decision and remanded for dismissal of Parks's suit. View "Simmonds v. Parks" on Justia Law

The Tribe filed suit against the United States and others alleging, inter alia, violations of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., and federal common law. The Tribe claimed that the Government breached its fiduciary duties under federal law to protect the land and natural resources subject to the aboriginal title of the Tribe. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the Tribe failed to allege "agency action" sufficient to meet the requirements of the sovereign immunity waiver in section 702, which is necessary to maintain its claims against the federal government and its agencies. View "Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of TX v. United States, et al." on Justia Law