Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Roger Barnett served as Second Chief of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation in 2013 and 2014. He pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma to embezzling funds from the Tribe by appropriating to his own use money withdrawn from ATM machines. The sole issue on this appeal was whether the district court properly determined the amount of money embezzled for purposes of calculating Defendant’s offense level and the amount he owed the Tribe in restitution. Defendant argued that the court’s reliance on the presentence report (PSR) and Addendum was improper because the government failed to present at sentencing any evidence of the amount of loss. The Tenth Circuit disagreed: the district court could properly rely on the PSR and Addendum because Defendant did not adequately challenge their recitations of the evidence concerning his defalcations. The only issue that he preserved for appeal was whether the recited evidence sufficed to support the court’s determination of the amount of loss, and the Tenth Circuit held that the evidence was sufficient. View "United States v. Barnett" on Justia Law

Alaska Native tribes filed suit against the Department, challenging the regulation implementing the prohibition barring the Department from taking land into trust for Indian tribes in Alaska. After the district court held that the Department’s interpretation was contrary to law, the Department, following notice and comment, revised its regulations and dismissed its appeal. Alaska intervened and now seeks to prevent any new efforts by the United States to take tribal land to trust within the State's borders. In this case, Alaska intervened in the district court as a defendant and brought no independent claim for relief. The court concluded that once the Department rescinded the Alaska exception, this case became moot. Even assuming, as Alaska argues, that the district court’s interpretation of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), 43 U.S.C. 1601 et seq., injured the State, such injury cannot extend the court's jurisdiction by creating a new controversy on appeal. Accordingly, the court dismissed Alaska's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Akiachak Native Community v. DOI" on Justia Law

Enacted in response to the high incidence of domestic violence against Native American women, 18 U.S.C. 117(a), applies to any person who “commits a domestic assault within . . . Indian country” and who has at least two prior convictions for domestic violence rendered “in Federal, State, or Indian tribal court proceedings.” The Sixth Amendment guarantees indigent defendants appointed counsel in state or federal proceedings in which a term of imprisonment is imposed, but does not apply in tribal-court proceedings. The Indian Civil Rights Act, (ICRA) which governs tribal-court proceedings, includes a right to appointed counsel only for sentences exceeding one year, 25 U.S.C. 1302(c)(2). Supreme Court precedent holds that convictions obtained in state or federal court in violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel cannot be used in subsequent proceedings “to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense” except for uncounseled misdemeanor convictions for which no prison term was imposed. The Ninth Circuit reversed Bryant’s section 117(a) conviction, finding that the Sixth Amendment precluded use of his prior, uncounseled, tribal-court convictions a predicate offenses. The Supreme Court reversed. Because Bryant’s tribal-court convictions complied with ICRA and were valid when entered, use of those convictions as predicate offenses in a section 117(a) prosecution does not violate the Constitution. Bryant’s sentence for violating section 117(a) punishes his most recent acts of domestic assault, not his prior crimes. He suffered no Sixth Amendment violation in tribal court, so he cannot “suffe[r] anew” from a prior deprivation. ICRA sufficiently ensures the reliability of tribal-court convictions, guaranteeing “due process of law,” providing other procedural safeguards, and allowing a prisoner to challenge the fundamental fairness of proceedings in federal habeas proceedings. View "United States v. Bryant" on Justia Law

The Nation filed suit against defendants contending that the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701‐2721, preempts the application of a local anti‐gambling ordinance to a Nation‐owned gaming facility located on land owned by the tribe (the Lakeside facility). The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and, following a motion for reconsideration, concluded that the individual plaintiffs lacked standing. The court concluded that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction, as it was not required to resolve questions of tribal law to hear the lawsuit. The court held that it was entitled to defer to the BIA's recognition of an individual as authorized to act on behalf of the Nation, notwithstanding the limited issue that occasioned that recognition. The court also concluded that the individual plaintiffs have standing to sue because they will suffer an injury distinct from any felt by the Nation. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cayuga Nation v. Tanner" on Justia Law

The defeated faction of the Tribe filed suit arguing that the Department erred in several of its decisions related to choosing the leadership authority for the Tribe by failing to comply with the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. The court concluded that the Tribe’s recent adoption of a new constitution moots this appeal. Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts to deciding live cases or controversies. This rule forecloses the court's ability to reach the merits in this case, because there is no chance that a remand to the Bureau of Indian Affairs would make any difference whatsoever. View "Timbisha Shoshone Tribe v. USDOI" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq., the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA), 42 U.S.C. 1996, the Free Exercise Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. Specifically, plaintiffs sought to prevent the government from prosecuting them under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. 801 et seq., for possessing cannabis for religious or therapeutic use, obtaining cannabis, and cultivating or distributing cannabis consistent with state law. At issue in this appeal is the district court's grant of summary judgment for the government on the RFRA claim. The court concluded that, even assuming such use constitutes an “exercise of religion,” no rational trier of fact could conclude on this record that a prohibition of cannabis use imposes a “substantial burden.” Nothing in the record demonstrates that a prohibition on cannabis forces plaintiffs to choose between obedience to their religion and criminal sanction, such that they are being "coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs." The court failed to see how prohibiting a substance that plaintiffs freely admit is a substitute for peyote would force them to act at odds with their religious beliefs. In light of Holt v. Hobbs, plaintiffs in this case have produced no evidence establishing that denying them cannabis forces them to choose between religious obedience and government sanction. The court rejected plaintiffs' claims under the AIRFA because the Act does not create a cause of action or any judicially enforceable individual rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Oklevueha Native Am. Church v. Lynch" on Justia Law

The Nation filed suit against defendants challenging the constitutionality of H.B. 2534, a law passed by the Arizona legislature that allows a city or town within populous counties to annex certain surrounding, unincorporated lands. The Nation alleges that H.B. 2534 was enacted to block the federal government from taking the 135 acres it purchased into trust on behalf of the Nation. The Nation planned to build a casino on Parcel 2 of the land. This process would render the land part of the Nation’s reservation pursuant to the Gila Bend Indian Reservation Lands Replacement Act, Pub. L. No. 99-503, 100 Stat. 1798. The court concluded that H.B. 2534 stands as a clear and manifest obstacle to the purpose of the Act because it was enacted after the Nation’s trust application was filed, and it uses that application itself to thwart the taking of purchased land into trust. Accordingly, the court held that H.B. 2534 is preempted by the Act. The legality of the Secretary’s taking of Parcel 2 into trust pursuant to the Act is affirmed, and the Nation is free to petition the Secretary to have the remainder of the land taken into trust, pursuant to the Act. View "Tohono O'odham Nation v. Arizona" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the court considered whether Florida’s Rental Tax and Florida’s Utility Tax, as applied to matters occurring on Seminole Tribe lands, violate the tenets of federal Indian law. The court held that Florida’s Rental Tax is expressly precluded by 25 U.S.C. 465, and, in the alternative, is preempted by the comprehensive federal regulation of Indian land leasing. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's order as to this issue. The court concluded, however, that the district court erred in placing the legal incidence of the Utility Tax on the Tribe and find that, on this record, the Tribe has not demonstrated that the Utility Tax is generally preempted by federal law. Therefore, the court reversed as to this issue and remanded for further proceedings. View "Seminole Tribe v. Stranburg" on Justia Law

Long, a member of the Lower Brule Sioux Tribe, operated the “OC Store,” a novelty store, on the reservation. The store had few exterior windows. BIA Officer Spargur encountered juveniles, carrying fireworks. One juvenile stated that he just bought them at the OC Store. Spargur went to the Store, was unsure whether it was closed, but concluded the store was open because of lights, music, unlocked doors, and the juveniles’ report that they had “just” purchased fireworks. Spargur entered through two unlocked doors, stopped at a third door, and “knock[ed] and announce[d] police.” Receiving no response, Spargur opened the main door, and, seeing Long’s son, entered the store. Another of Long’s sons acknowledged the juveniles had been in the store. Spargur noticed a small package on one of the concession tables that, based on his experience and training, he “recognized . . . as a package normally holding synthetic marijuana.” Once Long emerged, Spargur reminded him not to sell fireworks after Independence Day, left the store, and prepared an affidavit for a search warrant. A judge, 60 miles away, approved the warrant by telephone. Spargur and others searched the store, seizing 80 grams of synthetic marijuana. Long conditionally pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to dismiss, finding that the officers’ actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment. View "United States v. Long" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, applying advantage gambling techniques, won a significant amount of money on video blackjack machines at a casino owned and operated by the Tonto Apache Tribe on tribal land. Plaintiffs filed suit against the tribal defendants, seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and under state tort law for battery, false imprisonment, conversion, defamation, trespass to chattels, and negligence. The district court denied defendants' motion to dismiss. At issue was whether tribal officers may assert tribal sovereign immunity when sued in their individual capacities for an assertedly unconstitutional detention and seizure of property. The court concluded that sovereign immunity is a quasi-jurisdictional issue that, if invoked at the Rule 12(b)(1) stage, must be addressed and decided; the district court erred in concluding that it could deny the tribal defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) motion even if they were entitled to tribal sovereign immunity; the tribal defendants are not entitled to tribal sovereign immunity, however, because they are being sued in their individual capacities, rather than in their official capacities, for actions taken in the course of their official duties; and whether the tribal defendants were acting under state or tribal law does not matter for purposes of this analysis, although it will matter for purposes of deciding whether plaintiffs can succeed in their section 1983 claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Pistor v. Garcia" on Justia Law