Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

Mother appealed the juvenile court’s orders denying her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 and terminating her parental rights to her daughter, C.R., born in December 2020. The father was not a party to the appeal. Mother did not challenge the merits of the court’s rulings but argued that the order terminating her parental rights should be conditionally reversed due to deficiencies in the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services’ (DCFS) initial inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and related California statutes.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Juvenile Court Referee Juan M. Valles, had previously reviewed the case. The court detained C.R. from her parents in January 2021, sustained a section 300 petition, declared C.R. a dependent, and removed her from her parents’ custody. Mother was granted reunification services, which were later terminated in September 2023. The court denied mother’s section 388 petition in September 2024 and terminated her parental rights. Mother filed separate notices of appeal, which were consolidated for purposes of briefing, argument, and decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not apply was supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that both the Department and the court had previously inquired about the family’s potential Indian ancestry during mother’s dependency case, and maternal grandmother had denied any Indian ancestry. The court concluded that the Department’s inquiry was adequate and that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding that ICWA did not apply. The court affirmed the juvenile court’s orders. View "In re C.R." on Justia Law

In January 2023, law enforcement officers from the Rosebud Sioux Tribe responded to a report of a man brandishing a firearm at Benjamin Fool Bull's home. Witnesses identified Tyson Quigley as the man with the firearm and Erwin White Lance as the man with a baseball bat. Both men were later found in a gold Chrysler sedan, which contained a firearm, ammunition, and other items. Quigley declined to speak with investigators, but White Lance admitted to being invited into the residence and claimed responsibility for the firearm before invoking his right to remain silent.Quigley and White Lance were charged with first-degree burglary and using a firearm during a crime of violence. Quigley was also charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. White Lance died during the proceedings, and the charges against him were dismissed. The district court granted the Government's motion to exclude White Lance's statements as hearsay, ruling that they were not admissible under Rule 804 or Rule 807. At trial, Quigley was found guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm but acquitted of the other charges. He was sentenced to 90 months in prison and three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that White Lance's statement about taking responsibility for the firearm was not sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted under Rule 804(b)(3) or Rule 807. The court noted that the statement was made under circumstances that suggested a motive to protect Quigley and was contradicted by eyewitness testimony. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the statement. View "United States v. Quigley" on Justia Law

A mother appealed the July 2024 orders of the Montana Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, which awarded guardianship of her children, I.R.S. and M.W.A.H., to non-kinship, non-Native American foster parents. The children were removed from the mother's home due to her illicit drug use and associated safety concerns. I.R.S. is a member of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe, triggering the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Department initially placed I.R.S. with the mother's sister (Aunt), but later removed him due to allegations of physical abuse. The mother did not object to the new placement at the time. M.W.A.H. was born in September 2022 and was also removed from the mother's custody due to her continued issues. Both children were placed with a non-kinship, non-Native American foster family.The District Court adjudicated both children as youths in need of care and extended temporary custody to the Department. The mother did not contest these adjudications. The Department later petitioned for guardianship, which the mother initially contested but later approved of the placement. However, she changed her mind multiple times during the proceedings. The Aunt filed a motion to intervene, asserting her right under ICWA, but later withdrew her motion and was deemed an "interested person."The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decisions. The court held that the mother was not denied her right to counsel, as she had stipulated to the adjudication and did not pursue a transfer to tribal court. The court also found that the District Court did not err in failing to treat the mother's questions about transferring her case to tribal court as a motion to transfer. Additionally, the court concluded that the District Court did not erroneously deny the Aunt's motion to intervene, as she withdrew her motion. Finally, the court held that the District Court correctly concluded that good cause existed to deviate from ICWA placement preferences, as the Department had made diligent efforts to find a suitable ICWA-preferred placement but found none. View "In re I.R.S. & M.W.A.H." on Justia Law

Gary Perez and Matilde Torres, members of the Lipan-Apache Native American Church, believe that certain religious services must be conducted at a specific site within Brackenridge Park in San Antonio, Texas. The City of San Antonio planned improvements to the park, including tree removal and bird deterrence, which Perez and Torres argued would destroy their sacred worship space. They sued the City, claiming violations of their religious rights under the First Amendment, the Texas Constitution, the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and a new clause in the Texas Constitution that prohibits limiting religious services.The federal district court granted limited relief, allowing the Church access for certain ceremonies but did not enjoin the City's improvement plans. Perez appealed, and the Fifth Circuit initially affirmed the district court's decision but later withdrew its opinion and certified a question to the Supreme Court of Texas regarding the scope and force of the new Texas Religious Services Clause.The Supreme Court of Texas held that the Texas Religious Services Clause imposes a categorical bar on governmental limitations of religious services, regardless of the government's interest in the limitation. However, the Court also concluded that the scope of the clause is not unlimited and does not extend to the government's preservation and management of publicly owned lands. The Court emphasized that the clause does not require the government to provide or maintain natural elements necessary for religious services on public property. The case was remanded to the federal courts for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "PEREZ v. CITY OF SAN ANTONIO" on Justia Law

Citizens for a Better Eureka (CBE) filed a petition challenging the City of Eureka's decision to redevelop a city-owned parking lot into affordable housing, claiming the project was improperly exempted from the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The City Council had adopted a resolution authorizing the reduction or removal of public parking to facilitate the development, citing a Class 12 CEQA exemption for surplus government property sales. CBE argued that the project was unlawfully piecemealed and that the entire redevelopment should be considered under CEQA.The Humboldt County Superior Court dismissed the petition, agreeing with the Wiyot Tribe's motion that the Tribe, selected as the developer for the project, was a necessary and indispensable party to the proceedings. The court found that the Tribe could not be joined due to its sovereign immunity, and thus, the case could not proceed without it.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the Tribe was indeed a necessary and indispensable party. The court reasoned that the Tribe had significant interests in the project, having invested time and resources into its development. The court also found that any judgment in favor of CBE would prejudice the Tribe by hindering its ability to proceed with the project. Additionally, the court noted that CBE failed to join the Tribe within the statutory period, further justifying the dismissal. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition. View "Citizens for a Better Eureka v. City of Eureka" on Justia Law

Deborah Hemstead filed a workers' compensation claim against her employer, United Indian Health Services, Inc. (United Indian). United Indian argued that it was entitled to tribal sovereign immunity and thus not subject to the state workers' compensation system. The administrative law judge (ALJ) rejected this claim, applying the five-factor "arm of the tribe" test from People v. Miami Nation Enterprises, and found that United Indian did not qualify for sovereign immunity. The ALJ's decision was based on factors such as United Indian's creation under state law, lack of explicit tribal intent to share immunity, and the financial relationship between United Indian and the tribes.The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (Board) denied United Indian's request for reconsideration, adopting the ALJ's findings. The Board found no abuse of discretion in the ALJ's rejection of United Indian's claim of sovereign immunity.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case de novo. The court concluded that the Board and ALJ erred in denying sovereign immunity to United Indian. The court found that United Indian's method of creation, purpose, tribal control, and financial relationship with the tribes all weighed in favor of granting sovereign immunity. The court noted that United Indian was created by several tribes to provide healthcare services under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, which promotes tribal self-governance and self-sufficiency. The court held that United Indian is entitled to sovereign immunity and reversed the Board's decision, remanding the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "United Indian Health etc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Roger Snake, an elder member of the Ho-Chunk tribe, pleaded guilty in 2011 to two counts of abusive sexual contact with minors. After completing his prison sentence in 2020, he began a lifetime term of supervised release. Snake violated several conditions of his release, including having unapproved and unsupervised contact with minors and traveling outside the judicial district without permission. The district court revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to 24 months in prison, which was above the recommended range in the Sentencing Guidelines.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin initially addressed Snake's violations informally, reminding him of the conditions of his supervised release. However, after further violations, including being found alone with minors in his home, the court issued a summons. Snake admitted to the violations, and his lawyer requested home detention instead of prison, citing his role as a tribal elder. The district court rejected this argument, emphasizing the severity of his violations and the risk he posed to minors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Snake argued that the district court failed to adequately explain the reasons for imposing a sentence above the guideline range. The appellate court, applying a highly deferential standard of review, found that the district court had sufficiently explained its decision. The court noted that the district judge had considered the relevant statutory factors and the egregiousness of Snake's violations. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, emphasizing the need for clear explanations in sentencing and the importance of addressing potential procedural errors promptly. View "United States v. Snake" on Justia Law

A 13-year-old girl reported to her school principal that her mother’s ex-boyfriend had inappropriately touched her in a bathtub on tribal land. During a forensic interview, she described being touched on the outside of her vaginal area and feeling the man’s penis on her back. The accused denied the allegations but later admitted to being naked in the bathtub with the children, claiming he left immediately. In a subsequent law enforcement interview, he responded “mmhmm” to statements that he had touched the girl’s vagina, which an agent interpreted as acknowledgments rather than admissions. At trial, the girl testified about two incidents: one in a bathtub when she was seven, and another in a bedroom where she awoke bleeding. The government introduced a recording of the “mmhmm” responses, and the jury was instructed that silence or failure to deny an accusation could be considered an admission.A jury in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota convicted the defendant of aggravated sexual abuse of a child under 12 and abusive sexual contact of a child. The defendant moved for acquittal or a new trial, arguing insufficient evidence and inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony. The district court denied acquittal but granted a new trial, citing concerns about leading questions during testimony, the prejudicial effect of the “mmhmm” responses and related jury instruction, and the mandatory minimum sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court abused its discretion by granting a new trial on grounds not raised in the defendant’s Rule 33 motion, as required by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The appellate court reversed the order granting a new trial, reinstated the convictions, and remanded the case for sentencing. View "United States v. Drum" on Justia Law

K.B. (Mother) appealed the Thirteenth Judicial District Court's order terminating her parental rights to her daughter, P.E.W., arguing that the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services Child and Family Services Division (Department) failed to engage in active efforts to assist her in reunifying with her Indian child, and that the District Court wrongly approved a non-Native American foster placement for P.E.W., in violation of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).The District Court had removed K.B.'s children, B.J.B. and P.E.W., from her care due to allegations of physical neglect and abuse. The Department filed a petition for emergency protective services, adjudication as youth in need of care, and temporary legal custody. The court adjudicated P.E.W. as a youth in need of care, granted temporary legal custody to the Department, and determined that ICWA applied. The Department developed a treatment plan for K.B., but she failed to comply consistently. The Department made extensive efforts to assist K.B., including providing transportation, financial assistance, and facilitating visitations. Despite these efforts, K.B. struggled with chemical dependency, unstable housing, and compliance with treatment programs. The District Court extended temporary legal custody multiple times and ultimately terminated K.B.'s parental rights, finding that the Department had made active efforts as required by ICWA and that continued custody by K.B. would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to P.E.W.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The court held that the Department had made active efforts to reunify K.B. with her child, as required by ICWA, and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in terminating K.B.'s parental rights. The court also found that good cause existed to deviate from ICWA's placement preferences due to the lack of suitable ICWA-compliant placements and the specialized needs of P.E.W. View "In re P.E.W." on Justia Law

Andy Nahkai was charged with two counts of abusive sexual contact with a child and one count of abusive sexual contact with a child aged 12-16, all occurring within Indian country. During the investigation, Nahkai made incriminating statements to law enforcement officers while being interviewed in an unlocked police vehicle parked outside his home. The officers did not administer Miranda warnings before the interview.The United States District Court for the District of Utah granted Nahkai’s motion to suppress the statements he made during the interview. The court concluded that the interrogation was custodial, and the statements were not voluntary under the Fifth Amendment. The court based its decision on the officers' failure to inform Nahkai that he was free to leave, the accusatory nature of the questioning, and the police-dominated atmosphere of the encounter.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Nahkai was not in custody for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona. The court found that the totality of the circumstances did not support the conclusion that Nahkai’s freedom of action was curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest. The court noted that Nahkai was not physically restrained, the vehicle doors were unlocked, and the questioning, although accusatory, was not unusually confrontational. The court reversed the district court’s order suppressing Nahkai’s statements and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Nahkai" on Justia Law