Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

Two parents, Ruby and Jaspar, challenged the termination of their parental rights to their two children, both of whom are considered Indian children under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) due to their mother’s tribal membership. Both parents had longstanding substance abuse issues, and the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) became involved after incidents of neglect, drug exposure, and unsanitary living conditions, including both children testing positive for opioids at birth and after the family’s eviction. The children were removed from the home and placed with relatives, while OCS provided the parents with case plans, referrals to treatment, visitation arrangements, and repeated efforts to maintain contact and assist with reunification.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, First Judicial District, Juneau, oversaw proceedings in which both parents stipulated to probable cause that their children were in need of aid. Over time, both parents disengaged from OCS and became largely unreachable, prompting OCS to increase its efforts to locate them through various means, including collaboration with tribal representatives, outreach at shelters, and the use of multiple databases. Despite intermittent contact and some attempts by the parents to reengage, the children remained in foster care for nearly three years while OCS continued providing services and support to the children and their caregivers.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska, the parents argued that OCS failed to make “active efforts” to reunify the family as required by ICWA, and the mother further argued that the court erred in finding her continued custody likely to harm the children and that termination was in their best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed the termination, holding that OCS made thorough and diligent efforts under ICWA, that the record supported the finding of likely harm if the children were returned to the parents, and that termination was in the children’s best interests. View "Ruby C. v. State" on Justia Law

A young girl, identified as H.M., moved in with her uncle and aunt in Oklahoma in 2014. Both caretakers, the uncle (a member of the Cherokee Nation) and his wife (a non-Indian), became the subject of concern when, in 2019, H.M., then nine years old, fled their home. She was found malnourished, unwashed, and exhibiting signs of physical and emotional abuse, including weight loss and injuries. Subsequent investigation revealed a long period of severe abuse and neglect.A federal grand jury in the Northern District of Oklahoma indicted both caretakers on charges of child abuse and child neglect under Oklahoma law, with federal jurisdiction arising under statutes applicable to Indian country. The uncle was charged under the Major Crimes Act, while the aunt was charged via the Assimilative Crimes Act and the General Crimes Act. Both were also charged with aiding and abetting each other. After a joint jury trial, both were found guilty of child abuse and child neglect. The aunt unsuccessfully moved post-trial to dismiss the indictment for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for a new trial. At sentencing, the uncle received 180 months and the aunt 240 months in prison, based on sentencing calculations that did not apply a particular federal sentencing guideline.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in calculating the uncle’s advisory sentencing range because it failed to apply the most analogous federal guideline—aggravated assault under U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2—to the Oklahoma child abuse conviction. This was deemed procedural error warranting resentencing. The Tenth Circuit vacated the uncle’s sentence and remanded for resentencing, but affirmed all other convictions and the aunt’s sentence, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions, jurisdictional rulings, or the handling of sentencing evidence. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Kyle and Jill Welsh, members of the Colorado River Indian Tribes (CRIT) and owners of WW Young Money, LLC, leased tribal land to operate a smoke shop. After renewing their lease in 2020, tribal officials notified the Welshes in 2021 that their lease was terminated, alleging violations of the CRIT property code, including untimely rent payments, continued occupancy after a demand to vacate, and property damage. The Welshes responded by filing a civil RICO action in federal court, alleging that the tribal officials engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity that included illegal lease termination, conversion of inventory, extortion, and providing false information to law enforcement.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the complaint. It held that the tribal officials were entitled to sovereign immunity because their alleged conduct occurred within the scope of their authority and in their representative capacities. The court also ruled that CRIT was a required party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, as it had a legally protected interest in the lease, and that the action could not continue without the tribe, whose joinder was barred by sovereign immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the tribal officials were not entitled to sovereign immunity because they were sued in their individual capacities for money damages, and any recovery would come from them personally, not from CRIT. The appellate court also determined that CRIT was not a required party because the outcome would not affect its real property or contractual rights, as the plaintiffs did not seek to reinstate the lease. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(7) and remanded for consideration of whether the complaint states a valid claim and if leave to amend should be granted. View "WELSH V. LOUDBEAR" on Justia Law

This case concerns a mother’s appeal from an order terminating her parental rights to three children, following state intervention and child protection proceedings. The Department of Public Health and Human Services initiated proceedings by filing petitions asserting the children were in need of care, identifying the children’s parents, and considering whether the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) might apply. The Department investigated possible tribal connections, particularly with the Blackfeet Tribe, by gathering family history, sending verification requests, and notifying the Tribe of hearings. The Blackfeet Tribe responded that none of the children were enrolled or eligible for enrollment. The Department completed ICWA checklists, and the district court, after multiple hearings, consistently found no reason to know the children were Indian children under ICWA.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, terminated the mother’s parental rights, finding that the Department made diligent efforts to determine the applicability of ICWA. At no point during the proceedings did the mother object to, or challenge, the Department’s efforts or the court’s determination that ICWA did not apply. It was only on appeal that she argued the Department’s efforts were insufficient, citing potential errors in information provided to the Blackfeet Tribe.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the district court correctly found that the Department made diligent efforts regarding ICWA. The Supreme Court held that the district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous: the Department fulfilled its duty to investigate and notify the Tribe, and no evidence supported a contrary result. The Court further held that the mother waived her right to challenge the Department’s ICWA efforts by not objecting during the lower court proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed the order terminating parental rights. View "In re L.C." on Justia Law

A child, K.L., was removed from his mother’s custody after allegations of substance abuse and child endangerment. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a petition on K.L.’s behalf, and he was placed with his half-siblings at their maternal aunt’s home. The mother’s whereabouts were frequently unknown, and she made only limited appearances during the proceedings. The father, J.A., was not initially involved but later established his biological relationship to K.L. and participated in reunification efforts, which ultimately were terminated after the court found his progress insufficient. The juvenile court then terminated both parents’ rights after determining K.L. was likely to be adopted, and no exception to adoption applied.After the termination of his parental rights, the father appealed, arguing that DCFS failed to conduct an adequate initial inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and corresponding California law. Specifically, he asserted that DCFS should have made greater efforts to contact the maternal grandmother to determine whether K.L. might have Indian ancestry. The father contended that the failure to interview the maternal grandmother rendered the inquiry insufficient and warranted conditional reversal of the termination order.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the record and determined that DCFS fulfilled its initial inquiry obligations by contacting all reasonably available relatives, including the parents, paternal grandmother, maternal aunt, and others. The court found that maternal grandmother was not reasonably available, as her contact information could not be obtained and the maternal aunt declined to provide it without her consent. The court held that DCFS was not required to take additional investigative steps. The order terminating parental rights was affirmed. View "In re K.L." on Justia Law

A mother gave birth to a child who was eligible for enrollment in an Indian tribe as defined by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The mother admitted to using methamphetamine during pregnancy, which led to an initial report to state authorities, though the child remained in her care as he did not test positive for drugs. Several months later, the child was found unattended in a hotel room under the care of an adult suspected of being under the influence, prompting the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) to take emergency custody. The father, who was incarcerated at the time, was identified and participated in early proceedings by telephone. Following his release, he attempted to engage in the case plan and visited his son, but over the next two and a half years, OCS assigned five different caseworkers to the family. The father experienced periods of incarceration, lapses in contact, and personal challenges, but he also took parenting classes, sought substance abuse assessment, and maintained some visitation.The Superior Court for the Third Judicial District, Anchorage, adjudicated the child as being in need of aid and later terminated the father’s parental rights on grounds of abandonment and substance abuse. At trial, the court found that OCS had made active efforts to reunify the family, relying on the preparation of a case plan, some referrals for substance abuse testing, and attempts to contact the father, even though it recognized that OCS’s efforts were not perfect, especially during periods of the father’s incarceration.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed whether OCS’s actions satisfied ICWA’s requirement that “active efforts” be made to prevent the breakup of an Indian family. The court held that OCS’s efforts were passive rather than active because it failed to make necessary referrals, provide adequate support services, and consistently engage with the father. The Supreme Court of Alaska reversed the termination of parental rights and remanded for further proceedings. View "Jace B. v. State" on Justia Law

A member of the Te-Moak Tribe of Western Shoshone Indians allegedly sold fentanyl to a non-tribal member while on tribal land within Nevada. After the transaction, the buyer left tribal territory and subsequently died in nontribal state territory from an overdose of the fentanyl, combined with methamphetamine. The State charged the tribal member with second-degree murder caused by a controlled substance, based on the sale leading to the buyer’s death.The Fourth Judicial District Court, Elko County, granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge, agreeing with his argument that the federal Major Crimes Act preempted Nevada’s jurisdiction. The district court reasoned that the only alleged criminal act—the drug sale—occurred entirely within tribal land, and thus Nevada could not prosecute the offense.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada considered whether the State had jurisdiction to prosecute a crime that began in Indian country but was completed in nontribal state territory. The Supreme Court held that Nevada has jurisdiction over crimes consummated within its boundaries, pursuant to NRS 171.015. The court determined that the charged offense was not complete until the victim died, and because death occurred in nontribal state territory, the crime was interterritorial and consummated within Nevada. The court further held that the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a), does not preempt Nevada’s jurisdiction over crimes that occur partially in Indian country and partially in nontribal territory. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court’s order of dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "STATE VS SALAZAR" on Justia Law

The case concerns an agreement between the City of Tulsa and the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, made in connection with ongoing federal litigation over whether Tulsa has criminal jurisdiction over Native Americans for conduct within the Nation's reservation. Through a settlement, Tulsa agreed not to exercise criminal jurisdiction over Native Americans on the reservation, to dismiss pending prosecutions in municipal court, and to refrain from future prosecutions of Native Americans for acts occurring there. The State of Oklahoma, through its Governor, challenged the validity of this settlement, arguing it was entered into without necessary state approvals.Following the settlement, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma declined to rule on the agreement’s validity, finding that whether the agreement was lawful was a matter of state law. The federal court also denied the State’s motion to intervene and ultimately dismissed the federal litigation after the parties stipulated to dismissal in light of their settlement.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma assumed original jurisdiction to decide whether Tulsa’s agreement with the Nation was valid under state law. The court concluded that although cities may enter into cooperative agreements with tribal governments, state law requires such agreements to be approved by both the Governor and the Joint Committee on State-Tribal Relations. The court held that Tulsa’s settlement was a new and independent agreement—not merely an extension of a prior cross-deputization agreement—and lacked the mandatory statutory approvals. The court issued a writ of mandamus compelling Tulsa to secure those approvals if it wishes to proceed and declared the settlement unenforceable as a matter of law until such approvals are obtained. View "STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. STITT v. CITY OF TULSA" on Justia Law

The case concerns the reconstruction of a bridge on Interstate 95 in Providence, Rhode Island, a project that received federal funding from the Federal Highway Administration. Because the project would affect the Providence Covelands Archaeological District, a site of historic and religious importance to the Narragansett Indian Tribe, federal law required that the agency consult with the Tribe and consider mitigation measures. Initially, a 2011 programmatic agreement provided for the transfer of certain parcels of land to the Tribe, but this transfer stalled when the State of Rhode Island demanded the Tribe waive its sovereign immunity as a condition. The Tribe refused, negotiations failed, and the agreement was terminated. Subsequently, the Highway Administration developed a new programmatic agreement, which did not include land transfers but instead provided for preservation covenants and educational initiatives. The Tribe objected to both the process and substance of the new agreement.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the Tribe’s claims regarding the first agreement for lack of standing but found standing as to claims concerning the second agreement. The district court granted summary judgment to the Highway Administration, ruling that the agency had adequately consulted with the Tribe, was not required to include the Tribe as a signatory, and had reasonably explained changes between agreements.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Tribe had standing to challenge the adequacy of consultation and the process by which the second agreement was adopted. The court further held that the Highway Administration was not required to make the Tribe a signatory since the affected land was not tribal land, that consultation with the Tribe was adequate under the law, and that the agency’s change of position was reasonably explained and not arbitrary or capricious. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Narragansett Indian Tribe v. McMaster" on Justia Law

A federally recognized tribe in Oklahoma has experienced ongoing leadership disputes for nearly two decades, with multiple factions vying for control. Since 2007, the tribe has failed to hold valid elections, instead appointing interim leaders, which has led to repeated litigation in tribal, federal, and now state courts. Recently, rival claimants conducted separate elections, resulting in competing assertions of authority and control over tribal assets, with the Bureau of Indian Affairs declining to recognize any leader due to the unresolved internal conflict.The Okfuskee County District Court became involved after one faction, supported by its purported Business Committee, filed for a temporary restraining order against another group for trespass and sought declaratory relief as to the legitimate tribal leadership. The court issued an emergency restraining order and denied a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the Business Committee recognized by tribal courts was the proper authority and that the dispute concerned civil trespass, not internal governance.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma was asked to assume original jurisdiction and issue a writ of prohibition against the district court’s proceedings. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that the dispute in the district court was, in fact, an unresolved intratribal leadership conflict that would require the state court to interpret tribal law and governance structures. The court determined that such intratribal disputes are nonjusticiable in state courts due to principles of tribal sovereignty and self-government, and that the purported waiver of sovereign immunity by one faction could not confer jurisdiction when the authority of that faction itself was contested. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma granted the writ of prohibition, assumed original jurisdiction, and ordered the district court to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "ANDERSON v. PARRISH" on Justia Law