Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

Waukegan Potawatomi Casino, LLC (WPC) alleged that its Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the City of Waukegan did not advance its casino proposal for licensing consideration. WPC claimed it experienced intentional discrimination during the application process as a "class of one." The City of Waukegan certified three other applicants but not WPC, which alleged that the process was rigged to benefit another applicant, Lakeside Casino, LLC. WPC pointed to the relationship between the City's mayor and a founding partner of Lakeside, as well as the City's handling of supplemental information from applicants, as evidence of discrimination.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment for the City. The court concluded that WPC, as an arm of a sovereign Native American tribe, could not maintain a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Additionally, the court found that WPC's class-of-one equal protection claim failed because WPC was not similarly situated to the other applicants and there were multiple conceivable rational bases for the City's conduct.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that WPC could not carry its heavy burden as a class-of-one plaintiff. The court noted that there were several rational bases for the City's decision, including differences in the casino proposals and the applicants' experience. The court also found that WPC failed to identify a similarly situated comparator who was treated more favorably. The court concluded that the City's conduct throughout the review process, including its handling of supplemental information, had rational justifications. Thus, WPC's class-of-one claim failed under both prongs of the analysis. View "Waukegan Potawatomi Casino, LLC v City of Waukegan" on Justia Law

B.V. and L.T. are the parents of two children, B.V. and B.V. The children were removed from their home in February 2021 after being left unattended at a crime scene for 13 hours. B.V. was arrested for attempted murder and burglary, and L.T. could not be located. A temporary custody order was issued to the Mountain Lakes Human Service Zone. B.V. was later convicted and sentenced to 20 years in prison, with an estimated release date in January 2030. L.T. has not had contact with the Zone since the termination of parental rights petition was filed.The children were adjudicated as needing protection in October 2021, and a 12-month custody order was issued to the Zone. A permanency hearing in November 2022 extended the custody order by six months. The children were taken to Arizona by their maternal aunt in April 2023, but the placement was unsuccessful, and they returned to North Dakota in September 2023. L.T. sporadically attempted visitation but lost contact with the Zone in February 2024. B.V. had minimal contact with the Zone and did not engage in the services offered.The Juvenile Court of Rolette County terminated B.V. and L.T.'s parental rights on October 18, 2024. B.V. appealed, arguing that the Zone did not make active efforts to prevent the breakup of his Indian family as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that continued custody by B.V. would likely result in serious harm to the children.The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the termination of B.V.'s parental rights. The court found that the Zone made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the family, including offering supervised visits and conducting relative searches. The court also found that continued custody by B.V. would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to the children, supported by the testimony of a qualified expert witness. View "Interest of B.V." on Justia Law

The Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe and two tribal officers filed a lawsuit in 2017 against Mille Lacs County, the County Attorney, and the County Sheriff. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief to address alleged interference with the Band’s inherent law enforcement authority. The plaintiffs requested the district court to declare that the Band has the inherent authority to establish a police force and authorize its officers to investigate violations of federal, state, and tribal law within the original boundaries of the Mille Lacs Reservation. They also sought a declaration that the Band’s federally-delegated law enforcement authority permits individual Band officers to investigate violations of federal law and arrest suspects within the Reservation’s original boundaries.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota granted the Band partial summary judgment, affirming that the Mille Lacs Reservation’s boundaries remain as they were under the 1855 Treaty. The court concluded that subsequent treaties and federal statutes did not disestablish the Reservation. In a subsequent order, the court granted the Band’s request for declaratory relief, declaring that the Band possesses inherent sovereign law enforcement authority within the Reservation and that federal statutes and administrative actions give tribal officers federal authority to investigate violations of applicable federal law within the Reservation. The County defendants appealed these rulings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the appeals were moot due to an amendment to the applicable Minnesota statute, effective July 1, 2023, which resolved the concurrent law enforcement authority dispute under state law. The court determined that the district court orders being appealed should be vacated and remanded the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion. The court emphasized that the Minnesota Legislature’s amendment to the statute granted the Band unqualified law enforcement jurisdiction over all persons within the Reservation’s 1855 boundaries, rendering the primary issue in the case no longer live. View "Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe v. Madore" on Justia Law

Tracy L. Clark and Edward A. Clark filed a petition for the appointment of guardians of two minor children, K.D.B. and K.M.B., who are enrolled members of the Cherokee Nation, in Rogers County District Court in 2013. The district court granted temporary guardianship to the Clarks, and the Cherokee Nation intervened, noting their right to be involved under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). In 2021, the Cherokee Nation requested a transfer of the case to the Cherokee Nation District Court, citing an Intergovernmental Agreement with the State of Oklahoma regarding jurisdiction over Indian children within the Nation's reservation.The Rogers County District Court granted the motion to transfer the case to the Cherokee Nation District Court, finding that the children were domiciled on the Cherokee Nation Reservation and that the Agreement mandated the transfer. The Clarks objected, arguing that the Agreement could not redefine "reservation" and that the children did not reside within the reservation. The district court stayed the transfer pending appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the Cherokee Nation Reservation was never disestablished and that the children were domiciled within the reservation, thus falling under the jurisdiction of the Cherokee Nation as per the ICWA and the Agreement. The court found that the Agreement was valid and applicable, and that the transfer to tribal court was mandatory under its terms. The court also rejected the Clarks' arguments regarding waiver, retroactivity, and due process violations. The case was remanded to the Rogers County District Court to lift the stay and transfer the case to the Cherokee Nation District Court. View "In re Guardianship of K.D.B." on Justia Law

Taylor M. appealed a judgment from the District Court terminating her parental rights to her child, arguing that her due process rights were violated and that the court failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The child, born prematurely with various medical conditions, required extensive care. Taylor M., a registered member of the Mi’kmaq Nation, was largely absent during the child’s initial hospitalization. The Department of Health and Human Services filed for a child protection order, which was granted, and the child was placed with resource parents.The District Court held a jeopardy hearing in January 2023, finding clear and convincing evidence of jeopardy due to Taylor M.’s inability to care for the child. The court scheduled several hearings, but delays occurred, and the child’s resource parents moved out of state with the Department and tribe’s agreement. In October 2023, the Department filed a petition to terminate Taylor M.’s parental rights. At the consolidated hearing in January 2024, the court heard testimony from various parties, including the ICWA director for the Mi’kmaq Nation.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that the District Court complied with ICWA requirements. The court determined that the Department made active efforts to reunify the family and that Taylor M. did not take significant steps to address the jeopardy. The court also found beyond a reasonable doubt that continued custody by Taylor M. would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. The court affirmed the termination of Taylor M.’s parental rights, concluding that the child’s placement with the resource parents was appropriate and in the child’s best interest. View "In re Child of Taylor M." on Justia Law

Curtis Temple, a cattle rancher and member of the Oglala Sioux Indian Tribe (OST), had his grazing permits on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation expire on October 31, 2012. He reapplied for new permits, but another OST member, Donald Buffington, also applied. The OST allocation committee found Temple had over 1,600 cattle, exceeding the 300 animal unit limit, making Buffington the eligible applicant. Temple's permits were awarded to Buffington, and Temple's appeals to the OST executive committee and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) were unsuccessful. Temple continued to graze his cattle on the land allocated to Buffington, leading to multiple trespass notices and eventual impoundment of his cattle by the BIA.Temple filed a lawsuit in the District of South Dakota in August 2015, seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and contesting the permit allocation. The district court denied the TRO and dismissed Temple's permit allocation claims, requiring him to exhaust administrative remedies. Temple's due process claims regarding the impoundment of his cattle proceeded, but the district court found that the written notices of trespass provided to Temple were sufficient and did not violate his due process rights. Temple's motion to continue the trial was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Temple was provided due process through the written notices of trespass and had ample opportunity to contest the trespass determinations. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Temple's permit allocation claims for failure to exhaust tribal remedies, as he did not appeal the tribal court's decision. Lastly, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Temple's motion to continue the trial. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Curtis Temple v. Roberts" on Justia Law

The Unkechaug Indian Nation and its Chief, Harry B. Wallace, challenged the enforcement of New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) regulations prohibiting the harvesting of American glass eels. They argued that the Andros Order, a 1676 agreement between the Royal Governor of New York and the Nation, allowed them to fish freely and preempted the DEC’s regulations. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the DEC from enforcing these regulations against the Nation’s members in their customary fishing waters.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the Andros Order is not federal law preempting New York’s fishing regulations. The court also found that the Eleventh Amendment barred claims against the DEC but allowed claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against Commissioner Basil Seggos in his official capacity under the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision. The appellate court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred claims against the DEC but allowed claims against Commissioner Seggos under the Ex parte Young exception. The court also found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in failing to resolve Daubert motions or privilege disputes before ruling on the summary judgment motions. Finally, the court held that the Andros Order is not federal law binding on the United States because it was entered before the Confederal period, on behalf of the British Crown, and has not been ratified by the United States. Therefore, the Andros Order does not preempt New York’s fishing regulations, and the judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "Unkechaug Indian Nation v. Seggos" on Justia Law

Four Native American tribes operating casinos in Oklahoma filed a federal lawsuit in August 2020 to invalidate certain tribal-gaming compacts entered into by the Governor of Oklahoma and other tribes. These compacts were approved by the U.S. Secretary of the Department of the Interior by operation of law. The tribes argued that the Governor lacked the authority to enter into these compacts, violating Oklahoma law and their rights under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).The Governor, represented by private counsel, defended the compacts' validity under federal law, arguing that any provisions violating state law could be severed. In July 2023, the Oklahoma Attorney General filed a notice to assume control of the state's defense, asserting that the compacts were invalid under state law. The Governor moved to strike the Attorney General's appearance, arguing that he had the authority to retain counsel and that the Attorney General could not override this.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia certified a question to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma regarding whether the Attorney General could assume control of the defense over the Governor's objection. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that the Attorney General could not take control of the defense in this case. The court emphasized the Governor's constitutional role as the "Supreme Executive" with the authority to select and direct counsel for the state's interests. The court also noted that the Attorney General could appear in the case but could not override the Governor's choice of counsel. View "CHEROKEE NATION v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR" on Justia Law

Marci Walkingstick Dixon, a Native American woman and member of the Cherokee Nation, worked at Northeastern State University (NSU) in the Information Technology Services Department. After being supervised by Dr. Richard Reif, she reported experiencing discriminatory comments and actions based on her race and sex. Following her complaint to NSU's Title IX officer, she faced increased hostility from Dr. Reif. In 2018, after a dispute over compensatory time and subsequent reprimand, she formally complained about a hostile work environment. NSU then began characterizing her time report as falsified and eventually terminated her employment, citing poor job performance and improper timekeeping.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma granted summary judgment in favor of NSU and Dr. Reif on Dixon's claims of Title VII sex and race discrimination, Title VII retaliation, and FMLA retaliation. The court found that Dixon failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation and could not show that NSU's reasons for her termination were pretextual. The court also concluded that Dr. Reif was not Dixon's employer under the FMLA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's summary judgment on Dixon's Title VII sex and race discrimination claims and her Title VII retaliation claim, finding that she had established a prima facie case and presented sufficient evidence of pretext. However, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Dr. Reif on the FMLA retaliation claim, agreeing with the lower court's application of the economic reality test to determine that Dr. Reif was not Dixon's employer under the FMLA. View "Dixon v. Regional University System of the Oklahoma Board" on Justia Law

Manley Barton, a registered member of the Navajo tribe, applied for relocation benefits from the Office of Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation (ONHIR) based on his residence at his grandparents' homesite on the Hopi Partitioned Lands (HPL). The Navajo-Hopi Settlement Act required individuals residing on land partitioned to the tribe of which they were not a member to relocate. To be eligible for benefits, applicants had to show they were residents of the land partitioned to the other tribe on December 22, 1974, and were heads of household when they moved away. Manley claimed he lived at the HPL homesite until 1986, despite being away for education and employment.ONHIR denied Manley's application, and the Independent Hearing Officer (IHO) upheld the denial, concluding that Manley's residence at the HPL homesite ended in 1984 when his grandparents relocated. The IHO did not consider other evidence of Manley's intent to reside at the HPL homesite, such as his testimony and that of his family members about his continued use of the homesite for ceremonies and chores. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of ONHIR, finding the IHO's decision was supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary or capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's summary judgment. The court held that the IHO improperly applied the "temporarily away" exception, which allows applicants who are away for education or employment to establish residency through intent and manifestations of intent. The IHO's reliance solely on the grandparents' relocation to determine Manley's legal residence was arbitrary and capricious. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "BARTON V. OFFICE OF NAVAJO AND HOPI INDIAN RELOCATION" on Justia Law