Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

Oscar Hudspeth, a member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe, was convicted by a jury of two sex abuse offenses involving his young stepdaughter, D.J., which occurred when she was between five and seven years old and living in his home. The prosecution’s evidence included D.J.’s testimony about the abuse and statements Hudspeth made during a post-polygraph interview with an FBI agent, where he admitted to inappropriate touching. Prior to trial, both parties agreed to exclude any reference to the polygraph test from evidence, and the district court admitted a redacted version of the interview transcript omitting mention of the polygraph.In the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota, Hudspeth moved to either exclude the entire interview or, alternatively, to ensure all polygraph references were redacted. When it became clear that a redacted version would be admitted, Hudspeth changed his position, seeking to admit the entire interview, including polygraph references, to provide context for his admissions. The district court admitted the redacted interview and excluded polygraph references, noting that Hudspeth had earlier agreed to the exclusion. Hudspeth was ultimately found guilty and sentenced to the mandatory minimum term.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed whether excluding polygraph references violated Hudspeth’s constitutional right to present a complete defense. The court held that the exclusion did not violate his constitutional rights or constitute an abuse of discretion. It found that polygraph evidence is generally unreliable and disfavored, and that the exclusion was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate. The court concluded that even if there was error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the strength of the prosecution’s case. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Hudspeth" on Justia Law

A group of environmental organizations, Native tribes, and individual plaintiffs sought to prevent a land exchange in Southeast Arizona’s Tonto National Forest, mandated by the Southeast Arizona Land Exchange and Conservation Act. This exchange would transfer nearly 2,500 acres of federal land, including Oak Flat—a site of religious significance to the Apache—and a large copper deposit to Resolution Copper Mining LLC. In return, the company would provide over 5,000 acres of equally appraised land to the federal government. Plaintiffs raised concerns under several statutes, including the Land Exchange Act, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Free Exercise Clause, alleging procedural and substantive flaws in the exchange.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied motions for preliminary injunctions, finding that plaintiffs failed to show likely success or serious questions on the merits of their claims relating to appraisal, NEPA compliance, tribal consultation, and religious liberty. In a related case, Apache Stronghold v. United States, the district court’s denial of an injunction on religious liberty grounds was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit and not disturbed by the Supreme Court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. The court held that plaintiffs had Article III standing and that their NEPA claims were justiciable as “final agency action.” However, it concluded that plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their appraisal, NEPA, consultation, or religious liberty claims. The court further determined that existing precedent foreclosed the RFRA and Free Exercise arguments. The court did not address other injunction factors and dissolved the administrative stay. View "BROWN LOPEZ V. USA" on Justia Law

A federal land exchange was mandated by the Southeast Arizona Land Exchange and Conservation Act, requiring the United States Forest Service to transfer approximately 2,500 acres of National Forest land, including Oak Flat—a site of religious significance to the Apache—to Resolution Copper Mining, LLC, in exchange for over 5,000 acres of private land. The legislation included requirements for tribal consultation, land appraisal, and the preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS). Following the issuance of a revised Final EIS in 2025, several environmental and tribal groups, as well as individual Apache plaintiffs, challenged the exchange. Their claims spanned the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Free Exercise Clause, alleging procedural and substantive deficiencies.Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied the plaintiffs’ motions for a preliminary injunction, finding that they had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on any claims relating to the appraisal process, NEPA, consultation, or the National Forest Management Act. A separate group of Apache plaintiffs brought similar claims, including religious liberty challenges, which were also denied—particularly in light of circuit precedent established in Apache Stronghold v. United States. All plaintiff groups appealed and sought further injunctive relief pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion and affirmed. The court held that plaintiffs had standing and their claims were justiciable, but that none of their arguments were likely to succeed on the merits or raised serious questions. The court specifically found the appraisals and environmental review sufficient, the agency’s tribal consultation adequate, and the religious liberty claims foreclosed by circuit precedent. The denial of a preliminary injunction was affirmed, and all related motions for injunctive relief were denied as moot. View "ARIZONA MINING REFORM COALITION V. UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE" on Justia Law

Twin infants who are eligible for tribal membership were placed in emergency foster care with licensed, non-tribal foster parents after being born with serious medical issues. The county obtained temporary legal custody of the children through a Child in Need of Protection or Services (CHIPS) proceeding, and the children were eventually moved from the foster parents’ home to the home of maternal relatives who are members of the same tribe as the children. The foster parents, after learning of the planned move, sought to intervene permissively in the CHIPS case, filed a third-party custody petition, and moved to stay the placement change, arguing in part that tribal placement preference statutes were unconstitutional.The Minnesota District Court denied the foster parents’ motions to intervene and for a stay, and dismissed the third-party custody petition without considering their constitutional arguments. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. It directed the district court to reconsider intervention and third-party custody, and addressed the constitutionality of the Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA), finding it constitutional. On remand, the district court again denied intervention and dismissed the third-party custody petition, concluding the foster parents were not proper parties and could not file such petitions in the ongoing CHIPS proceeding.The Minnesota Supreme Court consolidated the appeals. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying permissive intervention, as such intervention was not in the children’s best interests. The court also held that a third-party custody petition is not available in juvenile court CHIPS proceedings and may only be brought as a petition to transfer custody by a party to the action. Because the foster parents were not parties, the court declined to address their constitutional challenges to ICWA and MIFPA, and vacated the Court of Appeals’ discussion of those constitutional issues. The court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: L.K." on Justia Law

In 2002, an individual disappeared from her home in Ada, Oklahoma, and her ex-boyfriend quickly became a suspect. Evidence implicating him included his presence at her home, strange phone calls to her family, and physical injuries. Law enforcement discovered blood in his car and house, and, after consulting with his attorney, he led officers to the woman’s body, which was buried and showed signs of gunshot wounds. He subsequently pleaded guilty to murder in Oklahoma state court and was sentenced to life without parole.Many years later, following the Supreme Court’s ruling in McGirt v. Oklahoma, which clarified that certain areas in Oklahoma are Indian country and subject to federal—not state—jurisdiction for major crimes involving Native Americans, the state court vacated his conviction. As a member of a federally recognized tribe and with the crime occurring within the Chickasaw Nation Reservation, only the federal government could prosecute him. A federal grand jury indicted him for murder in Indian country and for causing death while violating federal firearm statutes. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma dismissed one firearm count as time-barred, and a jury convicted him on the remaining counts.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered three main arguments: (1) alleged failures in the jury selection process under the Jury Selection and Service Act, (2) denial of a motion to suppress statements about the location of the victim’s body, and (3) denial of a motion to compel disclosure of communications between the government and former defense counsel. The Tenth Circuit held that the defendant failed to comply with the procedural requirements for challenging jury selection, that Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence did not apply to his statements to law enforcement, and that any error in denying document disclosure was harmless. The convictions were affirmed. View "United States v. Mullins" on Justia Law

In this case, two federally recognized tribes in Madera County, California, were involved in a dispute over the authorization of a casino. One tribe, North Fork, sought to build and operate a large off-reservation casino on a 305-acre site near State Route 99. To do so, North Fork obtained a favorable “two-part determination” from the Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior, followed by a concurrence from the Governor of California, and the negotiation of a tribal-state compact. The compact was ratified by the Legislature. However, a statewide referendum (Proposition 48) resulted in California voters rejecting the ratification statute. The other tribe, Picayune-Chukchansi, which operated its own on-reservation casino, challenged the validity of the Governor’s concurrence, arguing it was rendered void by the voters’ rejection.Prior to this appeal, the matter was litigated in multiple forums. In the Madera County Superior Court, Picayune-Chukchansi sought declaratory relief to have the Governor’s concurrence declared void ab initio. Proceedings were stayed pending appellate decisions in related cases, including United Auburn Indian Community of Auburn Rancheria v. Newsom by the California Supreme Court, which recognized the Governor’s implied authority to concur, and Stand Up for California! v. State of California (Stand Up II) by the Court of Appeal, which held that the people retained the power to annul the Governor’s concurrence through a referendum. The trial court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of Picayune-Chukchansi, declaring the Governor’s concurrence void from the outset.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that the people of California, by rejecting Proposition 48, exercised their retained power to annul the Governor’s concurrence, and that this annulment rendered the concurrence void ab initio—meaning it never took effect and is not in effect. The court also found that the dispute was not moot and that the Governor’s authority to concur is subject to the electorate’s overriding power under California constitutional law. View "Picayune Rancheria v. North Fork Rancheria" on Justia Law

A member of the Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate tribe was observed by a tribal police officer driving erratically within the city limits of Sisseton, nearly causing multiple collisions and fleeing from law enforcement. He was apprehended in a tribal housing unit. Subsequently, the tribal prosecutor charged him in tribal court with driving under the influence (DUI) and resisting arrest, while South Dakota state court charged him with resisting arrest, reckless driving, and assaulting a law enforcement officer. He later pled guilty in state court to assault and was sentenced to two years in prison. The tribal court then dismissed the DUI charge without prejudice.He filed a federal lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota against various tribal officials, alleging that the DUI charge exceeded the tribe’s criminal jurisdiction and violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Indian Civil Rights Act. The District Court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the complaint failed to raise a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the dismissal. The court concluded that, even assuming it had jurisdiction to consider the scope of the tribe’s criminal authority, the case had become moot because the tribal DUI charge was dismissed and could not be refiled due to the expiration of the statute of limitations. The court found that neither the voluntary cessation exception nor the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness applied. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and vacated its decision, declining to address the underlying questions of tribal jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, or exhaustion of tribal remedies. View "LaBatte v. Gangle" on Justia Law

A 17-year-old defendant was charged with ten serious offenses, including murder and assault, after a violent confrontation at the home of his rivals. The incident stemmed from a feud with a classmate and escalated when the defendant, accompanied by his family, armed himself and attacked the victims’ home. The attack resulted in the death of one individual and severe injuries to others. The defendant, an enrolled member of the Cherokee Nation, was charged under federal law for crimes committed within the Cherokee Nation Indian Reservation.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma first reviewed the case. The government moved to transfer the defendant from juvenile to adult criminal proceedings under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act. After an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge recommended granting the transfer, and the district court adopted this recommendation after conducting a de novo review. The district court weighed the statutory factors, including the defendant’s age, social background, psychological maturity, prior delinquency record, past treatment efforts, and the availability of rehabilitative programs, and found that most factors favored transfer to adult status.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the statutory transfer factors and found no clear error in its factual findings. The court also rejected the defendant’s Eighth Amendment argument that transfer was unconstitutional due to the potential punishments, holding that the challenge was unripe under circuit precedent. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order transferring the defendant to adult criminal proceedings. View "United States v. J.D.V., Jr." on Justia Law

Members of the Crow Tribe who own trust allotments on the Crow Reservation challenged the loss of their historic water rights following the ratification of the Crow Tribe-Montana Compact and the Crow Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act. The Settlement Act, passed by Congress in 2010, codified a negotiated agreement among the Crow Tribe, the state of Montana, and the United States, which defined tribal water rights and provided substantial federal funding for water infrastructure. In exchange, the Tribe and allottees agreed to waive all other water rights claims. The Act required the Secretary of the Interior to publish a Statement of Findings certifying that certain conditions were met, which would trigger the waiver of prior water rights.After the Secretary published the Statement of Findings in June 2016—following a deadline extension agreed to by the Tribal Chairman and the Secretary—several allottees filed suit nearly six years later. They argued that the extension was invalid because, under the Crow Constitution, only the Tribal General Council or Legislature could authorize such an agreement. They also alleged that the Secretary’s action exceeded statutory authority, breached trust obligations, and violated their Fifth Amendment rights. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the Secretary’s publication of the Statement of Findings constituted final agency action reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, but found the Secretary reasonably relied on the Tribal Chairman’s authority to extend the deadline. The court further held that the Settlement Act created specific trust duties, but the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege any breach. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claims for takings, due process, and equal protection failed as a matter of law. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Hill v. DOI" on Justia Law

Gary Perez and Matilde Torres, members of the Lipan-Apache Native American Church, believe that certain religious services must be conducted at a specific site within Brackenridge Park in San Antonio, Texas. The City of San Antonio planned improvements to the park, including tree removal and bird deterrence, which Perez and Torres argued would destroy their sacred worship space. They sued the City, claiming violations of their religious rights under the First Amendment, the Texas Constitution, the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and a new clause in the Texas Constitution that prohibits limiting religious services.The federal district court granted limited relief, allowing the Church access for certain ceremonies but did not enjoin the City's improvement plans. Perez appealed, and the Fifth Circuit initially affirmed the district court's decision but later withdrew its opinion and certified a question to the Supreme Court of Texas regarding the scope and force of the new Texas Religious Services Clause.The Supreme Court of Texas held that the Texas Religious Services Clause imposes a categorical bar on governmental limitations of religious services, regardless of the government's interest in the limitation. However, the Court also concluded that the scope of the clause is not unlimited and does not extend to the government's preservation and management of publicly owned lands. The Court emphasized that the clause does not require the government to provide or maintain natural elements necessary for religious services on public property. The case was remanded to the federal courts for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "PEREZ v. CITY OF SAN ANTONIO" on Justia Law