Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

A group of individuals with beneficial interests in Indian trust lands on the Fort Berthold Reservation in North Dakota challenged the continued operation of an oil pipeline by Andeavor Logistics and related entities after the expiration of a federally granted right-of-way in 2013. Despite the expiration, Andeavor continued to operate the pipeline while negotiating for renewals with both the tribal government and individual landowners, but was unable to secure agreements with all landowners. The plaintiffs, known as the Allottees, alleged ongoing trespass, breach of the expired easement agreement, and unjust enrichment, seeking monetary damages, injunctive relief, and removal of the pipeline.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota twice dismissed the Allottees’ case, first for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, a decision reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in a prior appeal (Chase I), which instructed a stay for further agency action. After further BIA proceedings and related litigation (including the Tesoro case), the district court again dismissed all of the Allottees’ claims with prejudice, finding no individual federal common law cause of action for trespass, breach of contract, or unjust enrichment, and denied their motion to intervene in the Tesoro case, concluding the United States adequately represented their interests.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Allottees’ claims for trespass, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment, holding that individual Indian allottees with only equitable interests in land held in trust by the United States lack standing to bring these claims under federal common law. The court also affirmed denial of intervention in the Tesoro litigation. However, the Eighth Circuit remanded for further consideration of whether consolidation of the two related cases is appropriate under Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. View "Chase v. Andeavor Logistics, L.P." on Justia Law

A federally recognized tribe, which operates casinos under a tribal-state compact allowing video games of chance, objected when the Minnesota Racing Commission approved a 2023 amendment to a racetrack’s card club plan. This amendment allowed Running Aces Casino, Hotel & Racetrack to add an additional dealer table and 11 player stations featuring electronic table games. These electronic games use a live dealer and transmit images of physical cards to player stations, where patrons interact via video screens. Minnesota law limits commercial operation of such gambling devices and video games of chance to tribes and restricts the number of card tables at racetrack card clubs. The tribe argued that the Commission’s approval constituted an unlawful expansion of gambling, infringing upon its statutorily protected competitive environment.After the Racing Commission approved Running Aces’s request, the tribe petitioned the Minnesota Court of Appeals for review. The tribe contended that the Commission erred by permitting racetracks to operate devices reserved for tribes, by exceeding the statutory table limit, and by applying an unpromulgated rule. The Racing Commission and Running Aces challenged the tribe’s standing. The Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that the tribe had standing due to its legally protected market-restricted interest, but rejected its arguments on the merits, affirming the Commission’s decision.On further appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the issue of standing de novo and held that the tribe does have standing to challenge the Commission’s decision, as the statutory scheme creates a competition-restricted environment protecting the tribe’s interest in operating video games of chance. However, because the Supreme Court was evenly divided on the merits of the tribe’s challenge to the Commission’s decision, it affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision without expressing an opinion on those merits. View "In the Matter of the Minnesota Racing Commission's Approval of Running Aces Casino, Hotel & Racetrack's Request to Amend its Plan of Operation" on Justia Law

In 2002, an individual disappeared from her home in Ada, Oklahoma, and her ex-boyfriend quickly became a suspect. Evidence implicating him included his presence at her home, strange phone calls to her family, and physical injuries. Law enforcement discovered blood in his car and house, and, after consulting with his attorney, he led officers to the woman’s body, which was buried and showed signs of gunshot wounds. He subsequently pleaded guilty to murder in Oklahoma state court and was sentenced to life without parole.Many years later, following the Supreme Court’s ruling in McGirt v. Oklahoma, which clarified that certain areas in Oklahoma are Indian country and subject to federal—not state—jurisdiction for major crimes involving Native Americans, the state court vacated his conviction. As a member of a federally recognized tribe and with the crime occurring within the Chickasaw Nation Reservation, only the federal government could prosecute him. A federal grand jury indicted him for murder in Indian country and for causing death while violating federal firearm statutes. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma dismissed one firearm count as time-barred, and a jury convicted him on the remaining counts.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered three main arguments: (1) alleged failures in the jury selection process under the Jury Selection and Service Act, (2) denial of a motion to suppress statements about the location of the victim’s body, and (3) denial of a motion to compel disclosure of communications between the government and former defense counsel. The Tenth Circuit held that the defendant failed to comply with the procedural requirements for challenging jury selection, that Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence did not apply to his statements to law enforcement, and that any error in denying document disclosure was harmless. The convictions were affirmed. View "United States v. Mullins" on Justia Law

Two cousins alleged that the defendant lured them into his trailer with candy and sexually abused them when they were young children. As a result, he was charged with two counts of engaging in a sexual act with a minor under twelve years old, allegedly occurring on the Jicarilla Apache Reservation. The indictment specified that the victims were Indian and that the defendant was a non-Indian, as required for federal jurisdiction under the applicable statutes.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico presided over the trial. The government sought to prove the defendant’s non-Indian status primarily through the testimony of two law enforcement witnesses, who based their conclusions on reviews of various databases and documents. No direct genealogical or enrollment evidence was introduced. At the close of the government’s case, the defendant moved for acquittal under Rule 29, arguing that the government had failed to prove his non-Indian status. The district court denied the motion, relying on the witnesses’ testimonies. The jury convicted the defendant on one count, and he was sentenced to thirty years in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the government had presented sufficient evidence that the defendant was a non-Indian. Applying de novo review, the court found that the government’s evidence was inadequate to establish non-Indian status beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by circuit precedent. The court held that, because non-Indian status is an essential element of the charged crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1152 in the Tenth Circuit, the conviction could not stand without such proof. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit vacated the conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Ruiz" on Justia Law

The case concerns a child who was removed from his parents due to domestic violence, the father’s criminal history, and the mother’s untreated mental illness. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services placed the child with a caretaker and provided reunification services to the parents, but these efforts were unsuccessful. Parental rights were ultimately terminated, and adoption was set as the permanent plan. Throughout the proceedings, the Department investigated whether the child might have Native American heritage, as required under California law analogous to the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the Department’s efforts to determine the child's possible Native American ancestry. The parents had initially denied any such heritage, but at one point the father suggested there might be Native American ancestry. The Department interviewed or attempted to contact numerous relatives and family associates about possible Native American ancestry, but did not contact four specific known relatives. After reviewing the Department's inquiry, the juvenile court found there was no reason to know that ICWA applied in this case.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the adequacy of the Department’s inquiry under the deferential standard established by the California Supreme Court. The Court of Appeal held that the Department had adequately discharged its duty of reasonable inquiry by asking those persons it would normally contact whether the child might have Native American heritage, and was not required to contact every possible relative. The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court’s order, explicitly disagreeing with a contrary approach that would impose broader duties on the Department. View "In re K.G." on Justia Law

Two minor children, J.C. and S.C.Y., both enrolled members of the Mandan Hidatsa Arikara Nation, were placed in the care of Ward County Human Service Zone after repeated removals due to concerns about their mother, P.D.'s, ability to provide proper care. The children were found to be in need of protection and had spent substantial periods in foster care. The State sought termination of P.D.’s parental rights, alleging persistent issues that endangered the children’s well-being, including P.D.'s instability, incomplete compliance with service plans, ongoing substance abuse, and involvement in criminal activity.The Juvenile Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial District, reviewed the petitions and held a trial. The court considered testimony from various witnesses and documentary evidence, including progress reports and judicial notice of prior protection proceedings. The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence that the children were in need of protection, the causes for protection were likely to continue, and the children had suffered harm. The court also found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that returning the children to P.D. would likely cause them serious emotional or physical harm. The court terminated P.D.’s parental rights.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. The court affirmed the juvenile court’s factual findings and conclusions regarding the need for protection and likelihood of ongoing harm. However, the Supreme Court found that the juvenile court failed to make the required specific findings under N.D.C.C. § 27-19.1-01(2), which mandates detailed findings that “active efforts” were made to provide remedial and rehabilitative services to prevent the breakup of the Indian family, and that these efforts were unsuccessful. The Supreme Court retained jurisdiction and remanded the case for the juvenile court to make these necessary findings, allowing additional evidence if required. View "Interest of S.C.Y." on Justia Law

In this case, two federally recognized tribes in Madera County, California, were involved in a dispute over the authorization of a casino. One tribe, North Fork, sought to build and operate a large off-reservation casino on a 305-acre site near State Route 99. To do so, North Fork obtained a favorable “two-part determination” from the Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior, followed by a concurrence from the Governor of California, and the negotiation of a tribal-state compact. The compact was ratified by the Legislature. However, a statewide referendum (Proposition 48) resulted in California voters rejecting the ratification statute. The other tribe, Picayune-Chukchansi, which operated its own on-reservation casino, challenged the validity of the Governor’s concurrence, arguing it was rendered void by the voters’ rejection.Prior to this appeal, the matter was litigated in multiple forums. In the Madera County Superior Court, Picayune-Chukchansi sought declaratory relief to have the Governor’s concurrence declared void ab initio. Proceedings were stayed pending appellate decisions in related cases, including United Auburn Indian Community of Auburn Rancheria v. Newsom by the California Supreme Court, which recognized the Governor’s implied authority to concur, and Stand Up for California! v. State of California (Stand Up II) by the Court of Appeal, which held that the people retained the power to annul the Governor’s concurrence through a referendum. The trial court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of Picayune-Chukchansi, declaring the Governor’s concurrence void from the outset.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that the people of California, by rejecting Proposition 48, exercised their retained power to annul the Governor’s concurrence, and that this annulment rendered the concurrence void ab initio—meaning it never took effect and is not in effect. The court also found that the dispute was not moot and that the Governor’s authority to concur is subject to the electorate’s overriding power under California constitutional law. View "Picayune Rancheria v. North Fork Rancheria" on Justia Law

A non-Indian woman and a member of the Prairie Island Mdewakanton Dakota Indian Community married in Minneapolis and resided with their children in Edina, Minnesota, outside the reservation. Their marriage was supported financially by the husband’s “per capita payments” from the Community, and the wife received tribal insurance benefits, but neither spouse lived or owned property on the reservation. After more than thirteen years, both spouses filed for divorce on the same day—he in the Community’s Tribal Court, she in Minnesota state court. The state court stayed proceedings in favor of the Tribal Court, and after a trial, the Tribal Court dissolved the marriage, divided assets, awarded joint custody, and set child support. It did not award the wife spousal maintenance because under Community law, per capita payments are not marital property. The Community’s Court of Appeals affirmed the Tribal Court’s order.The wife then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, seeking a declaration that the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction and an injunction against enforcement of the order. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the husband, holding that the Tribal Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the divorce under the “consensual relationship exception” from Montana v. United States, based on the marriage and the wife’s connections to the Community.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. The Eighth Circuit held that the Tribal Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a divorce between a tribal member and a nonmember spouse who resided outside the reservation, because the consensual relationship exception did not apply in these circumstances. The court concluded that neither the marriage nor the wife’s limited connections to the Community provided a sufficient nexus to tribal lands or property, nor was tribal jurisdiction necessary to protect self-government or internal relations. The case was remanded with instructions to enjoin enforcement of the Tribal Court’s divorce order. View "Tix v. Tix" on Justia Law

A member of the Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate tribe was observed by a tribal police officer driving erratically within the city limits of Sisseton, nearly causing multiple collisions and fleeing from law enforcement. He was apprehended in a tribal housing unit. Subsequently, the tribal prosecutor charged him in tribal court with driving under the influence (DUI) and resisting arrest, while South Dakota state court charged him with resisting arrest, reckless driving, and assaulting a law enforcement officer. He later pled guilty in state court to assault and was sentenced to two years in prison. The tribal court then dismissed the DUI charge without prejudice.He filed a federal lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota against various tribal officials, alleging that the DUI charge exceeded the tribe’s criminal jurisdiction and violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Indian Civil Rights Act. The District Court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the complaint failed to raise a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the dismissal. The court concluded that, even assuming it had jurisdiction to consider the scope of the tribe’s criminal authority, the case had become moot because the tribal DUI charge was dismissed and could not be refiled due to the expiration of the statute of limitations. The court found that neither the voluntary cessation exception nor the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness applied. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and vacated its decision, declining to address the underlying questions of tribal jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, or exhaustion of tribal remedies. View "LaBatte v. Gangle" on Justia Law

A man was charged with aggravated sexual abuse of a minor that occurred in a home on the Choctaw Nation reservation in Oklahoma. The victim was a six-year-old boy, and the defendant, who had recently moved in with his stepdaughter, was alleged to have committed the offense within two days of his arrival. The prosecution charged the defendant under federal law, which required proof that the victim was an Indian and the defendant was a non-Indian.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma presided over the trial. The government presented testimony from the defendant’s stepdaughter and three law enforcement officers, as well as driver’s license records, to establish that the defendant was not an Indian. The stepdaughter testified she did not know of any tribal membership or Indian identity for the defendant. Law enforcement witnesses stated the defendant did not identify as Native American and that inquiries with five major Oklahoma tribes yielded no information about his tribal status. The defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29, arguing the evidence was insufficient to prove he was a non-Indian. The district court denied the motion, and the jury convicted the defendant, resulting in a 30-year prison sentence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a non-Indian, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 1152. The court held that the government failed to meet its burden, finding the evidence presented was too speculative and insufficient to establish the defendant’s non-Indian status. The Tenth Circuit vacated the conviction and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal. View "United States v. Hebert" on Justia Law