Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, a federally recognized Indian tribe, entered into self-determination contracts with the federal government under the Tribally Controlled Schools Act (TCSA), receiving funds to operate tribal schools. From 2012 to 2019, the tribe used some of these funds for non-school tribal operations, resulting in unearned revenue deficits. After conducting annual audits as required, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) found, in reports covering fiscal years 2016, 2017, and 2018, that the tribe owed millions in disallowed costs. The government began recouping these sums by offsetting other federal payments to the tribe. Although each report notified the tribe of its right to administratively appeal the findings, the tribe did not file any timely administrative or judicial appeals regarding these determinations.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota dismissed the tribe’s initial complaint as untimely, finding the claims barred by the one-year limitations period set by the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA) and the Contract Disputes Act (CDA). The district court allowed the tribe to amend its complaint to assert an overcollection claim concerning the FY 2017 debt. The government moved for summary judgment on this claim, which the district court granted, concluding the tribe had not presented evidence or legal authority to support its position and that the claim was foreclosed by statutory finality rules.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal and grant of summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit held that the tribe’s failure to exhaust its administrative remedies and timely pursue judicial review deprived the courts of subject matter jurisdiction over its claims. The court also held that the government’s collection actions were lawful, since the BIA’s determinations became final and binding when not timely appealed, and rejected the tribe’s arguments regarding overcollection and technical assistance. View "Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Dept. of Interior" on Justia Law

A newborn child was taken into state custody shortly after birth due to testing positive for addictive substances and requiring intensive medical care for withdrawal. The mother, who initially sought substance abuse treatment, was involuntarily discharged from her program for rule violations and aggression. After her discharge, she failed to participate in drug testing and further treatment, and disengaged from the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) for about a year. The child, considered an “Indian child” under federal law, was eventually placed in a foster home compliant with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The father was largely absent and uninvolved. After nearly the child’s entire life in state custody, the agency petitioned to terminate parental rights.The Superior Court for the Third Judicial District in Anchorage held a termination trial. The OCS presented testimony from a substance abuse expert and a cultural expert from the child’s tribe, as required by ICWA. The cultural expert, who was a tribal elder and had relevant experience, testified generally about substance abuse, the importance of child safety, and the parents’ noncooperation, but provided little detail about the tribe’s specific cultural standards as they related to the mother’s conduct. The superior court found clear and convincing evidence of risk of harm to the child, relied on the expert testimony, and terminated the mother’s parental rights.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska found that, although the expert was qualified, his testimony did not sufficiently contextualize the mother’s conduct within the tribe’s social and cultural standards, as required by ICWA. The court held that such testimony must be specifically grounded in the facts of the case and provide meaningful cultural context. Because this standard was not met, the Supreme Court reversed the termination of parental rights and remanded for further proceedings. View "Viva G. v. State" on Justia Law

A group of non-tribal landowners formed an association to regulate the use of parcels in a residential development on land historically belonging to a Native American tribe. After the tribe reacquired several lots through a designated tribal member, the association amended its restrictive covenants to prevent transfer of land to sovereign nations and to block removal of property from county tax rolls. The tribal member purchased multiple lots for the tribe and requested the federal government hold the land in trust. The association then filed suit in state court, seeking to enforce its covenants and prevent the tribe from reacquiring and exempting the land from local control.The Menominee County Circuit Court initially denied the tribe’s motion to dismiss. Later, after reconsideration, the circuit court dismissed the case, finding that federal law preempted the covenants and that tribal sovereign immunity barred the suit. The association appealed. While the state appeal was pending, the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Interior Board of Indian Appeals determined that federal law required acquisition of the lots into trust, and federal court affirmed dismissal of the association’s challenge, citing federal preemption. The association clarified it still sought a declaration on the enforceability of certain covenants.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case following certification from the court of appeals. It held that the tribe’s sovereign immunity barred the lawsuit, finding no congressional abrogation or waiver of immunity. The court also rejected arguments for in rem or immovable property exceptions to tribal immunity and concluded that immunity extended to the tribal member because the tribe was the real party in interest. The judgment of dismissal by the Menominee County Circuit Court was affirmed. View "Legend Lake Property Owners Association, Inc. v. Keshena" on Justia Law

A dispute arose over the operation of the Klamath Project, a large federal water management system serving both agricultural and wildlife needs in Northern California and Southern Oregon. The Bureau of Reclamation manages the project, which involves distributing water from Upper Klamath Lake, a reservoir that also provides habitat for endangered and threatened species, including two species of suckers and coho salmon. In response to ongoing drought and the listing of these species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the Bureau consulted with federal wildlife agencies and adopted procedures requiring minimum water levels and stream flows to protect the listed species. Competing interests include tribal fishing rights, agricultural irrigation, and wildlife conservation.The conflict intensified when the Klamath Water Users Association and Klamath Irrigation District challenged the Bureau’s authority to release water from Upper Klamath Lake to comply with the ESA, arguing such releases diminished water available for irrigation and exceeded the Bureau’s authority under state and federal law. The Oregon Water Resources Department issued an order to halt these releases, which led federal agencies and tribal groups to seek declaratory and injunctive relief in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The district court held that the Bureau's operations were subject to the ESA and enjoined enforcement of the state order.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the ESA applies to the Bureau’s operation of the Klamath Project, whether the district court’s order constituted a judicial taking of water rights, and whether the district court had jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit held that Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA applies to the Bureau’s Klamath Project operations, reaffirming its precedent that the ESA governs such federal water management actions. The court rejected the judicial taking claim, finding no adjudication of water rights occurred, and determined that neither prior exclusive jurisdiction nor Colorado River abstention doctrines barred the district court from deciding the case. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. View "YUROK TRIBE V. KLAMATH WATER USERS ASSOCIATION" on Justia Law

Two parents, Ruby and Jaspar, challenged the termination of their parental rights to their two children, both of whom are considered Indian children under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) due to their mother’s tribal membership. Both parents had longstanding substance abuse issues, and the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) became involved after incidents of neglect, drug exposure, and unsanitary living conditions, including both children testing positive for opioids at birth and after the family’s eviction. The children were removed from the home and placed with relatives, while OCS provided the parents with case plans, referrals to treatment, visitation arrangements, and repeated efforts to maintain contact and assist with reunification.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, First Judicial District, Juneau, oversaw proceedings in which both parents stipulated to probable cause that their children were in need of aid. Over time, both parents disengaged from OCS and became largely unreachable, prompting OCS to increase its efforts to locate them through various means, including collaboration with tribal representatives, outreach at shelters, and the use of multiple databases. Despite intermittent contact and some attempts by the parents to reengage, the children remained in foster care for nearly three years while OCS continued providing services and support to the children and their caregivers.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska, the parents argued that OCS failed to make “active efforts” to reunify the family as required by ICWA, and the mother further argued that the court erred in finding her continued custody likely to harm the children and that termination was in their best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed the termination, holding that OCS made thorough and diligent efforts under ICWA, that the record supported the finding of likely harm if the children were returned to the parents, and that termination was in the children’s best interests. View "Ruby C. v. State" on Justia Law

A young girl, identified as H.M., moved in with her uncle and aunt in Oklahoma in 2014. Both caretakers, the uncle (a member of the Cherokee Nation) and his wife (a non-Indian), became the subject of concern when, in 2019, H.M., then nine years old, fled their home. She was found malnourished, unwashed, and exhibiting signs of physical and emotional abuse, including weight loss and injuries. Subsequent investigation revealed a long period of severe abuse and neglect.A federal grand jury in the Northern District of Oklahoma indicted both caretakers on charges of child abuse and child neglect under Oklahoma law, with federal jurisdiction arising under statutes applicable to Indian country. The uncle was charged under the Major Crimes Act, while the aunt was charged via the Assimilative Crimes Act and the General Crimes Act. Both were also charged with aiding and abetting each other. After a joint jury trial, both were found guilty of child abuse and child neglect. The aunt unsuccessfully moved post-trial to dismiss the indictment for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for a new trial. At sentencing, the uncle received 180 months and the aunt 240 months in prison, based on sentencing calculations that did not apply a particular federal sentencing guideline.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in calculating the uncle’s advisory sentencing range because it failed to apply the most analogous federal guideline—aggravated assault under U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2—to the Oklahoma child abuse conviction. This was deemed procedural error warranting resentencing. The Tenth Circuit vacated the uncle’s sentence and remanded for resentencing, but affirmed all other convictions and the aunt’s sentence, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions, jurisdictional rulings, or the handling of sentencing evidence. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Kyle and Jill Welsh, members of the Colorado River Indian Tribes (CRIT) and owners of WW Young Money, LLC, leased tribal land to operate a smoke shop. After renewing their lease in 2020, tribal officials notified the Welshes in 2021 that their lease was terminated, alleging violations of the CRIT property code, including untimely rent payments, continued occupancy after a demand to vacate, and property damage. The Welshes responded by filing a civil RICO action in federal court, alleging that the tribal officials engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity that included illegal lease termination, conversion of inventory, extortion, and providing false information to law enforcement.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the complaint. It held that the tribal officials were entitled to sovereign immunity because their alleged conduct occurred within the scope of their authority and in their representative capacities. The court also ruled that CRIT was a required party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, as it had a legally protected interest in the lease, and that the action could not continue without the tribe, whose joinder was barred by sovereign immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the tribal officials were not entitled to sovereign immunity because they were sued in their individual capacities for money damages, and any recovery would come from them personally, not from CRIT. The appellate court also determined that CRIT was not a required party because the outcome would not affect its real property or contractual rights, as the plaintiffs did not seek to reinstate the lease. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(7) and remanded for consideration of whether the complaint states a valid claim and if leave to amend should be granted. View "WELSH V. LOUDBEAR" on Justia Law

This case concerns a mother’s appeal from an order terminating her parental rights to three children, following state intervention and child protection proceedings. The Department of Public Health and Human Services initiated proceedings by filing petitions asserting the children were in need of care, identifying the children’s parents, and considering whether the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) might apply. The Department investigated possible tribal connections, particularly with the Blackfeet Tribe, by gathering family history, sending verification requests, and notifying the Tribe of hearings. The Blackfeet Tribe responded that none of the children were enrolled or eligible for enrollment. The Department completed ICWA checklists, and the district court, after multiple hearings, consistently found no reason to know the children were Indian children under ICWA.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, terminated the mother’s parental rights, finding that the Department made diligent efforts to determine the applicability of ICWA. At no point during the proceedings did the mother object to, or challenge, the Department’s efforts or the court’s determination that ICWA did not apply. It was only on appeal that she argued the Department’s efforts were insufficient, citing potential errors in information provided to the Blackfeet Tribe.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the district court correctly found that the Department made diligent efforts regarding ICWA. The Supreme Court held that the district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous: the Department fulfilled its duty to investigate and notify the Tribe, and no evidence supported a contrary result. The Court further held that the mother waived her right to challenge the Department’s ICWA efforts by not objecting during the lower court proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed the order terminating parental rights. View "In re L.C." on Justia Law

A child, K.L., was removed from his mother’s custody after allegations of substance abuse and child endangerment. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a petition on K.L.’s behalf, and he was placed with his half-siblings at their maternal aunt’s home. The mother’s whereabouts were frequently unknown, and she made only limited appearances during the proceedings. The father, J.A., was not initially involved but later established his biological relationship to K.L. and participated in reunification efforts, which ultimately were terminated after the court found his progress insufficient. The juvenile court then terminated both parents’ rights after determining K.L. was likely to be adopted, and no exception to adoption applied.After the termination of his parental rights, the father appealed, arguing that DCFS failed to conduct an adequate initial inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and corresponding California law. Specifically, he asserted that DCFS should have made greater efforts to contact the maternal grandmother to determine whether K.L. might have Indian ancestry. The father contended that the failure to interview the maternal grandmother rendered the inquiry insufficient and warranted conditional reversal of the termination order.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the record and determined that DCFS fulfilled its initial inquiry obligations by contacting all reasonably available relatives, including the parents, paternal grandmother, maternal aunt, and others. The court found that maternal grandmother was not reasonably available, as her contact information could not be obtained and the maternal aunt declined to provide it without her consent. The court held that DCFS was not required to take additional investigative steps. The order terminating parental rights was affirmed. View "In re K.L." on Justia Law

A mother gave birth to a child who was eligible for enrollment in an Indian tribe as defined by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The mother admitted to using methamphetamine during pregnancy, which led to an initial report to state authorities, though the child remained in her care as he did not test positive for drugs. Several months later, the child was found unattended in a hotel room under the care of an adult suspected of being under the influence, prompting the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) to take emergency custody. The father, who was incarcerated at the time, was identified and participated in early proceedings by telephone. Following his release, he attempted to engage in the case plan and visited his son, but over the next two and a half years, OCS assigned five different caseworkers to the family. The father experienced periods of incarceration, lapses in contact, and personal challenges, but he also took parenting classes, sought substance abuse assessment, and maintained some visitation.The Superior Court for the Third Judicial District, Anchorage, adjudicated the child as being in need of aid and later terminated the father’s parental rights on grounds of abandonment and substance abuse. At trial, the court found that OCS had made active efforts to reunify the family, relying on the preparation of a case plan, some referrals for substance abuse testing, and attempts to contact the father, even though it recognized that OCS’s efforts were not perfect, especially during periods of the father’s incarceration.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed whether OCS’s actions satisfied ICWA’s requirement that “active efforts” be made to prevent the breakup of an Indian family. The court held that OCS’s efforts were passive rather than active because it failed to make necessary referrals, provide adequate support services, and consistently engage with the father. The Supreme Court of Alaska reversed the termination of parental rights and remanded for further proceedings. View "Jace B. v. State" on Justia Law