Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

A minor was removed from the custody of her adoptive parents following reports of severe physical abuse by her adoptive father and the adoptive mother’s failure to protect her. Reunification services were initially ordered for both parents, but after minimal progress, those services were terminated and a permanent plan of legal guardianship was established. The minor, approaching adulthood, was placed with new caregivers and expressed a desire for adoption by them. The adoptive mother later sought reinstatement of reunification services, arguing that the shift in the permanent plan from guardianship to adoption constituted changed circumstances, and that reinstating services would be in the minor’s best interest.The Superior Court of Calaveras County summarily denied the mother’s petition for modification under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388, finding she failed to make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances or new evidence, or that the requested relief would serve the minor’s best interest. The court also vacated a hearing on termination of parental rights, instead setting a new permanent plan and maintaining dependency jurisdiction.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying the mother’s section 388 petition without a hearing, as the petition did not present new evidence or demonstrate changed circumstances sufficient to warrant reinstatement of services. However, the Court of Appeal found that the Calaveras County Health and Human Services Agency failed to comply fully with its inquiry and notice obligations under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) regarding both biological and adoptive extended relatives. The appellate court affirmed the denial of the section 388 petition, but vacated the ICWA finding and remanded for further ICWA compliance and entry of a new finding. View "In re W.A." on Justia Law

A federally recognized Alaska Native tribe, Dot Lake Village, is a member of an intertribal consortium known as the Tanana Chiefs Conference (TCC). TCC, originally organized as a grassroots group in 1962 and incorporated as a nonprofit under Alaska law in 1971, provides governmental services—including healthcare—to its 42 member villages, most of which are federally recognized tribes. In 2021, TCC’s board of directors voted to recall its president, a decision Dot Lake Village challenged as violating TCC’s bylaws.Dot Lake Village filed a lawsuit in the Alaska Superior Court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to invalidate the recall and enforce procedural requirements for TCC meetings. TCC responded with a motion to dismiss under Alaska Civil Rule 12(b)(1), arguing the suit was barred by sovereign immunity because TCC is an arm of its member tribes. The superior court agreed, applying the multi-factor test from White v. University of California and Runyon ex rel. B.R. v. Association of Village Council Presidents, and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court also awarded attorney’s fees to TCC as the prevailing party, finding that Dot Lake Village had waived sovereign immunity on the fee issue by filing suit.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the dismissal and the attorney’s fees award. The court held that TCC possesses tribal sovereign immunity as an arm of its member tribes under the multi-factor test from Ito v. Copper River Native Association, and that no exception to immunity applies. The court also held that by bringing the lawsuit, Dot Lake Village waived its sovereign immunity with respect to attorney’s fees. The orders of the superior court were affirmed. View "DOT LAKE VILLAGE v. DENÁ NENÁ HENASH" on Justia Law

A member of the Choctaw Tribe was arrested by a police officer from the Duncan Police Department after the officer responded to a report of a suspicious individual at a store located within the boundaries of the Chickasaw Nation. The officer, who was cross-commissioned by both the city and the tribe, conducted field sobriety tests, arrested the individual, and read him Oklahoma’s Implied Consent Test Request. The arrestee was booked on state criminal charges, but it was later discovered during booking that he was a tribal member and the alleged offenses occurred in Indian country, rendering Oklahoma courts without jurisdiction. The officer then filed tribal charges, which were eventually dismissed.Following these events, the individual filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, raising federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest and state-law claims for false arrest and unlawful detention. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, determining that the officer acted under tribal, not state, authority and thus the § 1983 claim failed. The court also dismissed the state-law claims for the same reason.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the district court’s ruling was based on a misunderstanding of the applicable law. The appellate court explained that a state officer may detain a suspect before conclusively determining tribal status, and that acting in excess of authority may still constitute action under color of state law for § 1983 purposes. The Tenth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, without deciding whether the officer ultimately satisfied the color-of-law requirement. The court also reversed the dismissal of the state-law claims, since that decision depended on the mistaken analysis of the federal claim. View "Walden v. The City of Duncan, Oklahoma" on Justia Law

The case involves a child custody dispute between the unmarried parents of a minor child. The father is a member of the Kenaitze Indian Tribe, and the child is eligible for tribal membership; the mother is not a tribal member. Both parents sought custody, but disagreed on whether the case should proceed in the Kenaitze Tribal Court or the Alaska Superior Court. The father first filed a non-emergency custody petition in tribal court but soon asked to withdraw it after reaching a temporary agreement with the mother. Afterward, the mother filed petitions for domestic violence protective orders (DVPOs) against the father in state court, receiving a short-term order. While the long-term DVPO was pending, the father filed a second custody petition in tribal court, and the tribal court notified both parties of a custody hearing. Later, the mother filed a custody complaint in state superior court.The Alaska Superior Court reviewed motions from both parties. The father argued that because he first filed in tribal court, the tribal court should decide the matter. The mother contended the tribal court lacked jurisdiction under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and that she did not consent to tribal jurisdiction. The superior court found the tribal court had exercised jurisdiction first and dismissed the state custody case, pending acceptance by the tribal court. The mother appealed the dismissal, and the superior court stayed its order during the appeal. The father cross-appealed the stay.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska held that the tribal court was the proper forum for the custody dispute because the father's petition was filed there before the mother initiated state custody proceedings. The court clarified that, when simultaneous custody actions are filed in both tribal and state courts, the court where the matter is first filed is the preferred forum. The court affirmed the dismissal of the state case and found the issue of the stay pending appeal to be moot. View "Mallette v. Adams" on Justia Law

The case concerns a dispute over whether the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation is entitled, under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA), to restoration of approximately 1.5 million acres of unallotted land within the Uncompahgre Reservation in Utah. The Tribe argued that it was entitled to reclaim these lands, asserting that historical treaties, statutes, and executive orders granted it compensable title—meaning a right to proceeds from any sale of these lands. The federal government and the State of Utah, on the other hand, contended that the Tribe never acquired such compensable title for the Utah reservation lands; rather, any compensable title extended only to lands within the Tribe’s original reservation in Colorado.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the Tribe’s challenge to the Department of the Interior’s denial of restoration. In that court, all parties agreed that only lands to which the Tribe had compensable title could be restored under the IRA. The district court found that none of the relevant treaties, statutes, or executive orders gave the Tribe compensable title to the disputed lands in Utah, and thus granted summary judgment to the federal defendants and Utah, while denying the Tribe’s cross-motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The appellate court held that, under the text and structure of the 1880 Act and subsequent legal developments, the Tribe’s compensable title did not extend to unallotted lands within the Uncompahgre Reservation in Utah. Therefore, those lands are not eligible for restoration under the IRA. The court rejected the Tribe’s various historical and statutory arguments to the contrary and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. View "Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation v. USA" on Justia Law

A company operates a pipeline transporting oil and natural gas liquids between the United States and Canada. A portion of this pipeline crosses twelve miles of land within a Native American reservation in northern Wisconsin. In 2013, the company’s rights-of-way over certain parcels of reservation land expired. During the intervening years, the tribal band acquired ownership interests in a number of these parcels. The company continued to operate the pipeline without securing the tribal band’s renewed consent for the necessary easements. Following a breakdown in negotiations, the tribal band filed suit, alleging trespass and public nuisance. The band also pointed to the risk of a pipeline rupture near a river bend where erosion threatened pipeline safety.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment for the tribal band on its trespass and unjust enrichment claims, and against the company on its breach-of-contract counterclaim. After a bench trial, the district court awarded the band restitution for past trespass, ordered future disgorgement of profits, and issued an injunction requiring the company to cease operations across the affected parcels within three years and to implement a monitoring and shutdown protocol to abate the alleged nuisance. Both parties appealed; the district court stayed the shutdown portion of the injunction while the appeal was pending.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the finding that the company was trespassing on the parcels at issue and that restitution and injunctive relief are appropriate remedies. However, the court vacated the district court’s restitution calculation and the three-year shutdown deadline, remanding for a new determination of remedies that accounts for the public interest and ongoing pipeline reroute efforts. The court also held that federal statutory law displaced the band’s federal common law nuisance claim and vacated the related injunction. View "Bad River Band of the Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa v Enbridge Energy Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Two children were the subjects of a child welfare proceeding after concerns about their well-being led to the filing of a dependency petition. Their mother denied Native American heritage in earlier proceedings, but the record showed that neither the original county child welfare agency nor the juvenile court made sufficient inquiry into the children’s possible Indian ancestry, as required by both federal and California law. The case was later transferred to a different county, where the new agency also relied mainly on the mother’s denials without contacting extended maternal relatives. After the mother’s parental rights were terminated, she appealed, arguing that the agencies failed to comply with their statutory inquiry obligations.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, previously affirmed the ruling that the beneficial relationship exception did not apply but conditionally reversed the order terminating parental rights due to inadequate inquiry into possible Indian ancestry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and related state law. On remand, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services conducted an extensive inquiry, attempting to reach multiple maternal relatives and formally noticing several tribes and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The responses indicated the children were not eligible for tribal membership, and most relatives did not provide information substantiating tribal affiliation.After the additional inquiry, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County found no reason to believe the children were Indian children and reinstated termination of parental rights. The mother appealed again, challenging the adequacy of the inquiry. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, held that the child welfare agency’s actions satisfied their statutory duties under ICWA and related laws. The court affirmed the juvenile court’s order terminating the mother’s parental rights, holding that the agency undertook reasonable and diligent efforts and that further inquiry or notice was not required on the facts presented. View "In re X.A." on Justia Law

A child with multiple disabilities was living with his adoptive parents and several adult siblings, including one sibling with severe mental health issues who engaged in violent behavior. The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) became involved after incidents of domestic violence and reports that the parents were not sufficiently protecting the child. Despite OCS’s warnings and referrals to support organizations, the parents repeatedly allowed the violent sibling back into the home, exposing the child to further risk. Over several years, OCS provided rehabilitative services and created case plans requiring the mother to engage in parenting classes, substance abuse treatment, and measures to keep her adult children out if they were dangerous.The Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Palmer, initially placed the child in OCS custody and appointed a guardian ad litem. The Tribe intervened, and the mother stipulated at an adjudication hearing that the child was in need of aid. OCS continued to provide services and monitored compliance with the case plan, but the mother allowed the adult siblings, including the violent one, to return home. The mother partially engaged with required services but failed to demonstrate sustained protective capacity. OCS eventually filed a petition to terminate parental rights. At trial, testimony from caseworkers, experts, and law enforcement highlighted ongoing risks and the mother’s inability to remedy the unsafe conditions.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the termination order. It held that the Superior Court did not err in finding the child was in need of aid due to substantial risk of mental injury from exposure to domestic violence. The Supreme Court affirmed that OCS made active efforts to reunify the family, that the mother did not remedy the conduct placing the child at risk, and that returning the child to her custody would likely result in serious harm. The Court further held that termination was in the child’s best interests and affirmed the Superior Court’s ruling. View "Erin I. v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

A mother with a lengthy history of drug use, trafficking, and prior child welfare involvement was incarcerated in federal prison after being convicted for conspiracy to possess and distribute controlled substances. Her two minor children, D.L. and A.L., were initially placed with their father. After the children later disclosed abuse and neglect in their father's home, the Department of Social Services removed them and placed them in foster and institutional care.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Minnehaha County, South Dakota, oversaw abuse and neglect proceedings. Both parents stipulated that the children lacked proper parental care. The mother participated in hearings by video conference from prison. During the case, the mother filed three motions for compassionate release from federal custody, arguing that her early release would allow her to reunite with her children and avoid termination of her parental rights. While her first two motions for compassionate release were denied, her third remained pending at the time of the final dispositional hearing. The circuit court denied her requests for a continuance, emphasizing the children's need for stability and the uncertainty of the compassionate release proceedings. The court terminated both parents' rights, finding that the state had met its burden under the Indian Child Welfare Act and that termination was in the children’s best interests.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed only whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying the mother’s continuance requests based on her pending compassionate release motion. The Supreme Court declined to take judicial notice of the subsequent federal order granting compassionate release, as it was outside the appellate record and occurred after the termination decision. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance, emphasizing the children’s need for permanency and the speculative nature of the mother’s potential release. The decision of the circuit court was affirmed. View "Interest Of A.l." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a federally recognized Indian tribe, entered into self-determination contracts with the federal government under the Tribally Controlled Schools Act (TCSA), receiving funds to operate tribal schools. From 2012 to 2019, the tribe used some of these funds for non-school tribal operations, resulting in unearned revenue deficits. After conducting annual audits as required, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) found, in reports covering fiscal years 2016, 2017, and 2018, that the tribe owed millions in disallowed costs. The government began recouping these sums by offsetting other federal payments to the tribe. Although each report notified the tribe of its right to administratively appeal the findings, the tribe did not file any timely administrative or judicial appeals regarding these determinations.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota dismissed the tribe’s initial complaint as untimely, finding the claims barred by the one-year limitations period set by the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA) and the Contract Disputes Act (CDA). The district court allowed the tribe to amend its complaint to assert an overcollection claim concerning the FY 2017 debt. The government moved for summary judgment on this claim, which the district court granted, concluding the tribe had not presented evidence or legal authority to support its position and that the claim was foreclosed by statutory finality rules.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal and grant of summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit held that the tribe’s failure to exhaust its administrative remedies and timely pursue judicial review deprived the courts of subject matter jurisdiction over its claims. The court also held that the government’s collection actions were lawful, since the BIA’s determinations became final and binding when not timely appealed, and rejected the tribe’s arguments regarding overcollection and technical assistance. View "Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Dept. of Interior" on Justia Law