Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

A mining company sought to develop an open pit gold mine in the Kuskokwim River watershed, on lands owned by Alaska Native Corporations. To operate the mine, the company needed state permits for a natural gas pipeline right-of-way across state lands and for water appropriations to dewater the mining pit and support operations. Local tribes objected, arguing that the mine and its associated infrastructure would have significant impacts on the watershed, which is culturally and economically important to them. The Department of Natural Resources approved the pipeline right-of-way and water use permits after considering the impacts of the permitted activities themselves, but not the cumulative impacts of the entire mining project.The tribes appealed the Department’s decisions to the Commissioner, arguing that both the Water Use Act and the Alaska Constitution required consideration of the cumulative impacts of the whole mining project. The Commissioner denied the appeals, finding that the Department was only required to consider the effects of the permitted activities themselves. The tribes then appealed to the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage. The superior court affirmed the Department’s decisions, ruling that the agency was not required to conduct a cumulative impacts analysis of the entire mine project under either statute or the constitution.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed whether the Department was required to consider the cumulative impacts of the entire mining project when granting the pipeline right-of-way and water use permits. The court held that neither the Water Use Act nor the Right-of-Way Leasing Act required consideration of downstream effects of mining activity enabled by the permits. The court also held that Article VIII of the Alaska Constitution did not require the Department to consider the costs and benefits of developing private resources on private lands when deciding whether to grant permits for the use of state resources. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgments. View "Orutsararmiut Native Council v. Boyle" on Justia Law

A corporation owned by a federally recognized Indian tribe, along with several tribal officials, was alleged by the State of California to have violated state cigarette tax laws and regulations. The corporation manufactured and distributed cigarettes in California, including to non-tribal consumers, without collecting or remitting required state excise taxes or payments under the Master Settlement Agreement. California claimed that the corporation and its officials distributed contraband cigarettes not listed on the state’s approved directory and failed to comply with shipping, recordkeeping, and tax collection requirements under the federal Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act (PACT Act). Despite warnings and being placed on a federal non-compliance list, the corporation continued its operations.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California considered the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court found that the corporation, as an arm of the tribe, was shielded by tribal sovereign immunity and dismissed claims against it. However, the court allowed claims for injunctive relief against the individual tribal officials in their official capacities to proceed, holding that the Ex parte Young doctrine permitted such relief under the PACT Act. The court also denied the officials’ claims of qualified immunity for personal capacity claims, reasoning that qualified immunity did not apply to enforcement actions brought by a state under a federal statute.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Ninth Circuit held that the PACT Act does not preclude Ex parte Young actions for prospective injunctive relief against tribal officials, as the Act does not limit who may be sued or the types of relief available, nor does it contain a sufficiently detailed remedial scheme to displace Ex parte Young. The court also held that qualified immunity does not shield tribal officials from California’s claims for civil penalties and money damages under the PACT Act. View "STATE OF CALIFORNIA V. DEL ROSA" on Justia Law

A federally recognized Indian tribe in northern Nevada, whose lands were set aside by the federal government in the early 20th century, experienced a leadership dispute after the death of its council chairman in 2000. Two factions claimed to be the legitimate tribal government, leading to litigation in tribal courts and a prolonged refusal by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) to recognize either group. Eventually, the BIA recognized the results of a 2014 tribal election favoring one faction, but disputes over land occupation and government recognition persisted.The faction recognized by the 2014 election filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief regarding tribal leadership and alleging unauthorized occupation of tribal lands. The district court initially ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit later vacated those orders, holding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and remanded with instructions to dismiss. The BIA continued to recognize the election results unless a tribal remedy required otherwise.Before the Ninth Circuit issued its mandate, the tribe filed suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims, alleging statutory violations and breaches of trust related to land and water rights. The Claims Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, finding that some claims failed to identify a money-mandating source of law, others were time-barred, some were barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1500 due to the pending Nevada action, and some sought equitable relief outside its jurisdiction.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court’s dismissal. The court held that the tribe’s claims either lacked a money-mandating source of law, were time-barred, or were barred by § 1500 because they were based on substantially the same operative facts as the earlier Nevada action. The court also affirmed that the Claims Court lacked jurisdiction over the equitable relief requested. View "WINNEMUCCA INDIAN COLONY v. US " on Justia Law

Two children, Claudia and Leila, were declared dependents of the court after an incident in which their parents, Wendy C. (Mother) and Michael M. (Father), engaged in a domestic altercation in the children’s presence, with Father under the influence of methamphetamine and in possession of a knife. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) filed petitions alleging parental substance abuse and failure to protect the children. The juvenile court sustained these allegations, removed the children from Father’s custody, and initially placed them with Mother. Later, after Mother failed to comply with court-ordered counseling and tested positive for drugs, the children were removed from her care as well. Reunification services were terminated, and the court ultimately found the children adoptable, terminating both parents’ rights and designating the current caretaker as the prospective adoptive parent.Mother appealed the termination of her parental rights, arguing that the Department and the juvenile court failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and the California Indian Child Welfare Act (Cal-ICWA). The Department had interviewed the parents, both grandmothers, and a paternal aunt, all of whom denied knowledge of Indian ancestry. However, the Department did not inquire of other extended family members, including the maternal grandfather, maternal aunt, maternal uncle, and paternal grandfather, despite having or being able to obtain their contact information.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, held that the Department did not fulfill its duty under section 224.2, subdivision (b), to interview all reasonably available extended family members regarding possible Indian ancestry. The court conditionally reversed the orders terminating parental rights and remanded the case for further ICWA and Cal-ICWA inquiry and compliance. If the children are found to be Indian children, a new hearing must be held; otherwise, the original orders will be reinstated. View "In re Claudia R." on Justia Law

A federally recognized Indian tribe purchased a parcel of nonreservation land in Washington State using state and federal conservation grant funds, with the purpose of protecting salmon habitat and preserving tribal treaty fishing rights. The land was designated for conservation and was not part of any reservation. A neighboring landowner, a Washington corporation, claimed that it and its predecessors had acquired title to a strip of this land through adverse possession, based on decades of exclusive use and maintenance of a boundary fence. The corporation filed a quiet title action in Snohomish County Superior Court against both the tribe and the county, seeking to establish its ownership of the disputed strip.The Snohomish County Superior Court dismissed the action with prejudice, finding that the tribe was protected by sovereign immunity and could not be sued without its consent or an act of Congress. The corporation sought direct review by the Washington Supreme Court, which transferred the case to the Washington Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that tribal sovereign immunity is not subject to a common law immovable property exception unless Congress or the tribe itself clearly waives immunity. The court also noted that prior Washington cases allowing in rem jurisdiction over tribally owned nonreservation land were no longer good law in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, 584 U.S. 554 (2018).The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and held that state courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over adverse possession claims involving nonreservation land owned by tribes, unless there is a clear waiver of immunity by the tribe or Congress. The court further held that the common law immovable property exception does not apply to tribal sovereign immunity. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Flying T Ranch, Inc. v. Stillaguamish Tribe of Indians" on Justia Law

John Doe, a Native American juvenile and member of the Eastern Shoshone Tribe, was charged in federal court with multiple offenses, including kidnapping a minor on tribal land for the purpose of physical assault. The government filed a six-count juvenile information, and Doe admitted to certain charges, including kidnapping, assault with a dangerous weapon, and provided a factual basis for his admissions. The events occurred in a trailer on the Wind River Indian Reservation, where Doe assaulted two minor victims and instructed one to remain in a closet as he left the scene.The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming held an admission hearing, where Doe, with counsel, admitted to the relevant charges. The court found a sufficient factual basis and conditionally accepted the admissions. After a delinquency hearing, Doe was adjudicated delinquent on several counts and committed to detention and supervision. Following the district court’s judgment, the Tenth Circuit decided United States v. Murphy, which clarified that the “holds” element of federal kidnapping requires proof the victim was detained for an appreciable period beyond that necessary to commit any related offense. Doe appealed, arguing his admission was not knowing or voluntary because he was not informed of this temporal requirement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case under the plain error standard. The court held that Murphy did not clearly establish the temporal requirement as an essential element of kidnapping, nor did Doe demonstrate that the district court’s failure to inform him of this requirement was a plain error under well-settled law. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment of delinquency. View "United States v. Doe" on Justia Law

A dispute arose over the State of Hawai‘i Board of Land and Natural Resources’ (the Board) annual continuation of a revocable water permit issued to Kaua‘i Island Utility Cooperative (KIUC) for the diversion of water from state lands to power hydropower plants. The permit, first issued in 2003, was renewed yearly through 2022. In 2019, the diversion infrastructure was severely damaged, and KIUC ceased using the water for hydropower but continued to maintain the system. Petitioners, two organizations with members asserting native Hawaiian traditional and customary rights, requested contested case hearings in 2020 and 2021, arguing that the continued diversion and disrepair of the system harmed their rights and the environment. The Board denied these requests and continued the permit.Petitioners appealed to the Circuit Court of the First Circuit (Environmental Court), challenging the denial of contested case hearings, the permit’s continuation, and alleging violations of the Board’s public trust duties. While the appeal was pending, the permit expired at the end of 2022. The Environmental Court found that Petitioners had protected property interests under the Hawai‘i Constitution, that their due process rights were violated by the denial of contested case hearings, and that the Board’s failure to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law prevented meaningful review. The court vacated and reversed the Board’s 2021 and 2022 permit continuations.The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) vacated the Environmental Court’s decision, holding that Petitioners had standing under the right to a clean and healthful environment, but that the case was moot and no exceptions applied. The ICA also found no due process violation and concluded the Environmental Court exceeded its jurisdiction in reviewing the merits of the permit continuations.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i held that exceptions to mootness applied, Petitioners had standing based on injury to traditional and customary rights, and that contested case hearings were required to protect their due process rights. The court vacated the ICA’s judgment and remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings. View "Kia'i Wai o Wai'ale'ale v. Board of Land and Natural Resources" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was charged with abusive sexual contact of a minor in Indian Country, based on conduct that occurred between 1998 and 2000, when the victim was approximately 15 or 16 years old. The victim reported the abuse to the FBI in 2021, stating that she had previously disclosed it to a therapist at a rape crisis center, but no action was taken at that time. The alleged abuse took place within the Navajo Nation, and the defendant did not contest his status as an enrolled member of the Navajo Nation or the location of the offense.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the superseding indictment, which argued that the prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations. The district court found that the extended statute of limitations for sexual offenses against children under 18, as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3283, applied to the case. The defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea to a lesser offense—abusive sexual contact in Indian Country—reserving his right to appeal the statute of limitations issue.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed de novo whether the categorical approach or a case-specific analysis should be used to determine the applicability of § 3283’s extended statute of limitations. The court held that the categorical approach, typically used in sentencing and immigration contexts, does not apply to pretrial statute of limitations challenges under § 3283. Instead, a case-specific approach is appropriate, focusing on the facts and charges in the indictment. The court concluded that the offense charged involved the sexual abuse of a minor, so § 3283’s extended limitations period applied. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. View "United States v. Tso" on Justia Law

After the birth of a child who qualified as an Indian child under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) in Alaska took emergency custody due to the mother’s substance use during pregnancy. Initially, no relatives were available for placement, so the child was placed with a non-relative foster parent. Nearly two and a half years later, the mother requested that the child be placed with his great-grandmother. OCS denied this request, citing unsafe conditions in the great-grandmother’s home, including excessive clutter that posed safety risks. The great-grandmother made some improvements but did not sufficiently address the concerns. OCS also expressed doubts about her judgment and ability to protect the child, referencing past incidents involving other family members.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Fourth Judicial District, held a placement review hearing after the great-grandmother requested judicial review of OCS’s denial. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that OCS did not abuse its discretion in denying the placement, determining that the great-grandmother’s home remained unsuitable and that her past actions raised concerns about her ability to prioritize the child’s needs. The court also concluded that OCS was not required to provide the great-grandmother with reasonable efforts to make her home suitable, as she was not the child’s parent or guardian.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska considered whether ICWA required OCS to demonstrate “active efforts” to assist the great-grandmother in overcoming obstacles to placement. The court held that ICWA’s active efforts requirement applies to preserving or reunifying the family unit with a parent or Indian custodian, not to extended family members seeking placement. Therefore, OCS was not required to provide active efforts to the great-grandmother in this context. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision upholding OCS’s denial of placement. View "Betsy F. v. State" on Justia Law

Two children, S and P, who are members of the Pit River Tribe, were the subject of juvenile dependency proceedings in Oregon. The Department of Human Services (DHS) initially pursued reunification with their mother as the permanency plan. However, after DHS determined that reunification was no longer safe or feasible, it petitioned to change the plan to tribal customary adoption (TCA), a process recognized under the Oregon Indian Child Welfare Act (ORICWA) that allows for adoption through tribal custom without terminating parental rights. The juvenile court held a contested permanency hearing, received evidence from DHS, the tribe, and a qualified tribal expert, and ultimately found by clear and convincing evidence that TCA was an appropriate permanent placement and in the children’s best interests. The court then requested the tribe to submit a formal order or judgment evidencing completion of the TCA.After the tribe submitted its TCA resolution, the juvenile court scheduled a hearing to consider whether to accept the tribe’s documentation. At this hearing, the mother objected, arguing that she was entitled to a contested evidentiary hearing to challenge the TCA and that the court was required to make an independent best-interests determination. The juvenile court accepted the tribe’s resolution, entered judgment for TCA, and terminated its jurisdiction over the children. The mother appealed, raising procedural and substantive challenges to the process.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed whether the juvenile court was required to hold a contested evidentiary hearing before accepting the tribe’s TCA order or judgment. The court held that neither ORICWA nor the TCA statute requires a juvenile court to conduct a contested evidentiary hearing after a tribe submits its completed TCA documentation. The court found that the required determinations—including whether TCA is an appropriate permanent placement and is in the child’s best interests—are made at the permanency hearing, and the TCA hearing is not intended to relitigate those issues. The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court. View "Dept. of Human Services v. M. G. J." on Justia Law