Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a child who was removed from his parents due to domestic violence, the father’s criminal history, and the mother’s untreated mental illness. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services placed the child with a caretaker and provided reunification services to the parents, but these efforts were unsuccessful. Parental rights were ultimately terminated, and adoption was set as the permanent plan. Throughout the proceedings, the Department investigated whether the child might have Native American heritage, as required under California law analogous to the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the Department’s efforts to determine the child's possible Native American ancestry. The parents had initially denied any such heritage, but at one point the father suggested there might be Native American ancestry. The Department interviewed or attempted to contact numerous relatives and family associates about possible Native American ancestry, but did not contact four specific known relatives. After reviewing the Department's inquiry, the juvenile court found there was no reason to know that ICWA applied in this case.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the adequacy of the Department’s inquiry under the deferential standard established by the California Supreme Court. The Court of Appeal held that the Department had adequately discharged its duty of reasonable inquiry by asking those persons it would normally contact whether the child might have Native American heritage, and was not required to contact every possible relative. The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court’s order, explicitly disagreeing with a contrary approach that would impose broader duties on the Department. View "In re K.G." on Justia Law

Two minor children, J.C. and S.C.Y., both enrolled members of the Mandan Hidatsa Arikara Nation, were placed in the care of Ward County Human Service Zone after repeated removals due to concerns about their mother, P.D.'s, ability to provide proper care. The children were found to be in need of protection and had spent substantial periods in foster care. The State sought termination of P.D.’s parental rights, alleging persistent issues that endangered the children’s well-being, including P.D.'s instability, incomplete compliance with service plans, ongoing substance abuse, and involvement in criminal activity.The Juvenile Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial District, reviewed the petitions and held a trial. The court considered testimony from various witnesses and documentary evidence, including progress reports and judicial notice of prior protection proceedings. The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence that the children were in need of protection, the causes for protection were likely to continue, and the children had suffered harm. The court also found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that returning the children to P.D. would likely cause them serious emotional or physical harm. The court terminated P.D.’s parental rights.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. The court affirmed the juvenile court’s factual findings and conclusions regarding the need for protection and likelihood of ongoing harm. However, the Supreme Court found that the juvenile court failed to make the required specific findings under N.D.C.C. § 27-19.1-01(2), which mandates detailed findings that “active efforts” were made to provide remedial and rehabilitative services to prevent the breakup of the Indian family, and that these efforts were unsuccessful. The Supreme Court retained jurisdiction and remanded the case for the juvenile court to make these necessary findings, allowing additional evidence if required. View "Interest of S.C.Y." on Justia Law

In this case, two federally recognized tribes in Madera County, California, were involved in a dispute over the authorization of a casino. One tribe, North Fork, sought to build and operate a large off-reservation casino on a 305-acre site near State Route 99. To do so, North Fork obtained a favorable “two-part determination” from the Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior, followed by a concurrence from the Governor of California, and the negotiation of a tribal-state compact. The compact was ratified by the Legislature. However, a statewide referendum (Proposition 48) resulted in California voters rejecting the ratification statute. The other tribe, Picayune-Chukchansi, which operated its own on-reservation casino, challenged the validity of the Governor’s concurrence, arguing it was rendered void by the voters’ rejection.Prior to this appeal, the matter was litigated in multiple forums. In the Madera County Superior Court, Picayune-Chukchansi sought declaratory relief to have the Governor’s concurrence declared void ab initio. Proceedings were stayed pending appellate decisions in related cases, including United Auburn Indian Community of Auburn Rancheria v. Newsom by the California Supreme Court, which recognized the Governor’s implied authority to concur, and Stand Up for California! v. State of California (Stand Up II) by the Court of Appeal, which held that the people retained the power to annul the Governor’s concurrence through a referendum. The trial court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of Picayune-Chukchansi, declaring the Governor’s concurrence void from the outset.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that the people of California, by rejecting Proposition 48, exercised their retained power to annul the Governor’s concurrence, and that this annulment rendered the concurrence void ab initio—meaning it never took effect and is not in effect. The court also found that the dispute was not moot and that the Governor’s authority to concur is subject to the electorate’s overriding power under California constitutional law. View "Picayune Rancheria v. North Fork Rancheria" on Justia Law

A non-Indian woman and a member of the Prairie Island Mdewakanton Dakota Indian Community married in Minneapolis and resided with their children in Edina, Minnesota, outside the reservation. Their marriage was supported financially by the husband’s “per capita payments” from the Community, and the wife received tribal insurance benefits, but neither spouse lived or owned property on the reservation. After more than thirteen years, both spouses filed for divorce on the same day—he in the Community’s Tribal Court, she in Minnesota state court. The state court stayed proceedings in favor of the Tribal Court, and after a trial, the Tribal Court dissolved the marriage, divided assets, awarded joint custody, and set child support. It did not award the wife spousal maintenance because under Community law, per capita payments are not marital property. The Community’s Court of Appeals affirmed the Tribal Court’s order.The wife then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, seeking a declaration that the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction and an injunction against enforcement of the order. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the husband, holding that the Tribal Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the divorce under the “consensual relationship exception” from Montana v. United States, based on the marriage and the wife’s connections to the Community.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. The Eighth Circuit held that the Tribal Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a divorce between a tribal member and a nonmember spouse who resided outside the reservation, because the consensual relationship exception did not apply in these circumstances. The court concluded that neither the marriage nor the wife’s limited connections to the Community provided a sufficient nexus to tribal lands or property, nor was tribal jurisdiction necessary to protect self-government or internal relations. The case was remanded with instructions to enjoin enforcement of the Tribal Court’s divorce order. View "Tix v. Tix" on Justia Law

A member of the Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate tribe was observed by a tribal police officer driving erratically within the city limits of Sisseton, nearly causing multiple collisions and fleeing from law enforcement. He was apprehended in a tribal housing unit. Subsequently, the tribal prosecutor charged him in tribal court with driving under the influence (DUI) and resisting arrest, while South Dakota state court charged him with resisting arrest, reckless driving, and assaulting a law enforcement officer. He later pled guilty in state court to assault and was sentenced to two years in prison. The tribal court then dismissed the DUI charge without prejudice.He filed a federal lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota against various tribal officials, alleging that the DUI charge exceeded the tribe’s criminal jurisdiction and violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Indian Civil Rights Act. The District Court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the complaint failed to raise a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the dismissal. The court concluded that, even assuming it had jurisdiction to consider the scope of the tribe’s criminal authority, the case had become moot because the tribal DUI charge was dismissed and could not be refiled due to the expiration of the statute of limitations. The court found that neither the voluntary cessation exception nor the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness applied. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and vacated its decision, declining to address the underlying questions of tribal jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, or exhaustion of tribal remedies. View "LaBatte v. Gangle" on Justia Law

A man was charged with aggravated sexual abuse of a minor that occurred in a home on the Choctaw Nation reservation in Oklahoma. The victim was a six-year-old boy, and the defendant, who had recently moved in with his stepdaughter, was alleged to have committed the offense within two days of his arrival. The prosecution charged the defendant under federal law, which required proof that the victim was an Indian and the defendant was a non-Indian.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma presided over the trial. The government presented testimony from the defendant’s stepdaughter and three law enforcement officers, as well as driver’s license records, to establish that the defendant was not an Indian. The stepdaughter testified she did not know of any tribal membership or Indian identity for the defendant. Law enforcement witnesses stated the defendant did not identify as Native American and that inquiries with five major Oklahoma tribes yielded no information about his tribal status. The defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29, arguing the evidence was insufficient to prove he was a non-Indian. The district court denied the motion, and the jury convicted the defendant, resulting in a 30-year prison sentence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a non-Indian, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 1152. The court held that the government failed to meet its burden, finding the evidence presented was too speculative and insufficient to establish the defendant’s non-Indian status. The Tenth Circuit vacated the conviction and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal. View "United States v. Hebert" on Justia Law

A mining company sought to develop an open pit gold mine in the Kuskokwim River watershed, on lands owned by Alaska Native Corporations. To operate the mine, the company needed state permits for a natural gas pipeline right-of-way across state lands and for water appropriations to dewater the mining pit and support operations. Local tribes objected, arguing that the mine and its associated infrastructure would have significant impacts on the watershed, which is culturally and economically important to them. The Department of Natural Resources approved the pipeline right-of-way and water use permits after considering the impacts of the permitted activities themselves, but not the cumulative impacts of the entire mining project.The tribes appealed the Department’s decisions to the Commissioner, arguing that both the Water Use Act and the Alaska Constitution required consideration of the cumulative impacts of the whole mining project. The Commissioner denied the appeals, finding that the Department was only required to consider the effects of the permitted activities themselves. The tribes then appealed to the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage. The superior court affirmed the Department’s decisions, ruling that the agency was not required to conduct a cumulative impacts analysis of the entire mine project under either statute or the constitution.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed whether the Department was required to consider the cumulative impacts of the entire mining project when granting the pipeline right-of-way and water use permits. The court held that neither the Water Use Act nor the Right-of-Way Leasing Act required consideration of downstream effects of mining activity enabled by the permits. The court also held that Article VIII of the Alaska Constitution did not require the Department to consider the costs and benefits of developing private resources on private lands when deciding whether to grant permits for the use of state resources. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgments. View "Orutsararmiut Native Council v. Boyle" on Justia Law

A corporation owned by a federally recognized Indian tribe, along with several tribal officials, was alleged by the State of California to have violated state cigarette tax laws and regulations. The corporation manufactured and distributed cigarettes in California, including to non-tribal consumers, without collecting or remitting required state excise taxes or payments under the Master Settlement Agreement. California claimed that the corporation and its officials distributed contraband cigarettes not listed on the state’s approved directory and failed to comply with shipping, recordkeeping, and tax collection requirements under the federal Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act (PACT Act). Despite warnings and being placed on a federal non-compliance list, the corporation continued its operations.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California considered the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court found that the corporation, as an arm of the tribe, was shielded by tribal sovereign immunity and dismissed claims against it. However, the court allowed claims for injunctive relief against the individual tribal officials in their official capacities to proceed, holding that the Ex parte Young doctrine permitted such relief under the PACT Act. The court also denied the officials’ claims of qualified immunity for personal capacity claims, reasoning that qualified immunity did not apply to enforcement actions brought by a state under a federal statute.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Ninth Circuit held that the PACT Act does not preclude Ex parte Young actions for prospective injunctive relief against tribal officials, as the Act does not limit who may be sued or the types of relief available, nor does it contain a sufficiently detailed remedial scheme to displace Ex parte Young. The court also held that qualified immunity does not shield tribal officials from California’s claims for civil penalties and money damages under the PACT Act. View "STATE OF CALIFORNIA V. DEL ROSA" on Justia Law

A federally recognized Indian tribe in northern Nevada, whose lands were set aside by the federal government in the early 20th century, experienced a leadership dispute after the death of its council chairman in 2000. Two factions claimed to be the legitimate tribal government, leading to litigation in tribal courts and a prolonged refusal by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) to recognize either group. Eventually, the BIA recognized the results of a 2014 tribal election favoring one faction, but disputes over land occupation and government recognition persisted.The faction recognized by the 2014 election filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief regarding tribal leadership and alleging unauthorized occupation of tribal lands. The district court initially ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit later vacated those orders, holding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and remanded with instructions to dismiss. The BIA continued to recognize the election results unless a tribal remedy required otherwise.Before the Ninth Circuit issued its mandate, the tribe filed suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims, alleging statutory violations and breaches of trust related to land and water rights. The Claims Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, finding that some claims failed to identify a money-mandating source of law, others were time-barred, some were barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1500 due to the pending Nevada action, and some sought equitable relief outside its jurisdiction.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court’s dismissal. The court held that the tribe’s claims either lacked a money-mandating source of law, were time-barred, or were barred by § 1500 because they were based on substantially the same operative facts as the earlier Nevada action. The court also affirmed that the Claims Court lacked jurisdiction over the equitable relief requested. View "WINNEMUCCA INDIAN COLONY v. US " on Justia Law

Two children, Claudia and Leila, were declared dependents of the court after an incident in which their parents, Wendy C. (Mother) and Michael M. (Father), engaged in a domestic altercation in the children’s presence, with Father under the influence of methamphetamine and in possession of a knife. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) filed petitions alleging parental substance abuse and failure to protect the children. The juvenile court sustained these allegations, removed the children from Father’s custody, and initially placed them with Mother. Later, after Mother failed to comply with court-ordered counseling and tested positive for drugs, the children were removed from her care as well. Reunification services were terminated, and the court ultimately found the children adoptable, terminating both parents’ rights and designating the current caretaker as the prospective adoptive parent.Mother appealed the termination of her parental rights, arguing that the Department and the juvenile court failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and the California Indian Child Welfare Act (Cal-ICWA). The Department had interviewed the parents, both grandmothers, and a paternal aunt, all of whom denied knowledge of Indian ancestry. However, the Department did not inquire of other extended family members, including the maternal grandfather, maternal aunt, maternal uncle, and paternal grandfather, despite having or being able to obtain their contact information.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, held that the Department did not fulfill its duty under section 224.2, subdivision (b), to interview all reasonably available extended family members regarding possible Indian ancestry. The court conditionally reversed the orders terminating parental rights and remanded the case for further ICWA and Cal-ICWA inquiry and compliance. If the children are found to be Indian children, a new hearing must be held; otherwise, the original orders will be reinstated. View "In re Claudia R." on Justia Law