Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

Craig Wood was indicted on charges of assault with a dangerous weapon and assault resulting in serious bodily injury in Indian country. The government needed to prove Wood's Indian status to secure a conviction. To do so, they introduced a "Certificate of Indian Blood" from the Seneca-Cayuga Nation, authenticated by a "Certificate of Authenticity." Wood objected, arguing he was not given reasonable pre-trial notice of the Authenticity Certificate, as required by Rule 902(11), and thus had no fair opportunity to challenge it.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma overruled Wood's objection, admitting the Indian Blood Certificate into evidence. The court did not address the notice requirement under Rule 902(11) and based its decision solely on the fact that the same individual signed both certificates. Wood was subsequently convicted on both charges by a jury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court's decision to admit the Indian Blood Certificate without proper notice was manifestly unreasonable. The Tenth Circuit emphasized that Rule 902(11) requires reasonable pre-trial written notice to allow the opposing party a fair opportunity to challenge the evidence. The court concluded that the district court's failure to consider the notice requirement was an abuse of discretion.The Tenth Circuit also determined that the error was not harmless. The improperly admitted Indian Blood Certificate was the only direct evidence of Wood's Indian status, which was crucial for the jurisdictional requirement. The court noted that the government's argument that M.M.'s testimony about Wood's Indian status was sufficient was unconvincing and did not meet the required standard for harmless error.As a result, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment, vacated Wood's convictions, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Wood" on Justia Law

The case involves Leatrice Tanner-Brown, a descendant of people enslaved by the Cherokee Tribe and emancipated at the end of the Civil War. Her grandfather, George Curls, received land allotments as a minor. Tanner-Brown and the Harvest Institute Freedman Federation, LLC (HIFF) brought suit seeking various remedies related to the allotments, including an accounting from the Secretary of the Interior arising from the alleged creation of a trust relationship between the federal government and Indian beneficiaries.The district court dismissed the case for lack of standing, finding that Tanner-Brown failed to establish that she was injured by not receiving an accounting on the ground that there was no trust relationship between Curls and the federal government and that HIFF failed to satisfy the requirements for associational standing.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court found that although HIFF cannot sustain standing, Tanner-Brown has alleged a concrete injury-in-fact sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court also found that the case raises factual questions that cannot be resolved at this juncture and remanded for the district court to consider the merits of Tanner-Brown’s allegations and the relevant record documents in the first instance. View "Tanner-Brown v. Haaland" on Justia Law

The Chemehuevi Indian Tribe filed a complaint against the United States, alleging mismanagement of funds and breach of trust. The Tribe sought an accounting and damages for the alleged mismanagement of the Parker Dam compensation funds, the Indian Claims Commission (ICC) Judgment funds, and the suspense accounts. The Tribe also claimed that the U.S. government's failure to approve a proposed lease of its water rights constituted a Fifth Amendment taking and a breach of trust.The United States Court of Federal Claims dismissed the Tribe's complaint, ruling that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The court found that the Tribe was essentially seeking an accounting to discover potential claims against the government, rather than asserting a right to be paid a certain sum. The court also dismissed the Tribe's claims related to the proposed water rights lease, stating that the claim was outside the six-year statute of limitations.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the Tribe's complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The appellate court agreed that the Tribe was seeking an accounting to discover potential claims, rather than asserting a right to be paid a certain sum. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Tribe's claim related to the proposed water rights lease, agreeing that it was outside the statute of limitations. However, the appellate court vacated the lower court's dismissal of the Tribe's claim for failure to state a takings claim, stating that the Tribe's decision to lease the water off-reservation could fulfill the purpose of the reservation. View "CHEMEHUEVI INDIAN TRIBE v. US " on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Lori Lundeen, a property developer, and Lake County, Montana. Lundeen planned to develop a 60-lot subdivision, Wild Horse RV Resort, on her property in Lake County. She intended to use roads through the Big Arm townsite for access to her development. The Board of Lake County Commissioners granted conditional approval for the development. However, the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes contested the County’s ownership, regulatory authority, and right to use the access routes. Lundeen alleges that she relied on Lake County and the Lake County Attorney to research her access issue. After an eight-month moratorium on Lundeen’s development application, the Board conditionally approved an amended road layout for the development. Lundeen claims the Lake County Attorney represented to her that the Tribes’ claim was baseless and that she could proceed with the development.The District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District, Lake County, granted Lake County’s motion to dismiss Lundeen's lawsuit for failure to state a claim. The court reasoned that Lundeen was on inquiry notice of the negligent misrepresentation when she became aware the Tribes had blocked off her property. The court also determined the discovery and accrual rules for the statute of limitations were satisfied no later than when the Tribes blocked Lundeen’s access. Based on the applicable three-year statute of limitations, the court found Lundeen’s claims filed were time-barred.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court found that Lundeen had sufficiently asserted facts that, if accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to her, establish a basis for the claims asserted in her complaint. Therefore, the court concluded that the District Court erred by granting Lake County’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. View "Lundeen v. Lake County" on Justia Law

The case involves the Stillaguamish Tribe of Indians ("Tribe") and their appeal against a district court's order that determined their usual and accustomed fishing grounds ("U&As") under the Treaty of Point Elliott did not include certain marine waters. The Tribe argued that their U&As extended beyond the Stillaguamish River and included marine waters to the east of Whidbey Island. The Tribe presented documentary evidence and expert testimony about the historical locations and activities of the Stillaguamish Tribe. However, the district court concluded that the Tribe had not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that they customarily fished in the disputed marine waters at and before treaty times.The district court's decision was based on the law of the case as set forth in United States v. Washington and its various sub-proceedings. The court applied the standard set forth in United States v. Washington for determining a tribe’s U&As, which required the Tribe to demonstrate that it fished the claimed waters before and at treaty time. The court concluded that the Tribe's evidence was too speculative to meet that standard.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the district court correctly applied the law of the case. However, the appellate court could not affirm the district court's factual findings or conclusions of law due to the lack of sufficient detail in the order. The appellate court vacated the order of the district court and remanded the case for further factual findings as to the Tribe’s evidence of villages, presence, and fishing activities in the disputed marine waters. View "STILLAGUAMISH TRIBE OF INDIANS V. STATE OF WASHINGTON" on Justia Law

The case involves Tony Lamonte Greene and Billie Wayne Byrd, who are incarcerated in an Oklahoma state prison. They, along with seven co-plaintiffs, filed actions in the Court of Federal Claims, arguing that their imprisonment is unlawful and seeking monetary compensation from the United States. They claim to be members of the Cherokee Nation and argue that under certain treaties between the Cherokee Nation and the United States, the State of Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction to prosecute and incarcerate them. They each seek $100 per day for unauthorized detention and more than $1,000,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.The Claims Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ actions for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to show that the treaties on which they relied gave rise to a personal right to monetary relief on their part in the event of a breach of the covenants relating to the exercise of civil and criminal jurisdiction within the Cherokee Nation. The court explained that claims based on treaties with Indian nations can fall within the jurisdiction of the Claims Court because they are treated as “a species of contract.” However, the court concluded that the treaties were not money-mandating.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the Claims Court. The court found that the treaty provisions the appellants relied upon are not money-mandating. The court also noted that the agreements addressed the respective rights of sovereignty of the two contracting parties; they did not create contract-based rights in individuals, the breach of which could give rise to monetary remedies for those individual complainants. The court concluded that the appellants’ claim does not fall within the reach of the Tucker Act, and therefore, the Claims Court lacked jurisdiction to address their demand for damages from the United States attributable to their prosecution and incarceration by the State of Oklahoma. View "GREENE v. US " on Justia Law

The Northwestern Band of the Shoshone Nation filed a complaint against Idaho state officials concerning the interpretation of the 1868 Treaty of Fort Bridger between the United States and several bands of the Shoshone and Bannock Tribes, including the Shoshone’s Northwestern Band. Under the Treaty, the affiliated Shoshone and Bannock Tribes ceded most of their territory to the United States. At the same time, the Tribes expressly reserved their right to hunt on unoccupied lands of the United States. Idaho officials contend that the Treaty conditions the reserved hunting right on permanent residence on a designated reservation and that Northwestern Band members may not exercise the Tribes’ treaty-reserved hunting right because the Northwest Band does not reside on a designated reservation. The district court agreed with Defendants’ treaty interpretation. The only issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in concluding that the Treaty makes the reserved hunting right contingent on permanent residence on the Fort Hall or Wind River Reservations.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. The panel held that the Treaty’s terms, which must be read in context and construed as they would naturally be understood by the Tribes, plainly do not condition the exercise of the reserved hunting right on the Northwestern Band relocating to a reservation. Because the district court did not reach the Idaho officials’ alternative arguments regarding political cohesion and necessary joinder, the panel remanded the case for the district court to address those issues in the first instance. View "NORTHWESTERN BAND OF THE SHOSHONE NATION V. GREG WOOTEN, ET AL" on Justia Law

A-J.A.B. tested positive at birth for methamphetamine. H.J.B. (“Mother”) admitted methamphetamine use during her pregnancy. In March 2020, less than a month after A-J.A.B.’s birth, the Adams County Human Services Department (“the Department”) filed a petition in dependency and neglect concerning A-J.A.B. The Department’s petition noted that it had no information indicating that A-J.A.B. was an Indian child or eligible for membership in an Indian tribe, although the petition did not identify what efforts, if any, the Department took to determine whether A-J.A.B. was an Indian child. At the shelter hearing, Mother’s counsel informed the court that Mother may have “some Cherokee and Lakota Sioux [heritage] through [A-J.A.B.’s maternal great-grandmother].” However, Mother was uncertain if anyone in her family was actually registered with a tribe and acknowledged that she “probably [wouldn’t] qualify” for any tribal membership herself. The juvenile court ordered Mother to “fill out the ICWA paperwork,” but the court did not direct the Department to exercise its due diligence obligation under section 19-1-126(3). At the next hearing, Mother, who had not filled out the ICWA paperwork, again stated that she had “Native American heritage” through A-J.A.B.’s maternal great-grandmother. Because of these assertions, the juvenile court found that the case “‘may’ be an ICWA case.” By December 2020, the Department moved to terminate Mother’s parental rights. At the pretrial conference, Mother’s attorney informed the court that she spoke with A-J.A.B.’s maternal grandmother, who stated that she “thought that the heritage may be Lakota.” Mother’s attorney told the court “it doesn’t sound like there’s a reason to believe that ICWA would apply” and acknowledged that neither Mother nor A-J.A.B. were enrolled members of any tribe. The juvenile court subsequently concluded that “there [was] no reason to believe that this case [was] governed by [ICWA].” The juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights. Mother appealed, arguing the juvenile court erred in finding that ICWA did not apply because the court had a reason to know that A-J.A.B. was an Indian child. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the Department satisfied its statutory due diligence obligation under section19-1-126(3), and affirmed in different grounds. View "Colorado in interest of H.J.B." on Justia Law

Plaintiff is the former Chief Financial Officer of the Cypress Bayou Casino. The Casino is owned by the Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana. The Chitimacha Tribe is one of four federally recognized Indian tribes in Louisiana. According to the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint, the Chitimacha tribal council authorized Spivey (as CFO of the Casino) to make a $3,900 bonus payment to the then-newly elected chairman of the tribal council. Plaintiff claimed that several members of the tribal council turned around and reported the bonus payment to federal and state law enforcement. Plaintiff initially sued the Tribe, the Casino, and four tribal council members in federal court under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983 and 1985 and Louisiana tort law. The district court, over Plaintiff’s objections, again adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations, denied Plaintiff’s remand motion, and dismissed all Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded to state court. The court first wrote that when a district court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a removed case, it must remand. The court held, in accordance with the statute’s plain text and the great weight of authority from across the country, that Section 1447(c) means what it says, admits of no exceptions, and requires remand even when the district court thinks it futile. Moreover, the court held that such a dismissal should be made without prejudice. View "Spivey v. Chitimacha Tribe" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District of South Dakota challenging the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court’s exercise of jurisdiction in a custody matter involving his minor daughter, C.S.N. Petitioner claimed that the Tribal Court’s refusal to recognize and enforce North Dakota state court orders awarding him custody of C.S.N. violated the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. Section 1738A. The district court granted summary judgment to the Tribal Court after concluding that the PKPA does not apply to Indian tribes. Petitioner appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the PKPA does not apply to Indian tribes. As a result, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court is not obligated under that statute to enforce the North Dakota court orders awarding custody of C.S.N. to Petitioner. The district court properly granted summary judgment to the Tribal Court. The court further explained that its conclusion that the PKPA does not apply to Indian tribes is further supported by the fact that when Congress intends for tribes to be subject to statutory full-faith-and-credit requirements, it expressly says so. View "Aarin Nygaard v. Tricia Taylor" on Justia Law