Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

A child who is an enrolled member of a federally recognized tribe was placed in the guardianship of his paternal grandmother after his biological parents were found unable to care for him. Over the years, concerns arose regarding the guardian’s ability to meet the child’s medical and educational needs, leading to multiple child welfare referrals. Ultimately, the county child welfare agency filed a juvenile dependency petition, asserting the guardian’s failure to protect and provide for the child due to alleged mental illness and neglect. The child’s tribe, which had been involved in the child’s probate and dependency matters for several years, requested a court-ordered psychological evaluation of the guardian to assess her capacity to care for the child.The Superior Court of Riverside County ordered the psychological evaluation but specified it was for “case planning purposes only.” When the tribe later sought access to the evaluation to assist in case monitoring and planning, the guardian objected, arguing privacy and privilege concerns. The juvenile court denied the tribe’s request, finding the evaluation was not ordered for the tribe’s benefit and that there were no compelling reasons to release it. The tribe appealed, contending that it had a presumptive right to the evaluation under state and federal law due to its role in protecting the welfare of its citizen child.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, held that the tribe is presumptively entitled to access the guardian’s psychological evaluation under Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 and related statutes. The court concluded that the tribe, as a party to the proceedings and as a multidisciplinary team member, did not need to file a separate petition for access, and that neither privacy nor privilege barred disclosure of the court-ordered report. The appellate court reversed the juvenile court’s order and directed the release of the evaluation to the tribe. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law

The case concerns a longstanding dispute over tribal fishing rights in western Washington, originating from Judge Boldt’s 1974 decision interpreting treaties that guaranteed tribes the right to fish at their usual and accustomed grounds and stations (U&A). The Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe sought a determination that its U&A included the Skagit River, Baker River, and certain marine waters, arguing that these locations had not been specifically determined in the original Final Decision I or subsequent proceedings. The Tribe relied on historical and anthropological evidence, including materials produced after Final Decision I, to support its claim for expanded fishing rights.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed Sauk-Suiattle’s request for determination under Paragraph 25(a)(6) of the permanent injunction, finding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that Sauk-Suiattle’s U&A had been specifically determined in Final Decision I, thereby excluding any unnamed waters from further consideration. The dismissal was also alternatively supported by collateral estoppel grounds. The district court denied Sauk-Suiattle’s motion for reconsideration, which included additional evidence and expert testimony.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Sauk-Suiattle’s claim to U&A on the Skagit River, holding that this issue was precluded by its prior decision in Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe, 66 F.4th 766 (9th Cir. 2023). However, the Court reversed the district court’s dismissal as to the Baker River and marine waters, finding that Judge Boldt had not specifically determined Sauk-Suiattle’s rights to those locations. The Ninth Circuit remanded for the district court to exercise jurisdiction and consider Sauk-Suiattle’s Baker River and marine waters claims. View "SAUK-SUIATTLE INDIAN TRIBE V. STATE OF WASHINGTON" on Justia Law

A ten-year-old child, considered an Indian child under the Indian Child Welfare Act, was taken into emergency state custody due to neglect and self-harm concerns. The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) placed the child in foster care and later admitted him to a residential psychiatric facility for mental health treatment. The Native Village of Hooper Bay, the child’s tribe, intervened in the child in need of aid (CINA) proceeding and sought access to the child’s unredacted psychotherapy records, arguing they were necessary to secure appropriate services for the child. The child’s attorney objected to the release of these records, citing confidentiality concerns, while the court-appointed guardian ad litem (GAL) waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege.The Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Fourth Judicial District, Hooper Bay, ruled that the GAL held the authority to waive the child’s psychotherapist-patient privilege under CINA Rule 9(b)(3)(F)(ii) because the child was under twelve. The court ordered the release of the records to all parties, finding that the child’s attorney’s objection did not nullify the GAL’s waiver. The child’s motions for reconsideration and for an in camera review were denied, and the records were disclosed.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed whether a child between ten and twelve can, through an attorney’s objection, override a GAL’s waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in CINA proceedings. The court held that a child’s objection does not nullify the GAL’s waiver of the privilege. However, following an objection, the child bears the burden of showing that confidentiality should be maintained under the multi-factor framework of CINA Rule 9(b)(3)(D). The Supreme Court found that the superior court adequately applied the relevant factors and affirmed the decision to disclose the child’s records. View "Tanuk S. v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

The case concerns a fatal shooting that occurred after an altercation in a bar, where the defendant, after being physically attacked and ejected by several patrons, retrieved a firearm from his vehicle and fired into the bar, killing a patron. There was evidence presented that the defendant suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and possibly a traumatic brain injury as a result of the fight, which could have affected his mental state and perception of danger at the time of the shooting.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma presided over the original trial, where the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder in Indian Country and using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. The district court instructed the jury on imperfect self-defense but did not inform them that the government bore the burden to disprove this defense beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also instructed on diminished capacity, stating it was not a defense to second-degree murder or manslaughter. The defendant raised several challenges on appeal, including errors in jury instructions and prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. The district court also addressed multiplicitous charges under 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 924(j), dismissing the greater-included offense.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that the district court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury that the government must disprove imperfect self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt as to first-degree murder. This error affected the defendant's substantial rights and seriously impacted the fairness of the proceedings, necessitating reversal of the first-degree murder conviction. The Tenth Circuit rejected the defendant’s other challenges, including those related to diminished capacity instructions and prosecutorial statements. The court affirmed the district court’s choice to dismiss the greater-included firearm offense and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "United States v. Phillips" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was indicted for murder and related firearm offenses arising from the death of an individual in Indian Country. A key witness, William Lozer, had previously testified at a state preliminary hearing that the defendant confessed to and described details of the crime. Prior to the defendant's federal trial, the government was unable to locate Lozer, who was known to be transient and had not been seen or contacted by his family or attorney for months. The government sought to introduce Lozer's prior testimony, which had been given under oath and subject to cross-examination by defense counsel.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma considered whether the government had made sufficient efforts to locate Lozer and ultimately found that, despite reasonable and good-faith efforts, Lozer was unavailable as a witness. As a result, the court permitted the prior testimony to be read to the jury. At trial, additional evidence against the defendant was introduced, including incriminating statements to other individuals and physical evidence. The defendant was convicted on all counts, and the district court sentenced him to life in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the defendant’s argument that his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was violated by the admission of Lozer’s prior testimony. Applying a de novo standard of review, the Tenth Circuit held that the government’s efforts to locate Lozer were reasonable and made in good faith under the circumstances. Thus, Lozer was properly deemed unavailable, and the admission of his prior, cross-examined testimony did not violate the defendant’s confrontation rights. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the defendant’s convictions. View "United States v. Barker" on Justia Law

Two children, John and Jane, lived primarily with their maternal grandfather under an informal arrangement, while their parents, Nicole Roy and Harrison Dudley, Sr., retained responsibility for their medical care. Medical professionals discovered severe health issues: Jane, age two, suffered from life-threatening anemia and a scalp infection, while John, age six, had significant developmental delays and both children had untreated head lice. Roy and Dudley repeatedly failed to follow through with prescribed treatments, missed follow-up appointments, and did not address the children's medical and hygiene needs, despite receiving explicit instructions and assistance from healthcare providers.A grand jury indicted Roy and Dudley for felony child neglect and felony child endangerment under the Major Crimes Act, alleging the offenses occurred on the Red Lake Indian Reservation. After a trial in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, a jury convicted both defendants on all counts. The district court sentenced Roy to twelve months and one day and Dudley to four months of imprisonment, with both receiving three years of supervised release and special assessments. Roy’s appeal became moot due to her death, while Dudley appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the legality of his sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that sufficient evidence supported Dudley’s convictions, finding that a rational jury could conclude he willfully deprived the children of necessary care and recklessly endangered their health. The court also held that Dudley’s term of supervised release and the imposition of special federal assessments were lawful under the Major Crimes Act and relevant federal statutes. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment as to Dudley and vacated the judgment as to Roy, remanding with instructions to dismiss her indictment. View "United States v. Roy" on Justia Law

A minor was removed from the custody of her adoptive parents following reports of severe physical abuse by her adoptive father and the adoptive mother’s failure to protect her. Reunification services were initially ordered for both parents, but after minimal progress, those services were terminated and a permanent plan of legal guardianship was established. The minor, approaching adulthood, was placed with new caregivers and expressed a desire for adoption by them. The adoptive mother later sought reinstatement of reunification services, arguing that the shift in the permanent plan from guardianship to adoption constituted changed circumstances, and that reinstating services would be in the minor’s best interest.The Superior Court of Calaveras County summarily denied the mother’s petition for modification under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388, finding she failed to make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances or new evidence, or that the requested relief would serve the minor’s best interest. The court also vacated a hearing on termination of parental rights, instead setting a new permanent plan and maintaining dependency jurisdiction.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying the mother’s section 388 petition without a hearing, as the petition did not present new evidence or demonstrate changed circumstances sufficient to warrant reinstatement of services. However, the Court of Appeal found that the Calaveras County Health and Human Services Agency failed to comply fully with its inquiry and notice obligations under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) regarding both biological and adoptive extended relatives. The appellate court affirmed the denial of the section 388 petition, but vacated the ICWA finding and remanded for further ICWA compliance and entry of a new finding. View "In re W.A." on Justia Law

A federally recognized Alaska Native tribe, Dot Lake Village, is a member of an intertribal consortium known as the Tanana Chiefs Conference (TCC). TCC, originally organized as a grassroots group in 1962 and incorporated as a nonprofit under Alaska law in 1971, provides governmental services—including healthcare—to its 42 member villages, most of which are federally recognized tribes. In 2021, TCC’s board of directors voted to recall its president, a decision Dot Lake Village challenged as violating TCC’s bylaws.Dot Lake Village filed a lawsuit in the Alaska Superior Court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to invalidate the recall and enforce procedural requirements for TCC meetings. TCC responded with a motion to dismiss under Alaska Civil Rule 12(b)(1), arguing the suit was barred by sovereign immunity because TCC is an arm of its member tribes. The superior court agreed, applying the multi-factor test from White v. University of California and Runyon ex rel. B.R. v. Association of Village Council Presidents, and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court also awarded attorney’s fees to TCC as the prevailing party, finding that Dot Lake Village had waived sovereign immunity on the fee issue by filing suit.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the dismissal and the attorney’s fees award. The court held that TCC possesses tribal sovereign immunity as an arm of its member tribes under the multi-factor test from Ito v. Copper River Native Association, and that no exception to immunity applies. The court also held that by bringing the lawsuit, Dot Lake Village waived its sovereign immunity with respect to attorney’s fees. The orders of the superior court were affirmed. View "DOT LAKE VILLAGE v. DENÁ NENÁ HENASH" on Justia Law

A member of the Choctaw Tribe was arrested by a police officer from the Duncan Police Department after the officer responded to a report of a suspicious individual at a store located within the boundaries of the Chickasaw Nation. The officer, who was cross-commissioned by both the city and the tribe, conducted field sobriety tests, arrested the individual, and read him Oklahoma’s Implied Consent Test Request. The arrestee was booked on state criminal charges, but it was later discovered during booking that he was a tribal member and the alleged offenses occurred in Indian country, rendering Oklahoma courts without jurisdiction. The officer then filed tribal charges, which were eventually dismissed.Following these events, the individual filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, raising federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest and state-law claims for false arrest and unlawful detention. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, determining that the officer acted under tribal, not state, authority and thus the § 1983 claim failed. The court also dismissed the state-law claims for the same reason.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the district court’s ruling was based on a misunderstanding of the applicable law. The appellate court explained that a state officer may detain a suspect before conclusively determining tribal status, and that acting in excess of authority may still constitute action under color of state law for § 1983 purposes. The Tenth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, without deciding whether the officer ultimately satisfied the color-of-law requirement. The court also reversed the dismissal of the state-law claims, since that decision depended on the mistaken analysis of the federal claim. View "Walden v. The City of Duncan, Oklahoma" on Justia Law

The case involves a child custody dispute between the unmarried parents of a minor child. The father is a member of the Kenaitze Indian Tribe, and the child is eligible for tribal membership; the mother is not a tribal member. Both parents sought custody, but disagreed on whether the case should proceed in the Kenaitze Tribal Court or the Alaska Superior Court. The father first filed a non-emergency custody petition in tribal court but soon asked to withdraw it after reaching a temporary agreement with the mother. Afterward, the mother filed petitions for domestic violence protective orders (DVPOs) against the father in state court, receiving a short-term order. While the long-term DVPO was pending, the father filed a second custody petition in tribal court, and the tribal court notified both parties of a custody hearing. Later, the mother filed a custody complaint in state superior court.The Alaska Superior Court reviewed motions from both parties. The father argued that because he first filed in tribal court, the tribal court should decide the matter. The mother contended the tribal court lacked jurisdiction under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and that she did not consent to tribal jurisdiction. The superior court found the tribal court had exercised jurisdiction first and dismissed the state custody case, pending acceptance by the tribal court. The mother appealed the dismissal, and the superior court stayed its order during the appeal. The father cross-appealed the stay.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska held that the tribal court was the proper forum for the custody dispute because the father's petition was filed there before the mother initiated state custody proceedings. The court clarified that, when simultaneous custody actions are filed in both tribal and state courts, the court where the matter is first filed is the preferred forum. The court affirmed the dismissal of the state case and found the issue of the stay pending appeal to be moot. View "Mallette v. Adams" on Justia Law