Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

In 2020, a federal grand jury indicted David DeQuattro, an architect, and Cedric Cromwell, Chairman of the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council and President of the Mashpee Wampanoag Gaming Authority. They were charged with various federal offenses, including bribery and extortion, related to Cromwell allegedly soliciting and DeQuattro allegedly providing checks and other items of value to protect a contract between DeQuattro's firm and the Gaming Authority for building a casino on tribal land.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held a jury trial where DeQuattro was convicted of one count of federal-program bribery, and Cromwell was convicted of two counts of federal-program bribery and multiple counts of Hobbs Act extortion. However, the District Court later entered a judgment of acquittal on the Hobbs Act-related counts, determining that the Hobbs Act did not clearly abrogate tribal immunity. Both defendants appealed their § 666 convictions, and the government cross-appealed the judgment of acquittal on the Hobbs Act counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed both the § 666 convictions and the judgment of acquittal. The court found that the evidence did not suffice to show that the RGB contract was "business" of the Tribe, as required under § 666, because the Gaming Authority, which entered the contract, was a separate legal entity from the Tribe and received almost all its funding from a third party. The court also reversed the District Court's judgment of acquittal on the Hobbs Act convictions, holding that tribal officials do not enjoy immunity from federal criminal prosecution and that the evidence was sufficient to show Cromwell's intent to engage in a quid pro quo arrangement. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "United States v. Dequattro" on Justia Law

A mother sought to regain custody of her children, who had been living with their uncle and aunt in Canada for two years. The uncle and aunt opposed the return, arguing it was in the children's best interests to stay with them. Concurrent custody proceedings took place in Alaska and Canada, with Alaska ultimately asserting jurisdiction. After a custody trial, the uncle and aunt were awarded physical and legal custody of the children. The mother appealed, claiming the court made several legal and factual errors.The Alaska Superior Court found that it had jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) and consolidated the cases. During the trial, the court heard testimony from multiple witnesses, including the mother, the uncle, the aunt, and experts. The court found that the children were thriving in Canada and that returning them to their mother would be detrimental due to her erratic behavior and substance use. The court also conducted in camera interviews with the children, who expressed a preference to stay with their uncle and aunt.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's decision. The court held that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding custody to the uncle and aunt, finding that the children's welfare required it. The court also found that the Superior Court correctly applied the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) requirements, determining that the placement constituted a "foster care placement" and that active efforts had been made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family. The court concluded that the expert witnesses were properly qualified and that the evidence supported the finding that returning the children to their mother would likely cause serious emotional damage. The custody and visitation orders were upheld as not being an abuse of discretion. View "O'Brien v. Delaplain" on Justia Law

The case involves a criminal prosecution for a murder in Indian country. Francisco Villanueva and Adan Corona were convicted of first-degree murder and other offenses related to the killing of Vincent Von Brewer III, who owed money to members of the Eastside Oldies gang. Villanueva organized a group, including Corona and Estevan Baquera, to collect the debt. They confronted Brewer at a community center in Pine Ridge, South Dakota, where Villanueva and Corona fatally shot him. Baquera, who acted as an accessory after the fact, helped disguise a getaway car.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota convicted Villanueva and Corona on all counts, sentencing them to life imprisonment. Baquera pleaded guilty to being an accessory after the fact and received the statutory maximum sentence of 180 months, which was an upward variance from the advisory guideline range of 78 to 97 months. The district court found that Baquera pointed a firearm at the crowd to protect the gang members during the attack.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Villanueva challenged the admissibility of an eyewitness identification and the exclusion of a defense expert's testimony. The court found no reversible error, ruling that the identification was not arranged by law enforcement and that the exclusion of the expert's testimony was consistent with precedent. Corona contested the denial of his motion to suppress statements made during a traffic stop, but the court held that the Miranda warnings were not required during the initial detention. Baquera appealed his sentence, arguing it was based on erroneous facts and was unreasonable. The court found no clear error in the district court's findings and upheld the sentence as reasonable.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgments of the district court for all three defendants. View "United States v. Villanueva" on Justia Law

The case involves Angelica A. (mother) and Luis C. (father), who have two children, Dezi C. and Joshua C. In 2019, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) filed petitions to assert dependency jurisdiction over the children due to the parents' substance abuse and domestic violence issues. Both parents denied having Indian heritage, and the juvenile court initially found that ICWA did not apply. The children were removed from their parents' custody, and parental rights were eventually terminated in January 2022, with the children deemed adoptable by their paternal grandparents.The mother appealed the termination of her parental rights, arguing that the Department failed to comply with its duty under ICWA and related California provisions to inquire about the children's possible Indian ancestry from extended family members. The Court of Appeal acknowledged the Department's deficient inquiry but concluded that the error was harmless unless the record contained information suggesting a reason to believe the children might be Indian children.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and held that an inadequate initial ICWA inquiry requires conditional reversal of the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights. The court directed the Department to conduct an adequate inquiry and document it properly. If the juvenile court finds the inquiry proper and concludes that ICWA does not apply, the order terminating parental rights will be reinstated. If the inquiry reveals a reason to know the children are Indian children, the court must proceed in conformity with ICWA and California implementing provisions. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was reversed, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re Dezi C." on Justia Law

Evan D., an Indian child, was born with significant health complications. Shortly after his birth, the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) filed an emergency petition to adjudicate him a child in need of aid due to his parents' history of neglect, substance abuse, and domestic violence. Evan was placed with foster parents Rosalind and Max M., who lived near a medical facility capable of addressing his health needs. The Native Village of Togiak, Evan’s tribe, was informed of the proceedings and later petitioned to transfer jurisdiction over Evan’s case to the tribal court.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, adjudicated Evan a child in need of aid and granted temporary custody to OCS. OCS petitioned to terminate the parental rights of Evan’s parents, and the Tribe petitioned to transfer jurisdiction. Rosalind and Max moved to intervene, arguing that the Tribe might place Evan with his grandmother, who they believed could not meet his health needs. The Superior Court denied their motion, stating that federal law prohibits considering potential placement changes when deciding whether to transfer jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. The court held that the foster parents' arguments against transferring jurisdiction were contrary to federal law, which prohibits considering whether transfer could affect the child's placement. The court affirmed the Superior Court's decision, stating that the foster parents did not present valid grounds to deny the transfer of jurisdiction and therefore did not share any issue of law or fact in common with the underlying proceedings that would justify their intervention. The court also addressed the procedure for staying transfer orders pending appeal, emphasizing the need to balance competing interests. View "Rosalind M. v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves the termination of parental rights of an incarcerated father, Anton K., to his two daughters, Allie and Melissa, who are Indian children under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) removed the children from their parents' home due to allegations of abuse and neglect. Anton was later incarcerated on charges of physical and sexual assault against the children's mother, Keri K., and remained in custody throughout the proceedings.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Palmer, initially found probable cause to believe the children were in need of aid and that OCS had made active efforts to avoid removing them. OCS developed case plans for both parents and facilitated some initial visitation. However, after Anton's incarceration, OCS's efforts to facilitate visitation and provide rehabilitative services were limited, partly due to COVID-19 restrictions and miscommunications with the Department of Corrections (DOC). OCS continued to work with Keri and the children's Tribe, eventually placing the children with maternal relatives after efforts to place them with paternal relatives failed.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's order terminating Anton's parental rights. The court held that OCS had made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the family, considering the entirety of its efforts, including those directed at Keri and the children's extended family. The court acknowledged the significant gaps in OCS's efforts to facilitate visitation and provide services to Anton while incarcerated but concluded that the overall efforts, including those to reunify the children with Keri and place them with relatives, were sufficient under ICWA. View "Anton K. v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves a mother, Heather, who moved with her three children from Minnesota to Washington to escape domestic violence. After their arrival, the family experienced intermittent homelessness, and the children faced developmental and mental health challenges. Heather also struggled with mental health and substance abuse issues. The children's school reported potential physical abuse to the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF), leading to the children being placed in emergency shelter care.The King County Superior Court ordered the children into emergency shelter care, and the Court of Appeals denied review. Heather sought review of the shelter care order in the Washington Supreme Court. Department II of the Supreme Court reversed the shelter care order due to the State's failure to apply the "active efforts" standard required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and the Washington State Indian Child Welfare Act (WICWA). The case was remanded for further fact-finding. On remand, the trial court kept the children in shelter care, finding that returning them to Heather would place them in substantial and immediate danger.The Washington Supreme Court reviewed whether RCW 13.04.033(3) requires a lawyer to obtain "specific direction" from a client before seeking appellate review in child welfare cases. The court held that the statute does require such specific direction but does not mandate a separate sworn document or client signature. A notice of appeal or discretionary review filed under RAP 5.3 satisfies the requirement. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, which had dismissed the review due to the lack of a sworn, signed statement from Heather. However, as the case was moot, the Supreme Court remanded it to the trial court for any further necessary proceedings. View "In re Dependency of A.H." on Justia Law

Leslie Torgerson, a non-Indian, and Terri Torgerson, an enrolled member of the Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate Tribe (SWO), were married in South Dakota. Terri filed for divorce in the SWO tribal court, while Leslie filed for divorce in Roberts County. Leslie moved to dismiss the tribal court proceedings, arguing lack of jurisdiction and improper service, but the tribal court denied his motion. Subsequently, Terri moved to dismiss Leslie’s state court proceedings, and the circuit court granted her motion, recognizing the tribal court’s order under the principle of full faith and credit. Leslie appealed this decision.The circuit court concluded that it shared concurrent subject matter jurisdiction with the tribal court over the divorce but deferred to the tribal court’s order, which it believed had obtained valid personal jurisdiction first. The court also found that the tribal court’s order was entitled to full faith and credit, despite Leslie’s arguments to the contrary.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and reversed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the circuit court erred in extending full faith and credit to the tribal court’s order. Instead, the court should have applied the principles of comity under SDCL 1-1-25, which requires clear and convincing evidence that the tribal court had proper jurisdiction and that the order was obtained through a fair process. The Supreme Court found that the tribal court lacked both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over Leslie, a non-Indian, and that the tribal court’s order did not meet the requirements for comity. Consequently, the tribal court’s order was not enforceable, and the circuit court’s dismissal of Leslie’s divorce action was reversed. View "Torgerson v. Torgerson" on Justia Law

The case involves Angelica A. (mother) and Luis C. (father), who have two children, Dezi C. and Joshua C. In 2019, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) filed petitions to assert dependency jurisdiction over the children due to the parents' substance abuse and domestic violence issues. Both parents denied having Indian heritage on their Parental Notification of Indian Status forms. The juvenile court initially found that ICWA did not apply based on the parents' denials. The children were removed from their parents' custody, and the parents were provided with reunification services, which were later terminated due to non-compliance. The court eventually terminated the parents' rights, concluding the children were adoptable by their paternal grandparents.The mother appealed the termination of her parental rights, arguing that the Department failed to comply with its duty under ICWA and related California provisions to inquire about the children's possible Indian ancestry from extended family members. The Court of Appeal acknowledged the Department's inquiry was deficient but concluded the error was harmless unless the record suggested a reason to believe the children might be Indian children.The California Supreme Court reviewed the case to resolve the conflict among lower courts regarding the standard for assessing prejudice from an inadequate ICWA inquiry. The Court held that an inadequate Cal-ICWA inquiry requires conditional reversal of the juvenile court's order terminating parental rights. The Department must conduct an adequate inquiry and document it properly. If the juvenile court finds the inquiry proper and concludes ICWA does not apply, the termination order will be reinstated. If ICWA applies, the court must proceed accordingly. The Court emphasized the importance of protecting tribal rights and ensuring compliance with ICWA and Cal-ICWA to determine whether a child is an Indian child. View "In re Dezi C." on Justia Law

Kenneth D. was born prematurely and tested positive for amphetamine and syphilis. His mother admitted to using methamphetamine during her pregnancy. The Placer County Department of Health and Human Services filed a juvenile dependency petition to remove Kenneth from his mother and her partner, T.D., due to suspected drug use. Initial inquiries about potential Native American heritage were made, but both mother and T.D. denied having any. Kenneth was placed in temporary custody.The Placer County Superior Court recognized T.D. as the presumed father based on a voluntary declaration of paternity and Kenneth’s birth certificate. Kenneth was adjudged a dependent and removed from the parents' custody. The court found that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did not apply. Later, J.T. was confirmed as Kenneth’s biological father, but the court did not inquire about his potential Native American heritage. The court terminated parental rights and approved an adoption plan, again finding ICWA did not apply. J.T. appealed, arguing the failure to comply with ICWA’s inquiry and notice provisions.The California Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that, absent exceptional circumstances, an appellate court may not consider postjudgment evidence to conclude that an ICWA inquiry error was harmless. The court emphasized that the sufficiency of an ICWA inquiry must generally be determined by the juvenile court in the first instance. The Court of Appeal’s consideration of postjudgment evidence was deemed erroneous. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s judgment and directed a conditional reversal of the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights, remanding the case for compliance with ICWA and California implementing statutes. View "In re Kenneth D." on Justia Law