Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns the termination of S.H.’s parental rights to her daughter, K.W., who is recognized as an Indian child under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Florida Department of Children and Families sought to terminate S.H.’s parental rights, and the circuit court conducted a multi-day adjudicatory hearing. The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the statutory grounds required under Florida law for termination were met. Additionally, because K.W. is an Indian child, the court applied the ICWA’s higher “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard to determine that continued custody by S.H. would likely result in serious emotional harm to K.W.S.H. appealed to the Florida Sixth District Court of Appeal, arguing that the ICWA’s “beyond a reasonable doubt” burden should apply not only to the federal finding but also to the separate findings required by Florida law for termination. The Sixth District rejected this argument, holding that the ICWA did not preempt Florida’s clear and convincing evidence standard for its distinct statutory findings. The court thus affirmed the circuit court’s decision. S.H. sought further review, pointing out a conflict with the Florida First District Court of Appeal’s decision in J.P.H. v. Florida Department of Children & Families, which had applied the ICWA’s higher standard more broadly.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case to resolve this conflict. It held that the ICWA does not preempt the clear and convincing evidence standard that Florida law applies to its separate statutory findings required for termination of parental rights. Instead, the ICWA’s “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard applies solely to the specific finding regarding the likelihood of serious harm from continued custody. The Court approved the Sixth District’s decision and disapproved J.P.H. where inconsistent. View "S.H. v. Department of Children and Families" on Justia Law

Two individuals, Roberto Miranda and Roberto Orellana, traveled together to a restaurant parking lot, where a casino employee handed them a box containing $352,000. The employee had been deceived into surrendering the money, which belonged to the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe. Both men were charged with federal crimes related to transporting stolen money and aiding and abetting that offense. Orellana also faced a charge for illegal reentry into the United States. Each pleaded guilty to the relevant offenses.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota sentenced Miranda to seventy months’ imprisonment, an upward variance from the Sentencing Guidelines range of 41–51 months, based in part on findings that Miranda minimized his involvement and was not candid. Orellana received a fifty-month sentence, also exceeding his Guidelines range of 30–37 months. Both defendants had entered plea agreements containing broad appeal waivers, though each preserved limited rights to appeal the substantive reasonableness of a sentence above the Guidelines range.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that Miranda knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to challenge the district court’s calculation of his Sentencing Guidelines range and dismissed that part of his appeal. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in Miranda’s sentence and affirmed it. With respect to Orellana, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court committed plain error by speculating, without record support, that Orellana was involved with Mexican drug cartels and that this speculation was a principal basis for the sentence imposed. The court determined this error affected Orellana’s substantial rights and the fairness of the proceedings. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit vacated Orellana’s sentence and remanded his case for resentencing. View "United States v. Orellana" on Justia Law

Oklahoma was authorized by Congress in 2005 to extend its administration of federal environmental programs into Indian country, upon approval by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). For many years, Oklahoma did not invoke this provision. However, after the Supreme Court's decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma expanded the definition of Indian country in the state, Oklahoma requested EPA approval to apply its environmental programs to these areas. The EPA initially granted the request in 2020, then withdrew it to allow for further tribal consultation. After extensive engagement with tribal nations, the EPA issued a new approval in January 2025 with added conditions requiring tribal engagement, but subsequently rescinded those conditions in May 2025 and reissued its approval without them.The Pawnee Nation of Oklahoma challenged the EPA’s May 2025 decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Pawnee Nation argued that the EPA's action was unlawful because the congressional provision authorizing Oklahoma's request, § 10211(a) of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act (SAFETEA), had expired in 2009, that the EPA erred by refusing to impose conditions on Oklahoma’s approval, and that the EPA failed to make contemporaneous determinations of Oklahoma’s programs’ compliance with federal law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit exercised exclusive jurisdiction and denied Pawnee Nation’s petition for review. The court held that § 10211(a) was unambiguous and remains active, not expired. It determined that EPA’s statutory obligation to approve Oklahoma’s request did not permit the agency to impose additional conditions, and found that EPA acted within the provision’s requirements by relying on its previous determinations that Oklahoma’s programs complied with federal law. The court affirmed EPA’s interpretation and approval. View "Pawnee Nation of Oklahoma v. Zeldin" on Justia Law

The appellant, a father of six Indian children, challenged the termination of his parental rights under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) took emergency custody of the children after receiving reports of neglect, including unsanitary living conditions and food insecurity. The father tested positive for multiple substances, and an initial out-of-home safety plan with a relative failed. OCS placed the children with their aunt, a preferred ICWA placement, and initiated proceedings for temporary custody, adjudication, disposition, and ultimately, termination of parental rights. Throughout the case, the father was represented by counsel at various stages, sometimes proceeding pro se, and repeatedly claimed he did not receive discovery materials.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Palmer, held hearings at each stage. Temporary custody was granted after expedited hearings, with findings that removal was necessary to prevent imminent harm. The father stipulated to probable cause for the children being in need of aid, reserving the right to contest at adjudication. Subsequent hearings resulted in approval of OCS’s permanency plan. The father failed to comply with his case plan, and OCS filed for termination. Multiple motions by the father, alleging ICWA and constitutional violations, were rejected by the superior court, which found OCS had complied with ICWA at all stages.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed three procedural arguments: denial of discovery, improper emergency removal, and alleged ICWA violations in earlier foster care proceedings. The court held that the superior court did not abuse its discretion regarding discovery, that OCS’s emergency removal complied with ICWA and Alaska law, and that alleged errors in earlier foster care actions did not invalidate the later, separate termination action. The court affirmed the termination order, finding no reversible error. View "Dash D. v. State" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a cattle company, alleged that a state agency unconstitutionally took its water rights without compensation as part of the agency’s adjudication of water rights in the Klamath Basin. The agency began the adjudication in 1975 and completed the administrative phase in 2014, with judicial review ongoing in a separate proceeding. The plaintiff claims that administrative determinations prioritizing tribal water rights over its own resulted in a deprivation of its rights.Following the complaint, the plaintiff served discovery requests for documents related to the agency’s determination of tribal water rights. The agency produced a substantial number of records but withheld 446 documents on grounds of attorney-client privilege. The plaintiff moved to compel production of documents over 25 years old, arguing these should be disclosed under Oregon’s public records law. The Marion County Circuit Court ordered the agency to produce the documents, citing a perceived conflict between discovery rules and the public records law, and issued a protective order limiting their use.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the trial court’s discovery order in an original mandamus proceeding. It held that the public records law and civil discovery rules are independent avenues for obtaining records from a public body. The court determined that discovery in civil litigation is governed by procedural requirements and limitations, including the attorney-client privilege, and that courts may not compel production of privileged records in discovery merely because those records may be subject to disclosure under the public records law. The Supreme Court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its discovery order. View "Sprague River Cattle Co. v. State of Oregon" on Justia Law

A.H., a minor and tribal citizen, was placed under the guardianship of his paternal grandmother following his parents’ inability to care for him. Over the years, multiple child welfare referrals were made due to Guardian’s failure to meet A.H.’s medical and educational needs. The Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) initiated dependency proceedings, and the Soboba Band of Luiseno Indians (the Tribe) intervened because of concerns about Guardian’s mental health and her ability to care for A.H. The juvenile court ordered Guardian to undergo a psychological evaluation for case planning purposes after findings of inadequate care and missed medical appointments for A.H.In the Superior Court of Riverside County, the Tribe repeatedly requested access to Guardian’s psychological evaluation, arguing it was necessary for monitoring A.H.’s welfare and developing an appropriate case plan. Guardian objected, asserting privacy rights and noting the evaluation had not been filed with the court. The juvenile court denied the Tribe’s request, stating the evaluation was for case planning only and not for sharing with the Tribe. The Tribe then appealed, relying on state and federal law, including Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 and the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. It held that the Tribe, as an intervening party and member of A.H.’s multidisciplinary personnel team, is presumptively authorized to access Guardian’s psychological evaluation under section 827, subdivisions (a)(1)(K) and (f). The court found that neither privacy laws nor the psychotherapist-patient privilege barred disclosure, given the evaluation was court-ordered and necessary for A.H.’s best interests. The court reversed the juvenile court’s denial and directed release of the evaluation to the Tribe. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law

Two federally recognized tribes sued several entities, including Kalshi and Robinhood, alleging that Kalshi’s “event contracts”—which pay based on sports outcomes—amounted to unauthorized sports betting offered on tribal lands. The tribes argued this violated the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) and their own gaming ordinances, since only tribally authorized gaming is lawful under secretarial procedures that stand in place of a tribal-state compact. They also challenged Kalshi’s advertisement claiming sports betting was legal nationwide on its platform under the Lanham Act.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the tribes’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the transactions did not occur on Indian lands, found Kalshi not bound by any tribal compact or procedures, and determined that the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) controlled Kalshi’s conduct. The court reasoned that UIGEA exempted Kalshi’s contracts because they were regulated by the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). The Lanham Act claim was rejected as the challenged advertisement was deemed a nonactionable opinion about legality.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the denial of the preliminary injunction in part. The court held that the tribes were likely to succeed on their IGRA claims, finding Kalshi’s sports contracts constituted class III gaming, occurred on Indian lands when entered into from tribal territory, and were unauthorized under the tribes’ ordinances and secretarial procedures. The court determined that neither UIGEA nor CEA displaced IGRA’s remedies or barred the tribes’ claim. However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of the Lanham Act claim, holding Kalshi’s advertisement was a lay opinion. The case was remanded for consideration of the remaining preliminary injunction factors. View "BLUE LAKE RANCHERIA V. KALSHI, INC." on Justia Law

A former police officer for a federally recognized Indian tribe was terminated from his position and subsequently brought a lawsuit in federal court against several of his superior officers and the tribe's general counsel. His claims, brought against these individuals in their personal capacities, included federal civil rights causes of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985(2), and 1985(3), a Bivens claim, and a state tort claim for intentional interference with contractual relations. He did not sue the tribe itself. The complaint alleged that the defendants treated him less favorably than Native American employees, subjected him to a racially hostile work environment, interfered with his court testimony, and conspired to deprive him of due process in his employment and reputation.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada dismissed the action. The court held that the individual defendants were entitled to absolute personal immunity, and, alternatively, that the tribe was a required party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 that could not be joined due to tribal sovereign immunity. The court did not address arguments regarding tribal sovereign immunity or qualified immunity as independent grounds for dismissal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court held that tribal sovereign immunity does not bar suits seeking money damages from tribal officials in their individual capacities where any judgment would not operate against the tribe itself. The court further held that the individual defendants were not entitled to absolute immunity, as the functions at issue—personnel and employment decisions—were not historically protected by such immunity at common law. Additionally, the tribe was not a required party under Rule 19 because it lacked a legally protected interest that could be impaired by the litigation’s outcome. The court remanded for the district court to address any qualified immunity defenses in the first instance. View "ERWINE V. WESTBROOK" on Justia Law

WPX Energy, a non-Indian oil and gas company, obtained rights-of-way from the Bureau of Indian Affairs to access land owned by members of the Three Affiliated Tribes on the Fort Berthold Reservation. The Fettigs, tribal members and landowners, consented to the grants and also entered into side letter agreements with WPX Energy, imposing conditions such as prohibiting smoking and hunting, and specifying fines for violations. In 2020, the Fettigs filed suit in the Three Affiliated Tribes District Court, alleging WPX Energy violated the no-smoking provision. WPX Energy argued that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction, as it is a non-Indian entity, but the tribal district court, through Judge Jones, found it had jurisdiction under the Montana consensual relationship exception. The Fettigs also pursued an administrative claim with the Bureau, which was denied on the basis that the side letter agreements were not incorporated into the grants.WPX Energy sought a preliminary injunction in the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota, claiming the tribal court lacked jurisdiction. The district court granted the injunction, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit previously vacated it, requiring exhaustion of tribal remedies. After the Three Affiliated Tribes Supreme Court affirmed tribal jurisdiction, WPX Energy again sought relief in federal court, which again granted a preliminary injunction. Judge Jones appealed this second grant.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the tribal court had jurisdiction under the first Montana exception because the dispute arose from a commercial relationship created by the side letter agreements, which were independently negotiated and not governed by federal law. The court also found that normal litigation costs did not constitute irreparable harm. The Eighth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. View "WPX Energy Williston, LLC v. Jones" on Justia Law

A child who is an enrolled member of a federally recognized tribe was placed in the guardianship of his paternal grandmother after his biological parents were found unable to care for him. Over the years, concerns arose regarding the guardian’s ability to meet the child’s medical and educational needs, leading to multiple child welfare referrals. Ultimately, the county child welfare agency filed a juvenile dependency petition, asserting the guardian’s failure to protect and provide for the child due to alleged mental illness and neglect. The child’s tribe, which had been involved in the child’s probate and dependency matters for several years, requested a court-ordered psychological evaluation of the guardian to assess her capacity to care for the child.The Superior Court of Riverside County ordered the psychological evaluation but specified it was for “case planning purposes only.” When the tribe later sought access to the evaluation to assist in case monitoring and planning, the guardian objected, arguing privacy and privilege concerns. The juvenile court denied the tribe’s request, finding the evaluation was not ordered for the tribe’s benefit and that there were no compelling reasons to release it. The tribe appealed, contending that it had a presumptive right to the evaluation under state and federal law due to its role in protecting the welfare of its citizen child.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, held that the tribe is presumptively entitled to access the guardian’s psychological evaluation under Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 and related statutes. The court concluded that the tribe, as a party to the proceedings and as a multidisciplinary team member, did not need to file a separate petition for access, and that neither privacy nor privilege barred disclosure of the court-ordered report. The appellate court reversed the juvenile court’s order and directed the release of the evaluation to the tribe. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law